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    "title": "Synopsis B, Korea - The Outbreak of War, June-July 1950",
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    "ocrText": "KOREA - Synopsis B: The Outbreak of War, June-July 1950\n(Page 1)\nGuerrilla\nKorean Army authorities announced on April 1 that an estimated 700\nactivities\nguerrillas from North Korea had crossed the border into South Korea\nearly in the week. Efforts were made to prevent them from joining\nremnants of guerrilla bands, and the army announced in mid-April that\nis\nTRUMAM\nit had succeeded in destroying all but 150 of the 700. US observers\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\non the 15th confirmed the reports that the guerrillas had suffered\nHARRY\nheavy losses as the result of the prompt action of the Korean Army.\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nDulles visit\nOn June 17th Dulles arrived in Seoul for a three-day visit with\nSouth Korean and US officials. In an address on the 19th before\nthe opening session of the newly-elected National Assembly, Dulles\nsaid in part: \"As you establish here a wholesome society of steadily\nexpanding well-being, you will set up peaceful influences which will\ndisintegrate the hold of Soviet Communism on your fellows to the\nnorth and irresistably draw them into unity with you. Never for a\nminute do we concede that Soviet Communists will hold permanently\ntheir unwilling captives. No iron curtain can indefinitely block\noff the attracting force of what you do, if you persist in the way\nyou have been going The American people give you their support,\nboth moral and material, consistent with your own self-respect and\nyour primary dependence on your own efforts.\"\nDGA analyzes the\nOn several occasions during the MacArthur hearings DGA answered\npre-invasion\nquestions relative to how the Korean situation was viewed prior to\nsituation\nthe North Korean invasion. Byrd asked (p. 2013) \"Did that give\nany concern to you and others who were watching the Korean situation\nknowing it was a fallacy and might blow up anytime, the fact that\nthe South Koreans were so feebly armed as compared to the North\nKoreans?\" DGA replied: \"We understood that this was a dangerous\nsituation, and trusted in the fact that the invasion would not take\nplace until the South Koreans were able to handle themselves better.\nOf course, there was a great deal of thought and concern which was\nengendered by it.\"\nOn pp. .1990-2, in answer to a question by Bridges, DGA analyzed the\nintelligence received on North Korean-Soviet intentions and how this\nwas evaluated:\n\"Intelligence was available to the Department prior to the 25th of\nJune, made available by the Far Eastern Command, the CIA, the\nDepartment of the Army, and by the State Deparrtment representatives\nhere and overseas, and shows that all these agencies were in\nagreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic\nexisted at that time, but they were all in agreement that its\nlaunching in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent.\n\"The view was generally held that since the Communists had far from\nexhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through\nguerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimi-\ndation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than\novert military aggression. It was fully realized that the timing\nof any move in Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin. Now, the\n(Synopsis B, page 2)\nsame situation that existed in Korea existed in a number of other\nplaces, where the possibility of attack existed, but it was not\nbelieved that the attack would take place at that time.\n\"There has been considerable mention of two reports which are\nexamples of intelligence information concerning the intentions of\nBARNY ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL RECORDS TRUMAN AND LIBITY\nthe North Korean Forces, which were available prior to June 25. The\njoint weekly intelligence cable from Commander in Chief, Far East,\nSERVICE\"\non March 10, 1950, noted: 'Report received that People's Army will\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\ninvade South Korea in June 1950.' To that was attached this comment:\n\"Comment: The People's Army will be prepared to invade South Korea\nby fall and possibly by spring of this year indicated in the current\nreport of armed-force expansion and major troop movements at critical\n38th parallel areas. Even if future reports bear out the present\nindication, it is believed civil war will not necessarily be\nprecipitated; so that intentions in Korea are believed closely\nrelated to Communist program in Southeast Asia. Seems likely that\nCommunist overt military measures in Korea will be held in abeyance,\nat least until further observations made by Soviets of results of\ntheir program in such places as Indochina, Burma, and Thailand. If\nthe Soviets are satisfied they are winning the struggle for these\nplaces they probably will be content to wait a while longer and let\nSouth Korea ripen for future harvest. If checked or defeated in\ntheir operations in these countries in Asia they may divert large\nshare of their effort to South Korea, which would result in a\nPeople's Army invasion of South Korea.' That was on the 10th of\nMarch. On the 25th of March, that is 15 days after this report was\nsent in, G-2 of the Far East Command, stated his conclusion that:\n\"It is believed that there will be no civil war in Korea this\nspring or summer. The most probable course of North Korean action\nthis spring or summer is furtherance of its attempt to overthrow\nthe South Korean Government by the creation of chaotic conditions\nin the Republic through guerrilla activities and psychological\nwarfare.'\n\"Now it is interesting to note in this connection that on October\n12, 1949, the intelligence summary from Commander in Chief, Far\nEast, passed on a report that an attack was to be started on the 15th\nof October 1949, but stated that it was probably fabricated.