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section of the Comeil, and it was the desiro of Australia at least that the
Council should be the mechaniem through which that country could keep in
touch with NATO planningo
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff took strong exception to some of the
terms of the Canberra draft, and Dulles, in an effort to meet their objections,
negotiated revisions in the draft so that the final ANZUS Treaty omitted all
reference to subsidiary bodies of the Comeil and to coordinated planning
and referred merely to a *consultative relationship* with States or groups of
States "in the Pacific area". At the conclusion of the negotiation of these
revisions Dulles noted that what was left was a purely political organ, but
this viow of the effect of the revisions now appears not to have boen shared
by Australia and New Zealand. In the course of negotiations Australia
indicated that there would be no difficulty in reaching agreement "on matters
that do not affect the basic substance of the treaty" and 1t is possible
that in the Australian viow a military function for the Council was a part
of the Treaty's' basic substance" not to be affected by verbal changes.
The ANZUS Treaty was finally signed as one in a series of security
agreements which were related in a broad sense although not tied together
by their terms. The other instruments in this serios were the Philippine-
American security treaty, the Japanese-America: security treaty, and the
Japanese peace treaty. It was clearly understood that Australian and
New Zealand concurrence in a Japenese peace treaty which would permit the
rearmament of, Japan was conditioned on the conclusion of the ANZUS security
pact, and that the American desire for wider security arrangements in the
Pacific found expression in the bilateral treaties with Japan and the
Philippines which were concluded at the same time. The ANZUS Treaty retained
from the Canberrá draft the specific reference to a future "development of a
more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area". and it
was referred to by the Australian Ambassador at the time of signature as
the "first step towards what we hope will prove to be an ever widening
system of peaceful security in the vital area" of the Pacific.
II. United States Policy toward a Pacific Pact before the Dulles Mission
The decision of the United States Government in January 1951 to explore
the possibilities of concluding a six-power mutual security arrangement in
the Pacific area had received its initial impetus four months beforo in
conversations held in this country by officials of the Department of State
with Australian Minister for External Affairs Percy C. Spender. These
conversations in turn ware based on Spender's public advocacy in March 1950
of a defensive military arrangement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and
other countries, and including eventually the United States.1
Because
1
From Canberra, tels. 46 and 71, Feb. 22 and Mar. 10, 1950.
Decurity Inform tion
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"ocrText": "-2-\nsection of the Comeil, and it was the desiro of Australia at least that the\nCouncil should be the mechaniem through which that country could keep in\ntouch with NATO planningo\nThe American Joint Chiefs of Staff took strong exception to some of the\nterms of the Canberra draft, and Dulles, in an effort to meet their objections,\nnegotiated revisions in the draft so that the final ANZUS Treaty omitted all\nreference to subsidiary bodies of the Comeil and to coordinated planning\nand referred merely to a *consultative relationship* with States or groups of\nStates \"in the Pacific area\". At the conclusion of the negotiation of these\nrevisions Dulles noted that what was left was a purely political organ, but\nthis viow of the effect of the revisions now appears not to have boen shared\nby Australia and New Zealand. In the course of negotiations Australia\nindicated that there would be no difficulty in reaching agreement \"on matters\nthat do not affect the basic substance of the treaty\" and 1t is possible\nthat in the Australian viow a military function for the Council was a part\nof the Treaty's' basic substance\" not to be affected by verbal changes.\nThe ANZUS Treaty was finally signed as one in a series of security\nagreements which were related in a broad sense although not tied together\nby their terms. The other instruments in this serios were the Philippine-\nAmerican security treaty, the Japanese-America: security treaty, and the\nJapanese peace treaty. It was clearly understood that Australian and\nNew Zealand concurrence in a Japenese peace treaty which would permit the\nrearmament of, Japan was conditioned on the conclusion of the ANZUS security\npact, and that the American desire for wider security arrangements in the\nPacific found expression in the bilateral treaties with Japan and the\nPhilippines which were concluded at the same time. The ANZUS Treaty retained\nfrom the Canberrá draft the specific reference to a future \"development of a\nmore comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area\". and it\nwas referred to by the Australian Ambassador at the time of signature as\nthe \"first step towards what we hope will prove to be an ever widening\nsystem of peaceful security in the vital area\" of the Pacific.\nII. United States Policy toward a Pacific Pact before the Dulles Mission\nThe decision of the United States Government in January 1951 to explore\nthe possibilities of concluding a six-power mutual security arrangement in\nthe Pacific area had received its initial impetus four months beforo in\nconversations held in this country by officials of the Department of State\nwith Australian Minister for External Affairs Percy C. Spender. These\nconversations in turn ware based on Spender's public advocacy in March 1950\nof a defensive military arrangement among Australia, the United Kingdom, and\nother countries, and including eventually the United States.1\nBecause\n1\nFrom Canberra, tels. 46 and 71, Feb. 22 and Mar. 10, 1950.\nDecurity Inform tion"
}