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s. CHATIONAL AND SECURITY INFORMATION = -2- nationalists represent a minority but that it is always the minority that is heard. We hear nothing, he concluded, from the majority of the people in North Africa who are satisfied. He concluded with a reference to the strategic im- portance of North Africa not only to Europe but to South America, and expressed the hope that this whole problem could be examined in detail with us, in order that a satisfactory evolutionary program could be worked out. Passing to the Pinay Program for saving the franc, M. Reynaud gave as his entirely personal viewpoint the thought that it was not certain this could succeed. He said he could not say this publicly because he would not want to hurt the chances for success of his friend Pinay, but concluded that the French position was somewhat weak because the level of both imports and exports was low at present. He reverted to the Indochina situation again as the source of the main budgetary woes of France. In conclusion on this point he stressed that every effort would, however, be made to make Pinay's program work, since if it failed the consequences were hard to envisage. The Secretary inquired as to the present French thinking on the European Defense Force. M. Reynaud said that the British failure to participate in the EDF had had serious consequences in France because it meant that the European Army would be basically French and German, and that French troops must neces- sarily be outnumbered soon so long as such large forces were tied down in Indo- china. British participation was, therefore, thought of primary importance. He added that he still favored the EDC in accordance with the speeches he had given at Strasbourg, but was not overly optimistic of its chances of being ratified. He noted that during the February debate on the principle of the European Army, a favorable vote was gained by a narrow margin but only when important amendments had been inserted by the Socialists. He said the Socialist position remained critical because the Communists and Gaullists were opposed. The Secretary asked if the latter unanimously opposed, and M. Reynaud replied he thought they were but was not categoric on this point. Here, M. Reynaud inserted that General De Gaulle was continuing to act as a military leader and not as a statesman. He said when President Auriol asked him to form a government following the fall of the Faure Government, he had sought Gaullist participation therein in order to neutralize this very policy of opposition which they had followed in regard to the Schuman Plan and the European Army. The question of the signature of the EDC and the contractual agreements with Germany was raised. The Secretary made it clear why we were anxious to have these events occur as soon as possible, and outlined the Congressional timetable. Ambassador Bonnet stated he was already aware of this problem. M. Reynaud said that Foreign Minister Schuman has indicated we wanted signa- ture by May 10, but that was impossible. The hope was expressed that a later date in May would be possible, and the Secretary pointed out that if action were deferred until next month, it would not seem possible to obtain Congres- sional action thereon until the next session. DECLASSIFIED Ex O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (II) UR:NE:RHMcBride:y Dept. of State letter, 5-62-24 1973 DONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION Ba NLT HC 1 NARS Date 7-1676

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Page context
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    "ocrText": "s.\nCHATIONAL\nAND\nSECURITY INFORMATION\n=\n-2-\nnationalists represent a minority but that it is always the minority that is\nheard. We hear nothing, he concluded, from the majority of the people in North\nAfrica who are satisfied. He concluded with a reference to the strategic im-\nportance of North Africa not only to Europe but to South America, and expressed\nthe hope that this whole problem could be examined in detail with us, in order\nthat a satisfactory evolutionary program could be worked out.\nPassing to the Pinay Program for saving the franc, M. Reynaud gave as his\nentirely personal viewpoint the thought that it was not certain this could\nsucceed. He said he could not say this publicly because he would not want to\nhurt the chances for success of his friend Pinay, but concluded that the French\nposition was somewhat weak because the level of both imports and exports was\nlow at present. He reverted to the Indochina situation again as the source of\nthe main budgetary woes of France. In conclusion on this point he stressed\nthat every effort would, however, be made to make Pinay's program work, since\nif it failed the consequences were hard to envisage.\nThe Secretary inquired as to the present French thinking on the European\nDefense Force. M. Reynaud said that the British failure to participate in the\nEDF had had serious consequences in France because it meant that the European\nArmy would be basically French and German, and that French troops must neces-\nsarily be outnumbered soon so long as such large forces were tied down in Indo-\nchina. British participation was, therefore, thought of primary importance.\nHe added that he still favored the EDC in accordance with the speeches he had\ngiven at Strasbourg, but was not overly optimistic of its chances of being\nratified. He noted that during the February debate on the principle of the\nEuropean Army, a favorable vote was gained by a narrow margin but only when\nimportant amendments had been inserted by the Socialists. He said the Socialist\nposition remained critical because the Communists and Gaullists were opposed.\nThe Secretary asked if the latter unanimously opposed, and M. Reynaud replied\nhe thought they were but was not categoric on this point.\nHere, M. Reynaud inserted that General De Gaulle was continuing to act as\na military leader and not as a statesman. He said when President Auriol asked\nhim to form a government following the fall of the Faure Government, he had\nsought Gaullist participation therein in order to neutralize this very policy\nof opposition which they had followed in regard to the Schuman Plan and the\nEuropean Army.\nThe question of the signature of the EDC and the contractual agreements\nwith Germany was raised. The Secretary made it clear why we were anxious to\nhave these events occur as soon as possible, and outlined the Congressional\ntimetable. Ambassador Bonnet stated he was already aware of this problem.\nM. Reynaud said that Foreign Minister Schuman has indicated we wanted signa-\nture by May 10, but that was impossible. The hope was expressed that a later\ndate in May would be possible, and the Secretary pointed out that if action\nwere deferred until next month, it would not seem possible to obtain Congres-\nsional action thereon until the next session.\nDECLASSIFIED\nEx O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (II)\nUR:NE:RHMcBride:y\nDept. of State letter, 5-62-24 1973\nDONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION\nBa NLT HC 1 NARS Date 7-1676"
}