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S. TRUBLIT AND RECORDS U.S. SERVICE', (Synopsis D, page 7) DGA Denies On the 22nd DGA denied that agreement had been reached among the Agreement Western nations for a "buffer zone" on the south bank of the Yalu, but rumors persisted that such a plan would be offered to the Chinese Communist delegation when it arrived at Lake Success. The British Foreign Office announced on the 23rd that the British government had sent a message to the Chinese Communist authorities a day earlier, assuring the Peiping government that UN forces in Korea had no design on China or Chinese interests. The announce- ment said that the action had been taken unilaterally, although the US and other friendly nations had been informed that the note was being sent. Debate in the The nine-member Chinese Communist delegation arrived in New York on Security the 24th and appeared before the Security Council for the first Council time on the 27th. An agenda dispute caused a postponement of the debate on Korea until the 28th. Austin opened the debate with a statement based on MacArthur's communiqué of the 28th (see Synopsis c) which referred to "an entirely new war." Austin said, in part: "Last week the forces of the UN opened a general attack designed to finish their assigned task of repulsing aggression and restoring international peace and security in the area. This attack has now been repulsed in circumstances which make it clear that Chinese Communist armed forces totaling more than 200,000 men are now engaged in North Korea. They are supported by heavy reinforcements moving forward from behind the international boundary. It now appears doubtful that the war in Korea can be quickly concluded. It also appears clear beyond any doubt that what all the free world hoped was an intervention for a limited purpose is in fact aggression, outright and naked. The consequences of these facts must be faced squarely by the people of the world, and more particularly by this Council. After repeating the assurances that neither the US nor the UN had any designs against any part of China, Austin then put to the Chinese Communist representative a series of questions, in which he raised among others the following points: (1) whether the Communist intervention in Korea was "really in the interest of the Chinese people, as has been proclaimed," or whether it was on "behalf" of the Soviet Union; (2) whether it was still maintained that the Chinese forces in Korea are "composed entirely of volunteers, and if so, how could be explained "the 'voluntary manner in which their supplies have been organized, dispatched across the frontier, and distributed"; (3) why had the Chinese Communists ignored and set aside the "reiterated statements" by the UN and by the US that "there were no designs on Chinese terri- tory or legitimate interests"; (4) whether the Peiping authorities will respond to the central paragraph of the draft resolution before the Council, i.e., "to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individ- uals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North Korean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such nationals, individuals, or units which might presently be in Korea"; and (5) will there be peace or war in the Far East?"

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    "ocrText": "S. TRUBLIT\nAND\nRECORDS\nU.S.\nSERVICE',\n(Synopsis D, page 7)\nDGA Denies\nOn the 22nd DGA denied that agreement had been reached among the\nAgreement\nWestern nations for a \"buffer zone\" on the south bank of the Yalu,\nbut rumors persisted that such a plan would be offered to the\nChinese Communist delegation when it arrived at Lake Success.\nThe British Foreign Office announced on the 23rd that the British\ngovernment had sent a message to the Chinese Communist authorities\na day earlier, assuring the Peiping government that UN forces in\nKorea had no design on China or Chinese interests. The announce-\nment said that the action had been taken unilaterally, although\nthe US and other friendly nations had been informed that the note\nwas being sent.\nDebate in the\nThe nine-member Chinese Communist delegation arrived in New York on\nSecurity\nthe 24th and appeared before the Security Council for the first\nCouncil\ntime on the 27th. An agenda dispute caused a postponement of the\ndebate on Korea until the 28th. Austin opened the debate with a\nstatement based on MacArthur's communiqué of the 28th (see Synopsis c)\nwhich referred to \"an entirely new war.\" Austin said, in part:\n\"Last week the forces of the UN opened a general attack designed\nto finish their assigned task of repulsing aggression and restoring\ninternational peace and security in the area. This attack has now\nbeen repulsed in circumstances which make it clear that Chinese\nCommunist armed forces totaling more than 200,000 men are now\nengaged in North Korea. They are supported by heavy reinforcements\nmoving forward from behind the international boundary. It now\nappears doubtful that the war in Korea can be quickly concluded.\nIt also appears clear beyond any doubt that what all the free world\nhoped was an intervention for a limited purpose is in fact aggression,\noutright and naked. The consequences of these facts must be faced\nsquarely by the people of the world, and more particularly by this\nCouncil.\nAfter repeating the assurances that neither the US nor the UN had\nany designs against any part of China, Austin then put to the\nChinese Communist representative a series of questions, in which\nhe raised among others the following points: (1) whether the\nCommunist intervention in Korea was \"really in the interest of the\nChinese people, as has been proclaimed,\" or whether it was on\n\"behalf\" of the Soviet Union; (2) whether it was still maintained\nthat the Chinese forces in Korea are \"composed entirely of\nvolunteers, and if so, how could be explained \"the 'voluntary\nmanner in which their supplies have been organized, dispatched\nacross the frontier, and distributed\"; (3) why had the Chinese\nCommunists ignored and set aside the \"reiterated statements\" by\nthe UN and by the US that \"there were no designs on Chinese terri-\ntory or legitimate interests\"; (4) whether the Peiping authorities\nwill respond to the central paragraph of the draft resolution\nbefore the Council, i.e., \"to refrain from assisting or encouraging\nthe North Korean authorities, to prevent their nationals or individ-\nuals or units of their armed forces from giving assistance to North\nKorean forces and to cause the immediate withdrawal of any such\nnationals, individuals, or units which might presently be in\nKorea\"; and (5) will there be peace or war in the Far East?\""
}