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S.
U.S. SERVICES
(Synopsis E, page 4)
4th UN troops evacuated Seoul. Inchon and Kimpo airfields
were abandoned on the 5th, and on the 6th Allied troops were
forced to withdraw from Suwon airfield, 16 miles south of Seoul.
The Battle-
Communist pressure then shifted to the center of the line, par-
front is
ticularly around Wonju, which fell on January 8th. In the days
Stabilized
that followed, however, UN lines began to hold and the battlefront
became more and more stabilized. As Marshall said during the
MacArthur hearings (p. 324), "Thereafter, the situation of our
forces in Korea continued to improve and during the latter half
of January the enemy forces remained on the defensive. Throughout
February and March our forces maintained the initiative against
the enemy.
Many pages in the MacArthur hearings are devoted to the several
weeks of retreat and seeming disaster around the end of December
and beginning of January. The following excerpts and the documents
quoted perhaps suggest what DGA titles in his outline the "near
panic in Tokyo. "
MacArthur Sug-
Marshal] begins the account (p. 331ff) : "Late in December and early
gests Four
in January it appeared altogether possible that we might have to
Courses of
evacuate our forces from Korea. On December 29 the JCS requested
Action
General MacArthur's views as to the conditions which might determine
a decision to evacuate Korea. He suggested the following four
courses of action: Blockade of the coast of China. Destroy
through naval gunfire and air bombardment China's industrial
capacity to wage war. Secure appropriate reinforcements from the
Nationalist garrison on Formosa. Release existing restrictions
upon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action against the
vulnerable areas of China's mainland.
"Under these courses of action, unless they were adopted, and in
the absence of reinforcements, General MacArthur stated that it
would be necessary to contract our defense lines to the Pusan
beachhead for final evacuation.
The JCS Reply
"On January 9, the JCS, with the approval of the Secretary of
Defense and the President, informed General MacArthur that the
retaliatory measures suggested by him could not be permitted;
and he was therefore directed to defend in successive positions,
inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject
to the primary consideration of the safety of his troops and his
basic mission of protecting Japan. Should it become evident in
his judgment that evacuation was essential to avoid severe losses
of men and material, he was at that time to withdraw from Korea
to Japan. [This January 9 JCS message paraphrased on pp. 332-3.]
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"ocrText": "S.\nU.S. SERVICES\n(Synopsis E, page 4)\n4th UN troops evacuated Seoul. Inchon and Kimpo airfields\nwere abandoned on the 5th, and on the 6th Allied troops were\nforced to withdraw from Suwon airfield, 16 miles south of Seoul.\nThe Battle-\nCommunist pressure then shifted to the center of the line, par-\nfront is\nticularly around Wonju, which fell on January 8th. In the days\nStabilized\nthat followed, however, UN lines began to hold and the battlefront\nbecame more and more stabilized. As Marshall said during the\nMacArthur hearings (p. 324), \"Thereafter, the situation of our\nforces in Korea continued to improve and during the latter half\nof January the enemy forces remained on the defensive. Throughout\nFebruary and March our forces maintained the initiative against\nthe enemy.\nMany pages in the MacArthur hearings are devoted to the several\nweeks of retreat and seeming disaster around the end of December\nand beginning of January. The following excerpts and the documents\nquoted perhaps suggest what DGA titles in his outline the \"near\npanic in Tokyo. \"\nMacArthur Sug-\nMarshal] begins the account (p. 331ff) : \"Late in December and early\ngests Four\nin January it appeared altogether possible that we might have to\nCourses of\nevacuate our forces from Korea. On December 29 the JCS requested\nAction\nGeneral MacArthur's views as to the conditions which might determine\na decision to evacuate Korea. He suggested the following four\ncourses of action: Blockade of the coast of China. Destroy\nthrough naval gunfire and air bombardment China's industrial\ncapacity to wage war. Secure appropriate reinforcements from the\nNationalist garrison on Formosa. Release existing restrictions\nupon the Formosan garrison for diversionary action against the\nvulnerable areas of China's mainland.\n\"Under these courses of action, unless they were adopted, and in\nthe absence of reinforcements, General MacArthur stated that it\nwould be necessary to contract our defense lines to the Pusan\nbeachhead for final evacuation.\nThe JCS Reply\n\"On January 9, the JCS, with the approval of the Secretary of\nDefense and the President, informed General MacArthur that the\nretaliatory measures suggested by him could not be permitted;\nand he was therefore directed to defend in successive positions,\ninflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject\nto the primary consideration of the safety of his troops and his\nbasic mission of protecting Japan. Should it become evident in\nhis judgment that evacuation was essential to avoid severe losses\nof men and material, he was at that time to withdraw from Korea\nto Japan. [This January 9 JCS message paraphrased on pp. 332-3.]"
}