\n\"November 5, 1949, the intelligence summary had expressed the view\nthat previous rumors of an invasion during August, September, and\nOctober of 1949 had been started by the North Koreans for the purpose\nof causing unrest in South Korea. Also, in his report of December\n30, 1949, he advocated that a report that an invasion was to occur\nin March or April 1950 was not necessarily correct.\n\"The report of January 1, 1950, and Februaru 19, 1950, also contain\nreports of invasions in March and April 1950, and were discounted.\n\"Therefore, you would have had reports that this attack was going\nto occur almost every month, and the intelligence of the Far East\nbelieved that was not the case.\"\nNorth Korean\nNorth Korean troops launched surprise attacks against the ROK along\nInvasion\nthe 38th parallel early on the morning of June 25th (4 a.m., Korean\n(Synopsis B, page 3)\ntime; 2 p.m. EDT on the 24th). North Korean troops entered Seoul\non June 28th.\nTRUMAN\nWhile the South Korean cabinet held an emergancy meeting on the 25th\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nLIBRARY\nand announced that ROK troops \"are vigorously opposing this criminal\nARCHIVES AND\nattack on our soil,\" on the same day the Interior Ministry of the\nRECORDS\nU.S. SERVICE\"\nNorth Korean Communist regime issued a communique stating: \"The\npuppet National Defense Army of South Korea launched a surprise\nattack along the entire fromt of the 38th Parallel against North\nKorea today\nThe Ministry of Interior\nhas ordered the garrison\ntroops to repulse the enemy, who intruded into areas north of the\n38th Parallel\nThe\nPeople's Republic will adopt decisive counter-\nmeasures against the enemy if the South Korean puppet government does\nnot halt its adventurous attacks\nII\nSecurity Council At the request of the US, the Security Council met at 2 p.m. on the\ncalls for\n25th in emergency session. All were present except the Soviet Union.\ncessation of\nLie said at the opening of the session: \"The report received by me\nhostilities\nfrom the (UN) Commission (in Korea), as well as reports from other\nsources in Korea, make it plain that military actions have been\nundertaken by North Korean forces. The present situation is a serious\none and is a threat to international peace. I consider it the clear\nduty of the Security Council to take the steps necessary to re-\nestablish peace in that area.\"\nGross told the Council that the US had requested the emergency meeting\nas a result of reports concerning the attack received from the US\nambassador in Korea. Gross said in part:\n\"This wholly illegal and unprovoked attack by the North Korean forces,\nin the view of my Government, constitutes a breach of the peace and\nan act of aggression. This is clearly a threat to international peace\nand security. It is a threat which must inevitably be of grave\nconcern to the governments of all peace and freedom loving nations.\nA full-scale attack is now going forward in Korea. It is an invasion\nupon a state which the UN itself, by action of its General Assembly,\nhas brought into being. It is armed aggression against a Government\nelected under UN supervision. Such an attack strikes at the funda-\nmental purposes of the UN Charter\n(and) openly defies the interest\nand authority of the UN. Such an attack, therefore, concerns the\nvital interest which all the members of the UN have in the\norganization.\"\nGross then presented a draft resolution noting the Security Council's\n\"grave concern (over) the armed invasion of the ROK by armed forces\nfrom North Korea,\" and calling upon the \"authorities in North Korea\nto cease hostilities forthwith and to withdraw their armed forces to\nthe 38th parallel.\" Several members of the Council objected to the\nuse of the term \"invasion.\" It was also suggested that the cease-\nfire order be directed at both sides rather than at North Korea\nalone. These and other minor changes were accepted by the US, and\nthe resolution as amended was adopted by 9 to o, with Yugoslavia\nabstaining.\n(Synopsis B, page 4)\nOn the 26th Lie received a series of dispatches from the UN Commission\non Korea, reporting on developments in accordance with the instructions\nof the Security Council. The Commission advised that, in view of\npast experience and the existing situation, it was convinced that\nNorth Korea would not accede to the resolution of the Council nor\nwould it accept the good offices of the commission. It was pointed\nout that \"critical operations now in progress (might) end in (a)\nmatter of days and (the) question of (a) cease fire and (the) with-\ndrawal (of) North Korean forces suggested (by the) Council resolution\n(might) prove academic.\" It was suggested that the Council might\nHARRY ARCHIVES A NATIONAL TRUMAN LIBRARY\nconsider either inviting both parties to agree on a neutral mediator\nto negotiate peace, or requesting member governments to undertake\nimmediate mediation. As the result of observation and on the basis\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\nof the latest reports, the commission said that its presemt view of\nthe military situation was that: (1) judging from the actual progress\nof operations, the Northern regime was carrying out a \"well planned,\nconcerted, and full scale invasion of South Korea;\" (2) the South\nKorean forces were \"deployed on a wholly defensive basis in all sectors\nof the parallel;\" and (3) the South Koreans \"were taken completely\nby surprise as they had no reason to believe from intelligence sources\nthat invasion was imminent. 11\nMilitary action\nOn June 25th, as soon as word had been recieved of the North Korean\nby the US\ninvasion, top level conferences were held between State and Defense\nDepartment officials which resulted, as DGA put it during the MacArthur\nhearings (p. 2055), \"in a series of recommendations for the President.