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(Synopsis B, page 10)
"3. The Security Council of the UN acted in support of the
TRUMAN
Republic of Korea only after it was satistied that this was a case
of utterly unprovoked aggression.
"NATIONAL
ARCHIVES AND
"4. Any contention that hostilities were started by the Republic
RECURDS
SERVICE"
of Korea is clearly in the category of the Nazi claims of 1939 that
E.
Poland started hostilities by attacking Nazi Germany. "
Chinese
On July 2 the State Department announced that the Chinese National
Nationalist
Government had informed the US, in an aide-memoire on June 29 and 30,
offer of troops of the willingness of the Chinese government to send 33,000 troops
to South Korea. It was said that the troops, which would be ready
for embarkation in five days, would carry the "best equipment at
China's disposal. 11 The Chinese government asked to be "apprised of
the opinion of the US government at its earliest convenience.
11
DGA replies
It was also announced that on July lst DGA had expressed the "deep
appreciation of the US Government for this prompt and substantial
demonstration of support for the UN on the part of the Government
of the Republic of China. " DGA said that "in light, however, of
the threat of invasion of Taiwan by Communist forces from the main-
land, a threat repeated in the last day or so by spokesmen for the
Chinese Communist regime in Peiping, it is the view of the Government
of the US that it would be desirable for representatives of
General MacArthur's Headquarters to hold discussions with the
Chinese military authorities on Taiwan concerning the plans for the
defense of the island against invasion prior to any final decision
on the widdon of reducing the defense forces on Taiwan by transfer
of troops to Korea. It was emphasized that this reply represented
the viewpoint of the US "without assuming in any way to speak for
the UN. "
DGA elaborated on this decision during the MacArthur hearings (p.1763).
Saltonstall asked, "Did the State Department have any part in making
the decision that Chinese Nationalist troops should not be used in
Korea?" DGA replied: "Yes, sir; we recommended against it. .We
took
that action for two reasons. The first reason had to do with the
defense of Formosa. We are committed to see that that island does
not fall into hostile hands and to use military force to bring about
that result. We cannot, therefore, believe that it is wise in any
way to weaken or diminish the forces on Formosa. It is not
altogether an easy operation to assure that Formosa will not fall
merely by use of the fleet. It is altogether possible that despite
the efforts of the fleet landings can be made. Those might have
very serious results on Formosa. To remove troops to fight in Korea
would mean removing the best troops and the best armed troops; other-
wise they would be no good in Korea; and we think it would be a very
disadvantageous thing for the US to do. The second reason that we
objected to it is that it raises very serious complications with
other nations who are fighting in Korea and who do not recognize the
Nationalist Government, and believe that that would increase the
opposition to them of the Chinese Communists. 11
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"ocrText": "(Synopsis B, page 10)\n\"3. The Security Council of the UN acted in support of the\nTRUMAN\nRepublic of Korea only after it was satistied that this was a case\nof utterly unprovoked aggression.\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\n\"4. Any contention that hostilities were started by the Republic\nRECURDS\nSERVICE\"\nof Korea is clearly in the category of the Nazi claims of 1939 that\nE.\nPoland started hostilities by attacking Nazi Germany. \"\nChinese\nOn July 2 the State Department announced that the Chinese National\nNationalist\nGovernment had informed the US, in an aide-memoire on June 29 and 30,\noffer of troops of the willingness of the Chinese government to send 33,000 troops\nto South Korea. It was said that the troops, which would be ready\nfor embarkation in five days, would carry the \"best equipment at\nChina's disposal. 11 The Chinese government asked to be \"apprised of\nthe opinion of the US government at its earliest convenience.\n11\nDGA replies\nIt was also announced that on July lst DGA had expressed the \"deep\nappreciation of the US Government for this prompt and substantial\ndemonstration of support for the UN on the part of the Government\nof the Republic of China. \" DGA said that \"in light, however, of\nthe threat of invasion of Taiwan by Communist forces from the main-\nland, a threat repeated in the last day or so by spokesmen for the\nChinese Communist regime in Peiping, it is the view of the Government\nof the US that it would be desirable for representatives of\nGeneral MacArthur's Headquarters to hold discussions with the\nChinese military authorities on Taiwan concerning the plans for the\ndefense of the island against invasion prior to any final decision\non the widdon of reducing the defense forces on Taiwan by transfer\nof troops to Korea. It was emphasized that this reply represented\nthe viewpoint of the US \"without assuming in any way to speak for\nthe UN. \"\nDGA elaborated on this decision during the MacArthur hearings (p.1763).\nSaltonstall asked, \"Did the State Department have any part in making\nthe decision that Chinese Nationalist troops should not be used in\nKorea?\" DGA replied: \"Yes, sir; we recommended against it. .We\ntook\nthat action for two reasons. The first reason had to do with the\ndefense of Formosa. We are committed to see that that island does\nnot fall into hostile hands and to use military force to bring about\nthat result. We cannot, therefore, believe that it is wise in any\nway to weaken or diminish the forces on Formosa. It is not\naltogether an easy operation to assure that Formosa will not fall\nmerely by use of the fleet. It is altogether possible that despite\nthe efforts of the fleet landings can be made. Those might have\nvery serious results on Formosa. To remove troops to fight in Korea\nwould mean removing the best troops and the best armed troops; other-\nwise they would be no good in Korea; and we think it would be a very\ndisadvantageous thing for the US to do. The second reason that we\nobjected to it is that it raises very serious complications with\nother nations who are fighting in Korea and who do not recognize the\nNationalist Government, and believe that that would increase the\nopposition to them of the Chinese Communists. 11"
}