Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "75848921",
    "label": "Synopsis B, Korea - The Outbreak of War, June-July 1950",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848921"
}

{
    "id": "75848921",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848921",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Synopsis B, Korea - The Outbreak of War, June-July 1950",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848921",
    "collections": [
        "Dean Acheson Papers",
        "Princeton Seminars Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-03-01.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-03-01.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-03-01.jpg",
    "imageCount": 16,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75848921",
    "naId": 75848921,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "logicalDate": "1953-01-01",
            "year": 1953
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722151-03-01.jpg",
    "mediaId": "92123a6d66eab4a9",
    "ocrText": "KOREA - Synopsis B: The Outbreak of War, June-July 1950\n(Page 1)\nGuerrilla\nKorean Army authorities announced on April 1 that an estimated 700\nactivities\nguerrillas from North Korea had crossed the border into South Korea\nearly in the week. Efforts were made to prevent them from joining\nremnants of guerrilla bands, and the army announced in mid-April that\nTRUMAN\nit had succeeded in destroying all but 150 of the 700. US observers\non the 15th confirmed the reports that the guerrillas had suffered\nARCHIVES AND\n\"NATIONAL KECORDS\nheavy losses as the result of the prompt action of the Korean Army.\nis\nSERVICE\"\nDulles visit\nOn June 17th Dulles arrived in Seoul for a three-day visit with\nSouth Korean and US officials. In an address on the 19th before\nthe opening session of the newly-elected National Assembly, Dulles\nsaid in part: \"As you establish here a wholesome society of steadily\nexpanding well-being, you will set up peaceful influences which will\ndisintegrate the hold of Soviet Communism on your fellows to the\nnorth and irresistably draw them into unity with you. Never for a\nminute do we concede that Soviet Communists will hold permanently\ntheir unwilling captives. No iron curtain can indefinitely block\noff the attracting force of what you do, if you persist in the way\nyou have been going The American people give you their support,\nboth moral and material, consistent with your own self-respect and\nyour primary dependence on your own efforts.'\nDGA analyzes the On several occasions during the MacArthur hearings DGA answered\npre-invasion\nquestions relative to how the Korean situation was viewed prior to\nsituation\nthe North Korean invasion. Byrd asked (p. 2013) : \"Did that give\nany concern to you and others who were watching the Korean situation\nknowing it was a fallacy and might blow up anytime, the fact that\nthe South Koreans were so feebly armed as compared to the North\nKoreans? DGA replied: \"We understood that this was a dangerous\nsituation, and trusted in the fact that the invasion would not take\nplace until the South Koreans were able to handle themselves better.\nOf course, there was a great deal of thought and concern which was\nengendered by it.\"\nOn pp.1990-2, in answer to a question by Bridges, DGA analyzed the\nintelligence received on North Korean-Soviet intentions and how this\nwas evaluated:\n\"Intelligence was available to the Department prior to the 25th of\nJune, made available by the Far Eastern Command, the CIA, the\nDepartment of the Army, and by the State Deparrtment representatives\nhere and overseas, and shows that all these agencies were in\nagreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic\nexisted at that time, but they were all in agreement that its\nlaunching in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent.\n\"The view was generally held that since the Communists had far from\nexhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through\nguerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimi-\ndation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than\novert military aggression. It was fully realized that the timing\nof any move in Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin. Now, the"
}