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(Synopsis B, page 13) their internal capabilities. This, with the initial advantage of the aggressor, combines to give the enemy a strength that cannot be overcome until the UN forces achieve the effect of superiority in weapons and manpower. The task is not a small one when viewed in comparison with the potential resources of the aggressor force. Until forces of the Unified Command are increased further in strength, the rapidity with which success will be achieved cannot be predicted." The Council adjourned, at the suggestion of President Sunde, to give representatives time to study the report. When the Council reconvened on July 28th, Indian Representative Rau pointed out that the North Korean attack had "been denounced by a large majority of the countries of the world and the immense resources of a good many of them are now being mobilized in aid of the South. He said that "it is only a question of time when the invaders will be turned back; there is no TRUMAN doubt as to the final outcome, " but added: "If the North Koreans, even G3° AND at this stage, would comply with this Council's resolution of the 25th June---now that they know the world's verdict- they would spare Korea RECORDS, SERVICE' much needless suffering, they would allay fears of a world conflagra- Cs tion and strengthen the hands of those who are working for peace. On August 1st Malik ended the seven-month boycott of the Security Council by the USSR and assumed the presidency of the Council. The month of August was a period of obstructionism in the Security Council by the USSR. Proposals for a The British ambassador in Moscow was reported early in July to be Negotiated holding exploratory talks with Soviet officials on possible means of Peace ending the Korean conflict. The British government in a note similar to one sent by the US, had, on June 29, requested the Soviet government to cooperate in effecting a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. Tass reported on July 7th that the Soviet government did not intend to reply to the British request. The report said that since no specific proposals for a settlement had been made, it was "obvious" that no reply on the part of the Soviet Government was required. On the 11th the British Foreign Office stated that discussions on the subject were continuing in Moscow, but no indication was given of the trend of the conversations. Efforts by Meanwhile, there were persistent rumors that the Indian government had India informed the US and the USSR of its willingness to mediate in the Korean war. An official denial was issued July 5th by the Indian Foreign Ministry. Nehru, in response to questions, told a press conference in New Delhi on the 7th that India could "offer her good offices for mediation only if requested to do so by the parties concerned.' He said, however, that "if there is any chance of peace coming out of any negotiations Jawaharlal Nehru would go to the ends of the earth. " Nehru said he believed that the admission of the Chinese Communist government to the UN and return of the Soviet Union to the Security Council were "necessary conditions to enable the Security Council to discharge its function adequately and bring the Korean conflict to a prompt and peaceful conclusion." Concurrently, conversations were

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    "ocrText": "(Synopsis B, page 13)\ntheir internal capabilities. This, with the initial advantage of the\naggressor, combines to give the enemy a strength that cannot be overcome\nuntil the UN forces achieve the effect of superiority in weapons and\nmanpower. The task is not a small one when viewed in comparison with\nthe potential resources of the aggressor force. Until forces of the\nUnified Command are increased further in strength, the rapidity with\nwhich success will be achieved cannot be predicted.\"\nThe Council adjourned, at the suggestion of President Sunde, to give\nrepresentatives time to study the report. When the Council reconvened\non July 28th, Indian Representative Rau pointed out that the North\nKorean attack had \"been denounced by a large majority of the countries\nof the world and the immense resources of a good many of them are now\nbeing mobilized in aid of the South. He said that \"it is only a\nquestion of time when the invaders will be turned back; there is no\nTRUMAN\ndoubt as to the final outcome, \" but added: \"If the North Koreans, even\nG3° AND\nat this stage, would comply with this Council's resolution of the 25th\nJune---now that they know the world's verdict- they would spare Korea\nRECORDS,\nSERVICE'\nmuch needless suffering, they would allay fears of a world conflagra-\nCs\ntion and strengthen the hands of those who are working for peace.\nOn August 1st Malik ended the seven-month boycott of the Security\nCouncil by the USSR and assumed the presidency of the Council. The\nmonth of August was a period of obstructionism in the Security Council\nby the USSR.\nProposals for a\nThe British ambassador in Moscow was reported early in July to be\nNegotiated\nholding exploratory talks with Soviet officials on possible means of\nPeace\nending the Korean conflict. The British government in a note similar\nto one sent by the US, had, on June 29, requested the Soviet government\nto cooperate in effecting a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict.\nTass reported on July 7th that the Soviet government did not intend\nto reply to the British request. The report said that since no specific\nproposals for a settlement had been made, it was \"obvious\" that no\nreply on the part of the Soviet Government was required. On the 11th\nthe British Foreign Office stated that discussions on the subject were\ncontinuing in Moscow, but no indication was given of the trend of the\nconversations.\nEfforts by\nMeanwhile, there were persistent rumors that the Indian government had\nIndia\ninformed the US and the USSR of its willingness to mediate in the Korean\nwar. An official denial was issued July 5th by the Indian Foreign\nMinistry. Nehru, in response to questions, told a press conference in\nNew Delhi on the 7th that India could \"offer her good offices for\nmediation only if requested to do so by the parties concerned.' He\nsaid, however, that \"if there is any chance of peace coming out of\nany negotiations Jawaharlal Nehru would go to the ends of the earth. \"\nNehru said he believed that the admission of the Chinese Communist\ngovernment to the UN and return of the Soviet Union to the Security\nCouncil were \"necessary conditions to enable the Security Council to\ndischarge its function adequately and bring the Korean conflict to a\nprompt and peaceful conclusion.\" Concurrently, conversations were"
}