\"\nThe first action to be taken was to request an emergency meeting\nof the Security Council in an effort to solve by peaceful means the\nsituation that had been created in Korea. On the 26th HST issued\nthe following statement:\n\"The Government of the US is pleased with the speed and determination\nwith which the UN Security Council acted to order a withdrawal of the\ninvading forces to positions morth of the 38th Parallel. In accordance\nwith the resolution of the Security Council the US will vigorously\nsupport the effort of the Council to terminate this serious breach\nof the peace. Our concern over the lawless action taken by the\nforces from North Korea, and our sympathy and support for the people\nof Korea in this situation, are being demonstrated by the cooperative\naction of American personnel in Korea, as well as by steps taken to\nexpedite and augment assistance of the type being furnished under the\nMDAP. Those responsible for this act of aggression must realize how\nseriously the Government of the US views such threats to the peace\nof the world. Willful disregard of the obligation to keep the peace\ncannot be tolerated by nations that support the UN Charter.\"\nOn the 26th US Army officials stated that MacArthur had been\ninstructed to furnish military supplies to Korea from equipment in\nJapan. At the same time, the ECA said that its Korean aid program\nwas being placed on an emergency basis, and that it would be\nco-ordanated with MacArthur's program.\nOn June 27th HST issued the following statement: \"In Korea the\nGovernment forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to\n(Synopsis B, page 5)\npreserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from\nNorth Korea. The Security Council of the UN called upon the invading\ntroops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th parallel.\nThis they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack.\nThe Security Council called upon all members of the UN to render\nevery assistance to the UN in the execution of this resolution. In\nthese circumstances I have ordered US air and sea forces to give the\nKorean Government troops cover and support. The attack upon Korea\nmakes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the\nuse of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use\narmed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security\nTRUMAN\nHARRY\nARCHIVES AND RECORDS\nLIBRARY\nCouncil of the UN issued to preserve international peace and security.\nIn these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces\nSERVICE\"\nwould be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to\nU.S.\nUS forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that\narea.\n\"Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on\nFormosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese\nGovernment on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against\nthe mainland. The 7th Fleet will see that this is done. The\ndetermination of the future status of Formosa must await the\nrestoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan,\nor consideration by the UN.\n\"I have also directed that US forces in the Philippines be strengthened\nand that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accele-\nrated.\n\"I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military\nassistance to the forces of France and the associated states in\nIndochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close\nworking relations with those forces.\n\"I know that all members of the UN will consider carefully the\nconsequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the\nCharter of the UN. A return to the rule of force in international\naffairs would have far-reaching effects. The US will continue to\nuphold the rule of law.\n\"I have instructed\nAustin\nto report these steps to the Council.\"\nHST's declaration received almost unanimous approval in both houses\nof Congress, and was endorsed by about 50 diplomatic representatives\nin Washington. The State Department announced on the same day that\nthe US Embassy in Moscow had delivered a communication to the Soviet\nForeign Office asking that the Soviet government \"use its influence\nwith the North Korean authorities for the withdrawal of the invading\nforces and the cessation of hostilities.\"\nImmediately following HST's announcement of the 27th MacArthur took\nsteps to implement the order. A Communique issued on the 28th in\nTokyo said: \"The Far East Air Force and naval elements of the Far\nEast Command are conducting combat missions south of the 38th\nParallel of Korea in support of the Korean Republic. Ammunition\nand supplies are being air and water lifted to Korea (and) a small\nadvance echelon of GHQ has been established in Korea. 11\nis\nTRUMAN\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\nSERVICE\"\n(Synopsis B, page 6)\nGOVERNME\nSecurity Council Also on June 27th the North Korean authorities issued a statement\nrecommendations saying that the cease-fire order of the Security Council was con-\nfor assistance\nsidered illegal for two reasons: (1) North Korea was not represented\nto South Korea\nwhen its affairs were discussed; and (2) the Soviet Union and\nCommunist China had not participated in formulating the decision.\nThe Security Council met again on the 27th to consider the reports\nof its commission and to determine a future course of action in the\nface of continuing hostilities. Austin brought to the Council's\nattention HST's statement issued a few hours earlier. Austin sub-\nmitted the following resolution:\n\"The Secutiry Council,\n\"Having determined that the armed attack upon the ROK forces from\nNorth Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,\n\"Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and\n\"Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forth-\nwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and\n\"Having noted from the report of the UN Commission for Korea that the\nauthorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor with-\ndrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military\nmeasures are required to restore international peace and security, and\n\"Having noted the appeal from the ROK to the UN for immediate and\neffective steps to secure peace and security,\n\"Recommends that the Members of the UN furnish such assistance to the\nROK as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore\ninternational peace and security in the area.