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S. AND U.S. SERVICE (Synopsis D, page 9) part of the worldwide operations of the international Communist movement. " He said that "the hostility of Soviet intentions, taken alone, would not produce so grave a threat, 11 but that "the combination of these intentions and Soviet military power creates a very grave danger to the survival of free nations and free insti- tutions, a danger which must not be under-estimated." DGA said further: "No one can guarantee that war will not come. The present crisis is extremely serious. Whether reason will prevail is only partly for us to decide. We must hope and strive for the best while we prepare for the worst." HST in a statement prepared for his press conference on November 30th also stressed that the battlefield situation was uncertain, but said that "the forces of the UN have no intention of abandoning their mission in Korea. He continued: "We have committed ourselves to the cause of a just and peaceful world order through the UN. We stand by that commitment. We shall meet the new situation in three ways. We shall continue to work in the UN for concerted action to halt this aggression in Korea, We shall intensify our efforts to help other free nations strngthen their defenses in order to meet the threat of aggression elsewhere. We shall rapidly increase our own military strength.' HST's Atom When HST, in answer to questions from the press, said that action Bomb State- in Manchuria would depend on action in the UN and that MacArthur ment would take whatever steps were necessary to meet the military situation, he was asked whether such steps would include use of the atom bomb. HST replied that they would include every weapon which the US possessed, and then explained that use of the atom bomb was always under active consideration, but that it was a terrible weapon which should not be used on innocent persons and was one which he did not vant to see used. He said that the selection of targets was a military question and that the military commander in the field, who had charge of the use of weapons, would not have to wait for a specific UN authorization to use the atomic bomb. HST's remarks were widely published and commented upon, with some interpretations suggesting that he was giving special emergency consideration to use of the bomb to meet the situation created by the intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea, To clarify the matter, the White House issued a special statement shortly after the press conference. It said: "The President wants to make ti certain that there is no misinter- pretation of his answers to questions at his press conference today about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat. Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon.

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    "ocrText": "S.\nAND\nU.S.\nSERVICE\n(Synopsis D, page 9)\npart of the worldwide operations of the international Communist\nmovement. \" He said that \"the hostility of Soviet intentions,\ntaken alone, would not produce so grave a threat, 11 but that \"the\ncombination of these intentions and Soviet military power creates\na very grave danger to the survival of free nations and free insti-\ntutions, a danger which must not be under-estimated.\"\nDGA said further: \"No one can guarantee that war will not come.\nThe present crisis is extremely serious. Whether reason will prevail\nis only partly for us to decide. We must hope and strive for the\nbest while we prepare for the worst.\"\nHST in a statement prepared for his press conference on November 30th\nalso stressed that the battlefield situation was uncertain, but said\nthat \"the forces of the UN have no intention of abandoning their\nmission in Korea. He continued: \"We have committed ourselves to\nthe cause of a just and peaceful world order through the UN. We\nstand by that commitment. We shall meet the new situation in three\nways. We shall continue to work in the UN for concerted action to\nhalt this aggression in Korea, We shall intensify our efforts to\nhelp other free nations strngthen their defenses in order to meet\nthe threat of aggression elsewhere. We shall rapidly increase our\nown military strength.'\nHST's Atom\nWhen HST, in answer to questions from the press, said that action\nBomb State-\nin Manchuria would depend on action in the UN and that MacArthur\nment\nwould take whatever steps were necessary to meet the military\nsituation, he was asked whether such steps would include use of the\natom bomb. HST replied that they would include every weapon which\nthe US possessed, and then explained that use of the atom bomb was\nalways under active consideration, but that it was a terrible weapon\nwhich should not be used on innocent persons and was one which he\ndid not vant to see used. He said that the selection of targets\nwas a military question and that the military commander in the\nfield, who had charge of the use of weapons, would not have to wait\nfor a specific UN authorization to use the atomic bomb.\nHST's remarks were widely published and commented upon, with some\ninterpretations suggesting that he was giving special emergency\nconsideration to use of the bomb to meet the situation created by\nthe intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea, To clarify\nthe matter, the White House issued a special statement shortly\nafter the press conference. It said:\n\"The President wants to make ti certain that there is no misinter-\npretation of his answers to questions at his press conference\ntoday about the use of the atom bomb. Naturally, there has been\nconsideration of this subject since the outbreak of hostilities\nin Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military\nweapons whenever our forces are in combat. Consideration of the\nuse of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that\nweapon."
}