Letter from George Graham to Dean Acheson

5. From Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East, p. 332-333 us SERVICE* From the Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur on January 9. (The substance of the message follows hereunder: ) This replies to your recommendations: Careful consideration still being given to measures of retaliation you suggested. Contribution to general situation resulting from drawing of Chinese Communists into Korea is fully appreciated. The following points must be accepted on the basis df consideration of the over-all situation: (a) Strengthening of our effort in Korea does not appear justified on the basis of any change in policy or other eventuality outside of Korea. (b) United Nations coneurrence would be necessary and, in particular, negotiations with the British would be required on the question of blockade. Hong Kong position and extent of Chinese Communist trade with British would be involved. Evacuation from Korea by our forces or stabilization of our position in Korea, would be required before naval blockade of China coast could be undertaken. (c) Decision of attack objectives in Com- munist China with naval and air forces must await attack outside of Korea on UN forces by Chinese Communists since only in that eventuality could authorization be obtained. (d) In view of probable greater usefulness elsewhere and unlikeliness of effect on Korea outcome which would be decisive, use in Korea of Chinese Nationalists from Formosa not favored. (e) In event stablization in Korea not feasible, security of Japan must be served by portion of the forces which may be evacuated from Korea. If stabilization in Korea without commitment of additional forces can be accomplished, deployment of two National Guard divisions partly trained may be expected. (f) Intensification of economic blockade of Chinese trade being pressed.