\"\nThe resolution carried by a vote of 7 to 1 (Yugoslavia), with 2\nabstentions (India and Egypt).\nDGA comments\nThe next day support for the Security Council action was expressed\nin many quarters: Britain, Canada, France, and the Council of the\nOrganization of American States. At a press conference on the 28th\nDGA expressed gratitude for the \"almost unanimous world reaction\"\nthat had followed the UN action and the President's statement. He\nsaid: \"In all parts of the world where free opinion exists there\nhas been an immediate response--- a response to the realization that\nthis was, if there ever was in the world, a test of whether the UN\nis going to survive.\" DGA said that it was very important to remember\nthat since the meeting of the Security Council on June 25, \"all action\nin Korea has been under the aegis of the UN.' He also stressed that\nsince the moment the attack had occurred, the entire action of the\ngovernment of the US had been taken under Presidential leadership\nand direction, and that there had been complete unity among the\nPresident's advisers, both civil and military.\nThe first Soviet reaction to HST's announcement was contained in\na Pravda editorial on the 28th. It went on at great length about\nhow \"the events in Korea reveal with all clarity that the\nimperialist warmongers will not stop half way in pursuit of their\nobjects.\"\n(Synopsis B, page 7)\nTaft comments\nThe most severe domestic criticism of HST's action was made by Taft,\nwho charged on the 28th that the \"bungling and inconsistent foreign\npolicy\" of the Administration was responsible for the Korean situation.\nTaft said that he approved of the policy of sending US forces to\nassist South Korea, but suggested that \"any Secretary of State who\nhas been so reversed by his superiors and whose policies have pre-\ncipitated the danger of war, had better resign and let some one\nelse administer the program to which he was, and perhaps still is,\nso violently opposed.\" Taft said further: \"I do not like to have\nthis action go by without the approval of the Senate. If it is what\nit seems to me, it is a complete usurpation by the President of\nTRUMAN\nauthority to use the armed forces of this country. If the incident\nis permitted to go by without protest, at least from this body, we\nUARRY SERVICES AN NATIONAL\nhave finally terminated for all time the right of Congress to\ndeclare war, which is set out in the Constitution of the US.\"\nU.S.\nGOVED\nOn the 29th, at his press conference, HST said that there was not\na word of truth in Taft's contention that he had reversed the policy\nof the Secretary of State, HST said that the US action had been taken\nin an effort to preserve peace and that it was within the framework\nof the UN. He declared: \"We are not at war. 11\nNehru comments\nAlso on the 29th, India made its position clear, after prolonged\ncabinet deliberations. Nehru notified Lie that India was \"opposed\nto any attempt to settle international disputes by resort to aggression,\"\nand that for this reason the Indian delegate had voted for the first\nSecurity Council resolution on the Korean question. Nehru went on:\n\"The halting of aggression and the quick restoration of peaceful\nconditions are essential preludes to a satisfactory settlement. The\nGovernment of India therefore also accept the second resolution of\nthe Security Council. This decision of the Government of India does\nnot, however, involve any modification of their foreign policy. This\npolicy is based on the promotion of world peace and the development\nof friendly relations with all countries. It remains an independent\npolicy which will continue to be determined solely by India's ideals\nand objectives. The Government of India earnestly hope that even at\nthis stage it may be possible to put an end to the fighting and to\nsettle the dispute by mediation.\"\nThe Soviet\nAlso on the 29th, the Soviet government replied to the US request\nposition\nthat Soviet influence be used with the North Korean authorities to\nhave the invading forces withdrawn. A note delivered in Moscow said:\n\"According to reliable data of the Soviet Government, the events\nwhich are going on in Korea were provoked by the attack of the troops\nof the South Korean authorities on the frontier areas of Northern\nKorea. Therefore, the responsibility of these events lies with the\nSouth Korean authorities and with those who stand behind them. As\nis known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops from Korea earlier\nthan did the US Government and thereby confirmed its traditional\nprinciple of the inadmissibility of the interference of foreign\n(Synopsis B, page 8)\npowers in the internal affairs of Korea. It is not true that the\nSoviet Government refused to take part in the meetings of the\nSecurity Council; however, much as it desires it, it was impossible\nfor the Soviet Government to take part in the meetings of the\nSecurity Council since by virtue of the attitude of the US Government,\nthe permanent member of the Security Council China was not\nadmitted to the Council, which made it impossible for the Security\nCouncil to take decisions which have legal force.\" US officials\nmade no comment on the Soviet reply.\nOn the 30th the Security Council met again at the request of the\nIndian representative who announced that India had decided to accede\nto the resolution of the Council. The Egyptian representative told\nthe Council that if he had participated in the voting on the 27th,\nhe would have abstained in conformity with instructions since\nreceived from his government.\nThe Security Council was then notified that 33 of the 59 member\nstates of the UN had notified Lie of their support for the Council\nHARMY c. ARCHIVES NATIONAL TRUMAN BOYERWING LIBRARY\nresolution.\nU.S.