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(Synopsis B, page 12) The next day, July 8th, HST designated MacArthur as commanding general of the UN forces. On the 13th the State Department announced that a committee had been established to receive, screen, and forward to the UN offers of assistance to the UN unified command. On the 14th Lie announced that he had sent letters to the 52 UN members that had given what he interpreted to be favorable replies to the Security Council resolution of June 27, asking them to consider supplying ground troops for use in Korea. On the 21st Lie reported that replies to his appeal for increased assistance to South Korea had been received from 11 nations: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, TRUMAN Denmark, France, Greece, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, and Swerden. INATIONAL The replies contained offers of various types of aid, with only Bolivia ARCHIVES AND NECORDS making a formal pledge to supply ground troops, a token force of 30 SERVICE" No regular army officers. Lie said that several other governments were "in contact with Washington. On August 7th Lie reported at a press conference that "ww have now received replies from 41 member countries to my telegram of July 14. .Most have offered concrete assistance. The UK, Australia, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Thailand, South Africa and New Zealand have made definite offers of combat land, sea and air forces. Some of these forces are already engaged in action. Many of these offers are substantial. In addition, a number of governments are in consultation now with the unified command about supplying further military assistance." First Report on The Security Council met again on July 25th to hear the first report Action under by the US on the course of action taken under the unified command in Unified Command accordance with the July 7th resolution of the Council. The report, presented by Austin, said, in part: "Upon the request by the Security Council of the UN for assistance to defend the ROK against the North Korean aggressors, the only forces in the area immediately available were those US and British Commonwealth occupation forces under the command of Gen. MacArthur in the occupation of the Japanese Islands. The size and nature of these forces were sufficient only to perform the occupation duties in Japan. "Before committing the forces, in response to the Security Council resolutions, they had to be regrouped and re-equipped from standards for peacetime occupation of Japan- to standards suitable for combat in Korea. This also involved moving these troops, with their equipment and supplies, from their various occupation stations in Japan, by combinations of motor, rail, water and air transportation, to Korea. Even so, all the materials for sustained combat were not immediately available to General MacArthur and therefore had to be rushed to Korea from the US The well-planned attack by the North Korean regime, the size of their force, their logistical support and their ability to continue to press the attack, account for the degree of initiative enjoyed by the aggressor. The defenders of the ROK have been forced to submit to the time and place selected by the aggressor, and now must depend upon assistance from nations peacefully disposed and lying not merely hundreds, but thousands of miles away. "From the continuing appearance on the battlefield of large numbers of enemy personnel and equipment, it is now apparent that the North Korean aggressors have available to them resources far in excess of

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    "ocrText": "(Synopsis B, page 12)\nThe next day, July 8th, HST designated MacArthur as commanding general\nof the UN forces.\nOn the 13th the State Department announced that a committee had been\nestablished to receive, screen, and forward to the UN offers of\nassistance to the UN unified command.\nOn the 14th Lie announced that he had sent letters to the 52 UN members\nthat had given what he interpreted to be favorable replies to the\nSecurity Council resolution of June 27, asking them to consider\nsupplying ground troops for use in Korea. On the 21st Lie reported\nthat replies to his appeal for increased assistance to South Korea\nhad been received from 11 nations: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,\nTRUMAN\nDenmark, France, Greece, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, and Swerden.\nINATIONAL\nThe replies contained offers of various types of aid, with only Bolivia\nARCHIVES AND\nNECORDS\nmaking a formal pledge to supply ground troops, a token force of 30\nSERVICE\"\nNo\nregular army officers. Lie said that several other governments were\n\"in contact with Washington. On August 7th Lie reported at a press\nconference that \"ww have now received replies from 41 member countries\nto my telegram of July 14. .Most have offered concrete assistance. The\nUK, Australia, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Thailand, South Africa\nand New Zealand have made definite offers of combat land, sea and air\nforces. Some of these forces are already engaged in action. Many of\nthese offers are substantial. In addition, a number of governments\nare in consultation now with the unified command about supplying\nfurther military assistance.\"\nFirst Report on\nThe Security Council met again on July 25th to hear the first report\nAction under\nby the US on the course of action taken under the unified command in\nUnified Command\naccordance with the July 7th resolution of the Council. The report,\npresented by Austin, said, in part:\n\"Upon the request by the Security Council of the UN for assistance to\ndefend the ROK against the North Korean aggressors, the only forces in\nthe area immediately available were those US and British Commonwealth\noccupation forces under the command of Gen. MacArthur in the occupation\nof the Japanese Islands. The size and nature of these forces were\nsufficient only to perform the occupation duties in Japan.\n\"Before committing the forces, in response to the Security Council\nresolutions, they had to be regrouped and re-equipped from standards\nfor peacetime occupation of Japan- to standards suitable for combat in\nKorea. This also involved moving these troops, with their equipment\nand supplies, from their various occupation stations in Japan, by\ncombinations of motor, rail, water and air transportation, to Korea.\nEven so, all the materials for sustained combat were not immediately\navailable to General MacArthur and therefore had to be rushed to Korea\nfrom the US The well-planned attack by the North Korean regime, the\nsize of their force, their logistical support and their ability to\ncontinue to press the attack, account for the degree of initiative\nenjoyed by the aggressor. The defenders of the ROK have been forced\nto submit to the time and place selected by the aggressor, and now\nmust depend upon assistance from nations peacefully disposed and lying\nnot merely hundreds, but thousands of miles away.\n\"From the continuing appearance on the battlefield of large numbers\nof enemy personnel and equipment, it is now apparent that the North\nKorean aggressors have available to them resources far in excess of"
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