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(Synopsis A, page 2)
and within a short enough time to receive the Japanese surrender any
farther north. General Order No. 1 was then approved by the President
and issued by General MacArthur on September 2, 1945.
Had this di vision not been made, Soviet forces could have occupied
TRUMAN
the entire peninsula before the United States troops could have
reached Korea. The establishment of the line at the 38th parallel
S ARCHIVES "NATIONAL SERVICE" RECORDS AND
held free for the people of Korea the southern half of the country
with two-thirds of its population, saving them from Communist
domination.
It was never intended that the line established as a surrender con-
venience should give rise to a long-term division and occupation of
Korea. This latter was a development which resulted from the per-
sistent refusal of the U.S.S.R. to agree to the establishment of a
unified and independent Korea upon any basis other than that of
complete Communist domination of the entire state.
United States
From the time American military forces entered Korea in September
Efforts to
1945, it was the intention of the United States Government that,
Unify Korea
after disarmament of the Japanese troops in Korea and repatriation
of the Japanese military and civil personnel, there would take place
an orderly transfer of the functions of government to the Korean
people. This transfer would permit withdrawal of both United States
and Soviet military forces and the establishment by the people of
Korea of a united and independent government of their own choosing.
During the fall of 1945 the United States Commander in Korea, in an
effort to achieve these purposes, began negotiations with the Soviet
Commander to eliminate the artificial boundary of the 38th parallel
and to achieve a degree of cooperation in bringing about unity in the
economy and administration of the country. When these efforts proved
unavailing the United States took up the problem of Korea at the
Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1945.
The Moscow Agreement gave some hope that a formula had been found
under which the unification of Korea could be accomplished.
However, after nearly two years of discussion, during which the
United States sought in vain to reach an understanding under the
terms of the agreement, it was clear that further discussion with
the U.S.S.R. would be fruitless. The United States therefore re-
considered what action should be taken.
Review of
In this reconsideration it was of primary importance to determine
United States
the strategic interest of the United States in maintaining American
Policy
forces in Korea. It was the judgment of the responsible military
authorities that from the point of view of its own military security
the United States had little strategic interest in maintaining troops
in Korea; moreover, existing shortages of military manpower in many
areas of American responsibility throughout the world made it
essential that all available manpower be utilized in accordance with
the relative military priorities of such areas.
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"ocrText": "(Synopsis A, page 2)\nand within a short enough time to receive the Japanese surrender any\nfarther north. General Order No. 1 was then approved by the President\nand issued by General MacArthur on September 2, 1945.\nHad this di vision not been made, Soviet forces could have occupied\nTRUMAN\nthe entire peninsula before the United States troops could have\nreached Korea. The establishment of the line at the 38th parallel\nS ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL SERVICE\" RECORDS AND\nheld free for the people of Korea the southern half of the country\nwith two-thirds of its population, saving them from Communist\ndomination.\nIt was never intended that the line established as a surrender con-\nvenience should give rise to a long-term division and occupation of\nKorea. This latter was a development which resulted from the per-\nsistent refusal of the U.S.S.R. to agree to the establishment of a\nunified and independent Korea upon any basis other than that of\ncomplete Communist domination of the entire state.\nUnited States\nFrom the time American military forces entered Korea in September\nEfforts to\n1945, it was the intention of the United States Government that,\nUnify Korea\nafter disarmament of the Japanese troops in Korea and repatriation\nof the Japanese military and civil personnel, there would take place\nan orderly transfer of the functions of government to the Korean\npeople. This transfer would permit withdrawal of both United States\nand Soviet military forces and the establishment by the people of\nKorea of a united and independent government of their own choosing.\nDuring the fall of 1945 the United States Commander in Korea, in an\neffort to achieve these purposes, began negotiations with the Soviet\nCommander to eliminate the artificial boundary of the 38th parallel\nand to achieve a degree of cooperation in bringing about unity in the\neconomy and administration of the country. When these efforts proved\nunavailing the United States took up the problem of Korea at the\nMoscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1945.\nThe Moscow Agreement gave some hope that a formula had been found\nunder which the unification of Korea could be accomplished.\nHowever, after nearly two years of discussion, during which the\nUnited States sought in vain to reach an understanding under the\nterms of the agreement, it was clear that further discussion with\nthe U.S.S.R. would be fruitless. The United States therefore re-\nconsidered what action should be taken.\nReview of\nIn this reconsideration it was of primary importance to determine\nUnited States\nthe strategic interest of the United States in maintaining American\nPolicy\nforces in Korea. It was the judgment of the responsible military\nauthorities that from the point of view of its own military security\nthe United States had little strategic interest in maintaining troops\nin Korea; moreover, existing shortages of military manpower in many\nareas of American responsibility throughout the world made it\nessential that all available manpower be utilized in accordance with\nthe relative military priorities of such areas."
}