\nAlso on the 30th, HST, together with the cretaries of Defense and\nState, and the JCS, met with Congressional leaders and reviewed with\nthem the latest developments of the situation in Korea. After the\nmeeting a statement was issued which declared: \"The Congressional\nleaders were given a full review of the intensified military\nactivities. In keeping wi th the UN Security Council's request for\nsupport to the ROK in repelling the North Korean invaders and\nrestoring peace in Korea, the President announced that he had\nauthorized the US Air Force to conduct missions on specific military\ntargets in Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary, and had\nordered a Naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. General\nMacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground\nunits.\"\nUS answer to\nOn June 30 the State Department released a statement refuting the\ncharges of\nSoviet allegation, contained in notes to the US and to the UN on\nillegality\nJune 29, that the action of the Security Council with respect to\nKorea was illegal because it did not have the concurring votes of\nall the permanent members of the Council and because the Chinese\nparticipant in the action was not a representative of the Peiping\nregime. The statement said in part:\n\"With respect to Article 27 of the Charter dealing with Security\nCouncil voting, it is provided that substantive questions be decided\nby an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring\nvotes of the permanent members. By a long series of precedents,\nhowever, dating back to 1946, the practice has been established\nwhereby abstention by permanent members of the Council does not\nconstitute a veto. In short, prior to the Soviet allegations, every\nmember of the UN, including the USSR, accepted as legal and binding\ndecisions of the Security Council made without the concurrence, as\nexpressed through an affirmative vote, of all permanent members of\nthe Council.\"\n(Synopsis B, page 9)\nThe Department then cited 13 precedents in which either the Soviet\nUnion or other permanent Council members had abstained from voting\non other actions in the past. The statement continued: \"Furthermore\nArticle 28 of the Charter provides that the Security Council shall\nbe so organized as to be able to function continuously. This\ninjunction is defeated if the absence of a representative of a\npermanent member is construed to have the effect of preventing all\nsubstantive action by the Council. No one of the ten members of the\nCouncil participating in the meetings of June 25 and June 27 raised\nany question regarding the legality of the action---not even the\nmember who dissented on June 27.\" As for the Soviet claim on the\nTRUMAN\nChinese vote, the statement noted that \"no affirmative action has\nHARRY\nARCHIVES \"NATIONAL AND\nLIBRARY\nbeen taken which, by any stretch of the imagination, could give\nforce to the contention of the USSR that a representative of the\nRECORDS\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERSBENT\nPeiping regime should be regarded as the representative of China on\nthe Security Council.\"\nUS accused of\nOn July 2nd North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hen Nen issued a\nimperialism\nlengthy declaration accusing the US of imperialism, of having\nstarted the Korean conflict, and of having dictated policies to\nthe UN. On July 4th Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko issued\nan even lengthier statement along similar lines. He said:\n\"When it became clear that the terrorist regime of Syngman Rhee,\nwhich has never enjoyed the support of the Korean people, would fall,\nthe Government of the US passed openly to intervention in Korea\n\"The Government of the US\nis attempting to justify the intervention\nagainst Korea by contending that the intervention was allegedly S\nstarted on the directive of the Security Council\n(but) it is known\nthat the\nUS began to intervene with arms in Korea before the session\nof the Security Council would be called on June 27, without considering\nwhat the decision of the Security Council would be\nThe facts\nprove\nthat the resolution which the US Government is using as a cover for\nits armed intervention in Korea was illegally put through the\nSecurity Council, while the Charter of the organization of the UN\nhas been grossly infringed\n11\nDGA replies\nOn July 5th DGA issued the following statement in reply: \"In regard\nto the Korean hostilities, four simple points must be recognized and\nlong remembered by all the world. The people of this free nation\nhave clearly shown that they know the truth and are not going to be\nmisled by false versions of it. These are the facts:\n\"l. The present troubles in Korea started, not when the UN Security\nCouncil acted or when the US and others acted in support of the\nSecurity Council. It all started at dawn on Sunday, June 25, Korean\ntime,\n\"2. At that time troops from North Korea, without any provocation\nwhatever, crossed the 38th parallel and launched an aggressive attack\nagainst the Repbulic of Korea. All the reliable witnesses on the\nscene at the time, including the UN Commission, have established\nthat the North Korean forces were the aggressors.\n(Synopsis B, page 10)\n\"3. The Security Council of the UN acted in support of the\nTRUMAN\nRepublic of Korea only after it was satistied that this was a case\nARCHIVES AND\nKIBRARY\nof utterly unprovoked aggression.\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\n\"4. Any contention that hostilities were started by the Republic\nRECORDS\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nof Korea is clearly in the category of the Nazi claims of 1939 that\nPoland started hostilities by attacking Nazi Germany.\"\nChinese\nOn July 2 the State Department announced that the Chinese National\nNationalist\nGovernment had informed the US, in an aide-memoire on June 29 and 30,\noffer of troops\nof the willingness of the Chinese government to send 33,000 troops\nto South Korea. It was said that the troops, which would be ready\nfor embarkation in five days, would carry the \"best equipment at\nChina's disposal. The Chinese government asked to be \"apprised of\nthe opinion of the US government at its earliest convenience\nIf\nDGA replies\nIt was also announced that on July 1st DGA had expressed the \"deep\nappreciation of the US Government for this prompt and substantial\ndemonstration of support for the UN on the part of the Government\nof the Republic of China.