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{
    "localId": "193224209",
    "label": "Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Prime Minister of Italy Alcide de Gasperi, Ambassador of Italy Alberto Tarchiani, United States Ambassador to Italy James Dunn, George Perkins, and Homer Byington",
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    "id": "193224209",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Prime Minister of Italy Alcide de Gasperi, Ambassador of Italy Alberto Tarchiani, United States Ambassador to Italy James Dunn, George Perkins, and Homer Byington",
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        "Dean Acheson Papers",
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            "month": 9,
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "-5-\nIf the Italian and Yugoslav Government could say that their people will not\nbe placed under the rule of the other nation it would provide the only\npossible basis for general public acceptance in both countries. Ho recog\nnized that it was hard to know where the demarcation line should be placed\nand that there was a difficult problem of how to begin negotiations. He\nsaid that preliminary and secret conversations with Yugoslavia would be\nessential. He said that it would be impossible to achieve success unless\nthe negotiations began without preconceived conditions. He said he\nhad been stressing with the British that they must help persuade the\nYugoslavs to negotiate. Ambassador Dunn, when asked by the Secretary for\nhis view, said that he agreed with the Secretary that the only hope and\npossibility for a solution would rest on the willingness of both sides to\nconsult on the principle of an ethnic line. The Prime Minister then pointed\nout that the Yugoslavs would unquestionably speak about Slav minorities\nclsewhere in Italy than in Zone B. He pointed out that Italy has already\nlost under the Treaty some 180,000 Italians in the Istrian Peninsularo\nAlready suffering from this previous loss, the Italian people would hardly\nbe in the mood to receive such claims. Therefore, unless the digcussions\nwere limited at the outset it could only lead to failure which would make\nthe general situation worse, rather than better. The March 20 Declaration\ntherefore must be a point of departure in the conversations.\nIt was essential that the conversations should be within that framework\nand must begin with discussions on Zone B. He recognized that in order to\nmake a solution acceptable for Yugoslavia there might have to be concessions\nin Zone A and he would be willing to do this as he had indicated, always\nwithin the very strict limits of his possibilities. The Secretary pointed\nout that he had emphasized to the Yugoslavs that their wish to begin nego\ntiations from a rigid position was impossible and likewise he felt that an\nentry into discussion stipulated on the March 20 Declaration as a point of\ndeparture was not possible.\nMro Perkins pointed out that Yugoslavia also had a public opinion and\nin their present difficult situation it was most important for the Yugoslav\nGovernment to keep their hold on their people. Count Zoppi inquired whether\nthe lhited States would not help in bringing the two governments together\nand Mr. Perkins agreed that it might be possible to call in Ambassador Popovic\nagain and urge the Yugoslavs to facilitate a start. The Prime Minister\ninsisted that first of all we must prepare a new atmosphere which would not\ninvolve in the beginning of any negotiations reference to Zone A. He rom\niterated that even now all the lawyers in Italy were protesting about the\nissue of\nSECRET\nARCHIVES s. KECORDS NATIONAL ANO\ns\nSERVICE\""
}