\" DGA said that \"in light, however, of\nthe threat of invasion of Taiwan by Communist forces from the main-\nland, a threat repeated in the last day or so by spokesmen for the\nChinese Communist regime in Peiping, it is the view of the Government\nof the US\nthat it would be desirable for representatives of\nGeneral MacArthur's Headquarters to hold discussions with the\nChinese military authorities on Taiwan concerning the plans for the\ndefense of the island against invasion prior to any final decision\non the widdon of reducing the defense forces on Taiwan by transfer\nof troops to Korea. 11 It was emphasized that this reply represented\nthe viewpoint of the US \"without assuming in any way to speak for\nthe UN.\"\nDGA elaborated on this decision during the MacArthur hearings (p.1763).\nSaltonstall asked, \"Did the State Department have any part in making\nthe decision that Chinese Nationalist troops should not be used in\nKorea?\" DGA replied: \"Yes, sir; we recommended against it We took\nthat action for two reasons. The first reason had to do with the\ndefense of Formosa. We are committed to see that that island does\nnot fall into hostile hands and to use military force to bring about\nthat result. We cannot, therefore, believe that it is wise in any\nway to weaken or diminish the forces on Formosa. It is not\naltogether an easy operation to assure that Formosa will not fall\nmerely by use of the fleet. It is altogether possible that despite\nthe efforts of the fleet landings can be made. Those might have\nvery serious results on Formosa. To remove troops to fight in Korea\nwould mean removing the best troops and the best armed troops; other-\nwise they would be no good in Korea; and we think it would be a very\ndisadvantageous thing for the US to do. The second reason that we\nobjected to it is that it raises very serious complications with\nother nations who are fighting in Korea and who do not recognize the\nNationalist Government, and believe that that would increase the\nopposition to them of the Chinese Communists.\"\nTRUMAN\nHARRY\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nLIBRARY\nGOVERNMENT\n(Synopsis B, page 11)\nSecurity Council The Security Council met on July 7th to consider the situation in\nrecommendation\nKorea. This was its fourth meeting since the outbreak of hostilities\nfor unified\non June 25. Norwegian Representative Sunde, Council President for\ncommand\nJuly, declared that what some had hoped would be a \"short and\ndecisive police action\" had turned into a \"pitched battle of\nunforseeable duration.\" He said, however, that the response in\nsupport of the UN action had been encouraging and that the Republic\nof Korea was no longer alone in resisting the aggressors. The\nchairman reported that to date the Security Council had been formally\nnotified by 44 of the 59 members that they supported the resolutions\nof June 25 and June 27, and that 5 of these states were already\nparticipating in the military action. The British representative\nsaid that it had become clear that further steps would be needed to\nco-ordinate the assistance offered and that, accordingly, Great\nBritain and France were submitting the following draft resolution:\n\"The Security Council,\n\"Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea\nby forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,\n\"Having recommended that Members of the UN furnish such assistance\nto the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed\nattack and to restore international peace and security in the area,\n\"1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and\npeoples of the UN have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June\n1950 to assist the ROK in defending itself against armed attack and\nthus to restore internal peace and security in the area;\n\"2. Notes that Members of the UN have transmitted to the UN offers\nof assistance for the ROK;\n\"3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other\nassistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutioms\nmake such forces and other assistance available to a unified command\nunder the US;\n\"4. Requests the US to designate the commander of such forces;\n\"5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the\nUN flag in the course of operations\nconcurrently with the flags\nof the various nations participating;\n\"6. Requests the US to provide the Security Council with reports\nas appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.\"\nThe British representative said that the sponsors of the resolution\nhad considered suggestions that had been made for \"the possible\nconstitution of further machinery\" by the Security Council, but had\ndecided that there was no need for this at the present time. He\npointed out that the Security Council was acting under Article 39\nof the UN Charter so that its function in this matter was not an\n\"operative\" one, but rather a means of assuring the coordination\nof the efforts of individual UN members. The representative of China\nand Cuba spoke in support of the draft resolution and Chairman Sunde\nsaid that the proposal was \"a logical consequence of what the Council\nhad already done. The resolution was then adopted by a vote of\n7 to o, with 3 abstentions (Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia). Following\nthe vote, Austin told the Council that the US would \"of course\"\naccept the responsibilities involved \"in carrying out these principles\nof the UN.\"\n(Synopsis B, page 12)\nThe next day, July 8th, HST designated MacArthur as commanding general\nof the UN forces.\nOn the 13th the State Department announced that a committee had been\nestablished to receive, screen, and forward to the UN offers of\nassistance to the UN unified command.\nOn the 14th Lie announced that he had sent letters to the 52 UN members\nthat had given what he interpreted to be favorable replies to the\nSecurity Council resolution of June 27, asking them to consider\nsupplying ground troops for use in Korea. On the 21st Lie reported\nthat replies to his appeal for increased assistance to South Korea\nhad been received from 11 nations: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,\nDenmark, France, Greece, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, and Sweden.\nHARRY s. ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL RECORDS TRUMAN AND\nThe replies contained offers of various types of aid, with only Bolivia\nmaking a formal pledge to supply ground troops, a token force of 30\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nregular army officers. Lie said that several other governments were\n\"in contact with Washington.\" On August 7th Lie reported at a press\nconference that \"we have now received replies from 41 member countries\nUK, my Australia, the Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Thailand, South Africa\nto\ntelegram\nof July 14 Most have offered concrete assistance. The\nand New Zealand have made definite offers of combat land, sea and air\nforces. Some of these forces are already engaged in action. Many of\nthese offers are substantial. In addition, a number of governments\nare in consultation now with the unified command about supplying\nfurther military assistance.\"\nFirst Report on\nThe Security Council met again on July 25th to hear the first report\nAction under\nby the US on the course of action taken under the unified command in\nUnified\nCommand accordance with the July 7th resolution of the Council. The report,\npresented by Austin, said, in part:\n\"Upon the request by the Security Council of the UN for assistance to\ndefend the ROK against the North Korean aggressors, the only forces in\nthe area immediately available were those US and British Commonwealth\noccupation forces under the command of Gen. MacArthur in the occupation\nof the Japanese Islands. The size and nature of these forces were\nsufficient only to perform the occupation duties in Japan.\n\"Before committing the forces, in response to the Security Council\nresolutions, they had to be regrouped and re-equipped from standards\nfor peacetime occupation of Japan to standards suitable for combat in\nKorea. This also involved moving these troops, with their equipment\nand supplies, from their various occupation stations in Japan, by\ncombinations of motor, rail, water and air transportation, to Korea.\nEven so, all the materials for sustained combat were not immediately\navailable to General MacArthur and therefore had to be rushed to Korea\nfrom the US\nThe well-planned attack by the North Korean regime, the\nsize of their force, their logistical support and their ability to\ncontinue to press the attack, account for the degree of initiative\nenjoyed by the aggressor. The defenders of the ROK have been forced\nto submit to the time and place selected by the aggressor, and now\nmust depend upon assistance from nations peacefully disposed and lying\nnot merely hundreds, but thousands of miles away.\n\"From the continuing appearance on the battlefield of large numbers\nof enemy personnel and equipment, it is now apparent that the North\nKorean aggressors have available to them resources far in excess of\n(Synopsis B, page 13)\ntheir internal capabilities. This, with the initial advantage of the\naggressor, combines to give the enemy a strength that cannot be overcome\nuntil the UN forces achieve the effect of superiority in weapons and\nmanpower. The task is not a small one when viewed in comparison with\nthe potential resources of the aggressor force. Until forces of the\nUnified Command are increased further in strength, the rapidity with\nwhich success will be achieved cannot be predicted.\"\nThe Council adjourned, at the suggestion of President Sunde, to give\nrepresentatives time to study the report. When the Council reconvened\non July 28th, Indian Representative Rau pointed out that the North\nKorean attack had \"been denounced by a large majority of the countries\nof the world and the immense resources of a good many of them are now\nbeing mobilized in aid of the South. II He said that \"it is only a\nquestion of time when the invaders will be turned back; there is no\nTRUMAN\ndoubt as to the final outcome,\" but added: \"If the North Koreans, even\nHARIY ARCHIVES A NATIONAL\nLIBRARY\nat this stage, would comply with this Council's resolution of the 25th\nJune now that they know the world's verdict- they would spare Korea\nmuch needless suffering, they would allay fears of a world conflagra-\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\ntion and strengthen the hands of those who are working for peace.\"\nOn August 1st Malik ended the seven-month boycott of the Security\nCouncil by the USSR and assumed the presidency of the Council. The\nmonth of August was a period of obstructionism in the Security Council\nby the USSR.\nProposals for a\nThe British ambassador in Moscow was reported early in July to be\nNegotiated\nholding exploratory talks with Soviet officials on possible means of\nPeace\nending the Korean conflict. The British government in a note similar\nto one sent by the US, had, on June 29, requested the Soviet government\nto cooperate in effecting a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict.\nTass reported on July 7th that the Soviet government did not intend\nto reply to the British request. The report said that since no specific\nproposals for a settlement had been made, it was \"obvious\" that no\nreply on the part of the Soviet Government was required. On the 11th\nthe British Foreign Office stated that discussions on the subject were\ncontinuing in Moscow, but no indication was given of the trend of the\nconversations.\nEfforts by\nMeanwhile, there were persistent rumors that the Indian government had\nIndia\ninformed the US and the USSR of its willingness to mediate in the Korean\nwar. An official denial was issued July 5th by the Indian Foreign\nMinistry. Nehru, in response to questions, told a press conference in\nNew Delhi on the 7th that India could \"offer her good offices for\nmediation only if requested to do so by the parties concerned.\" He\nsaid, however, that \"if there is any chance of peace coming out of\nany negotiations Jawaharlal Nehru would go to the ends of the earth.\"\nNehru said he believed that the admission of the Chinese Communist\ngovernment to the UN and return of the Soviet Union to the Security\nCouncil were \"necessary conditions to enable the Security Council to\ndischarge its function adequately and bring the Korean conflict to a\nprompt and peaceful conclusion.\" Concurrently, conversations were\n(Synopsis B, page 14)\nreported to be taking place between the Chinese Communist government\nand the Indian ambassador in Peiping.\nOn July 13th the Indian government delivered to the US and the USSR\nnotes reported to contain a plea that the US and the USSR do everything\npossible to prevent the Korean war from spreading, and suggesting that\nthe Chinese Communists be admitted to the UN as a prerequisite to\nnegotiations on the subject. The text of the appeal was not made\npublic at the time, but Indian and US diplomatic officials stated that\nit did not contain an Indian offer to act as mediator.\nOn the 14th a State Department spokesman said that the US regarded the\nUN as the \"proper forum\" for settling the Korean issue, that the US\nTRUMAN\ndid not comtemplate bilateral negotiations with the USSR on the\nARCHIVES AND RECORDS LIBRERY\nquestion, and that the \"minimum and irreducible conditions\" for a\nHARRY\nsolution were \"a cease-fire and a return (by the North Koreans) to the\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\n38th parallel.'\nAlso on the 14th 23 members of the British Labor party submitted a\nmotion in the House of Commons urging the British government to seek\na peaceful settlement in the Korean conflict. The government was\nasked to use its efforts \"to limit the area of conflict;\" to bring\nabout a cease-fire and mediation \"under the authority of the UN;\" to\n\"urge the withdrawal of US forces from Formosa;\" to secure the\nadmission of the Chinese Communist government into the Security Council;\nand \"to take the initiative in bringing about an early meeting of\nrepresentatibes of all the great powers, including India, to consider\nwhat action can be taken to strengthen the UN and to end the cold\nwar.\"\nStalin sent a message to Nehru on July 15th, welcoming the Indian\ninitiative in endeavoring to restore peace, and agreeing with its\n\"point of view regarding the expediency of a peaceful ettlement of\nthe Korean question through the Security Council with the obligatory\nparticipation of representatives of the five great powers, including\nthe People's Government of China.\" Stalin said further: \"I believe\nthat to secure a speedy settlement of the Korean question, it would\nbe expedient to hear representatives of the Korean people in the\nSecurity Council.\"\nDGA replies\nOn July 18th DGA replied to Nehru's appeal of the 13th in a note that\nstated, in part: \"The purpose of the US Government and of the American\npeople with respect to Korea is to support by all means at our disposal\nthe determination of the UN to repel the armed attack upon Korea and\nto restore international peace and security to the area. It is painful\nto realize that there could have long since been a restoration of peace\nand the saving of the lives of those fighting on behalf of the UN had\nnot a small minority of the UN failed to meet their obligations under\nthe Charter and refused to use their authority and influence to prevent\nor stop the hostilities\n\"We do not believe that the termination of the aggression from northern\nKorea can be contingent in any way upon the determination of other\nquestions which are currently before the UN. There has not been at\n(Synopsis B, page 15)\nany time any obstacle to the full participation by the Soviet Union\nin the work of the UN except the decision of the Soviet Government\nitself. The Security Council has shown that it is both competent and\nwilling to act vigorously for the maintenance of peace. In our opinion,\nthe decision between competing claimant governments for China's seat\nin the UN is one which must be reached by the UN on its merits\nI\nknow you will agree that the decision should not be dictated by an\nunlawful aggression or by any other conduct which would subject the\nUN to coercion and duress.\"\nNehru replied on the following day and reiterated the Indian position,\nnoting that \"I do not think that the admission of China now would be an\nencouragement of aggression.\"\nSeveral weeks later, on August 3rd, during a debate in the Indian\nparliament, Nehru defended his efforts to obtain a seat in the Security\nTRUMAN\nCouncil for Communist China as a means of settling the Korean conflict\nHARRY\nARCHIVES AND RECORDS\nLIBRARY\nby saying: \"I am inclined to think that had the People's Republic\nSERVICE\"\n/originally7 been admitted to the UN, many of the subsequent develop-\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\nments, including the Korean development, might not have taken place.\"\nHe asserted that \"we Asians are in a better position to know what the\npeople of other Asian countries, such as Korea, China and Indo-China,\nreally want. If In reply to critics of US intervention, Nehru said,\nhowever, that \"Americans now in Korea are fighting in furtherance of\nwhat they consider to be the ideals of the UN, and it does not behoove\nus to criticize them.\"\nAttlee comments\nOn July 20th Prime Minister Attlee made a statement in the House of\nCommons that was designed to clarify the position taken by the British\nduring diplomatic discussions of tne Korean situation in Moscow. He\nsaid that, in order to avoid a misunderstanding, the British ambassador\nin Moscow had been \"instructed to deliver an aide-memoire to the\nSoviet Government confirming and summarising the views of His Majesty's\nGovernment.\" Briefly, these were \"that the immediate issue is to stop\nhostilities in Korea, in regard to which the British/Government\nreaffirmed their support for the resolutions of the Security Council;\nand that the restoration of peace in Korea cannot be made conditional\non the settlement of other issues.\""
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