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    "title": "Synopsis G, Korea - Miscellaneous Developments, February-June, 1951",
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    "ocrText": "TRUMAN\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nLIBRARY\nKOREA - Synopsis G: Miscellaneous Developments,\n(Page 1)\nRECORDS\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nFebruary-June, 1951\nGOVERNMENT\nThe 38th Parallel As the line of battle became stabilized and the initiative passed\nAgain\nback to UN forces in February, the question of crossing the 38th\nparallel again became a public issue.\nOn February 2nd the State Department issued a statement in response\nto published reports that Great Britain strongly opposed a recross-\ning of the 38th parallel in Korea by UN forces, and that the US\ngovernment also favored the halting of UN troops at the old\nboundary. The statement said: \"The present mission of the UN\nforces in Korea is to repel the aggression and restore international\npeace and security in the area. Repelling the aggression is a\nmilitary mission which will be vigorously pressed. The restoration\nof peace in the area is before the UN; the process would not be\nhelped by speculation about the 38th Parallel at this time. If\nA spokesman of the British Foreign Office said on the same day\nthat the British government would want a full discussion among all\nnations having troops in Korea before any new decision was made\non crossing the 38th parallel, but he declined to say whether\nthis question had been a specific point of discussion with the US.\nAttlee Comments\nOn February 12th Attlee told the House of Commons that it was the\nBritish view that the 38th parallel \"should not be crossed again\nuntil there had been full consultations with the UN and in par-\nticular with those member states that were contributing forces\nin Korea. \" He said that it had to be remembered, however, \"that\nthis was in no sense a military line and in deciding the line\naccount would have to be taken of military considerations.\"\nAttlee said that the US already had been informed of this view\nand had met the suggestion with the \"fullest comprehension of\nthe political implications involved in crossing the 38th parallel. If\nAlso on the 12th, in reply to inquiries about crossing the\nparallel, a spokesman of the State Department said that the US\nhad the matter \"under consideration and.\n[was] consulting\nother governments about it.\"\nMacArthur\nMacArthur expressed his views in a statement issued on the 13th,\nComments\nfollowing an inspection tour of the western front in Korea. The\nstatement said, in part: \"What the future has in store in Korea\ncontinues to be largely dependent upon international considera-\ntions, and decisions not yet known here. Meanwhile, the command\nis doing everything that could reasonably be expected of it.\nTyfial mug.\nOur field strategy, initiated upon Communist China's entry into\nthe war, involving a rapid withdrawal to lengthen the enemy's\nsupply lines with resultant pyramiding of his logistical\ndifficulties and an almost astronomical increase in the destruc-\na\ntiveness of our air power, has worked well. In the development\nof this strategy the 8th Army has achieved local tactical\nARCHIVESAN U.S. SERVICE\" S. RECORDS TRUMAH AND LIBRARY\n(Synopsis G, page 2)\nGOVERNMENT\nsuccesses through maximum exploitation of the air's massive\nblows on extended enemy concentrations and supplies, but in\nthe evaluation of these successes sight must not be lost of\nthe enemy's remaining potential for reinforcement and re-\nsupply. We must not fall into the error of evaluating such\ntactical successes as decisively leading to the enemy's defeat\njust as many erred in assessing our strategic withdrawals in\nthe face of Communist China's commitment to war as a decisive\ndefeat inflicted upon us.\n\"We are still engaged in a war of maneuver with the object of\ninflicting as heavy a punishment upon the enemy as possible,\nstriving constantly to keep him off balance to prevent his\nobtaining and holding the tactical initiative while at the same\ntime avoiding the hazards inherent in his numerical superiority.\nThe concept advanced by some that we should establish a line\nacross Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly\nunrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into\naccount the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the\nrugged terrain which is involved and the relatively small force\nwhich could be committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage\nin such strategy would insure destruction of our forces piece-\nmeal. Talk of crossing the 38th Parallel at the present stage\nof the campaign, except by scattered patrol action incidental\nto the tactical situation, is purely academic. From a military\nstandpoint we must materially reduce the existing superiority\nof our Chinese Communist enemy engaging with impunity in unde-\nclared war against us, with the unprecedented military advantage\nConclusion\nof sanctuary protection for his military potential against our\ncounterattack upon Chinese soil, before we can seriously consider\nconducting major operations north of that geographic line.\"\nDGA and HST\nAt his press conference on February 14, DGA said that he could not\nComment\ndiscuss the question whether UN forces should cross the 38th\nparallel, because such a discussion might aid the aggressors. He\nstated, however, that representatives of nations having troops in\nKorea were meeting regularly in Washington for an exchange of\nideas and information.\nAt his press conference on the 15th, HST said that the crossing\nof the former boundary was a military matter, that the President\nof the US never had interfered with military commanders in the\nfield, and that he had no intention of doing so in this instance.\nHe pointed out that the General Assembly resolution of October 7,\nwhich gave tacit approval to the crossing of the 38th parallel\nby UN forces, was still in effect and that the question of re-\ncrossing the old boundary line was a strategic one in the hands\nof MacArthur, as the Unified Commander. HST acknowledged that\nthere had been considerable discussion about the political aspects\nof the question, but declined to comment further.\nI $ LIBRARY I U.S.\n(Synopsis G, page 3)\nGOVERNMENT\nAfter another visit to the Korean battlefront, on February 20th\nMacArthur issued another statement on the 38th parallel controversy:\n\"The question of the recrossing of the 38th parallel continues to\narouse public discussion. While President Truman has indicated\nthat the crossing of the parallel is a military matter to be re-\nsolved in accord with my best judgment as theater commander, I\nwant to make it quite clear that if and when the issue actually\narises I shall not arbitrarily exercise that authority if cogent\npolitical reasons against crossing are then advanced and there is\nany reasonable possibility that a limitation is to be placed\nthereon. Meanwhile, I repeat that at this time the question is\nacademic.\"\nOn the 20th a spokesman of the British Foreign Office said that\nMacArthur's latest statement concerning the 38th parallel seemed\nto be \"very much in line\" with British views.\nThere were unconfirmed reports on the 24th that the Chinese\nCommunists had made an approach to Great Britain, through India,\nfor the opening of direct negotiations for the settlement of the\nKorean conflict. It was also reported that Communist China\nhad proposed stabilization of the front at the 38th parallel\nin order to establish the necessary conditions for peace talks.\nThe British Foreign Office said that it had no information about\nany overtures from Peiping.\nMacArthur Re-\nDuring early March UN forces pressed slowly forward and reached\nviews the\npoints only a short distance below the 38th Parallel. On March 7th,\nSituation\nafter another visit to the front lines, MacArthur issued a state-\nment that said, in part:\n\"Progress of the campaign continues to be satisfactory\nDesigned\nto meet abnormal military inhibitions, our strategic plan, involv-\ning constant movement to keep the enemy off balance with a cor-\nresponding limitation upon his initiative, remains unaltered.\nour\nOur selection of the battle area furthermore has forced him into\nthe military disadvantage of fighting far from his base and per-\nmitted greater employment of our air and sea arms against which\nhe has little defense. There has been a resultant continuing\nand exhausting attrition upon both his manpower and supplies.\nThere should be no illusions in this matter, however. In such\na campaign of maneuver, as our battle line shifts north the\nsupply position of the enemy will progressively improve, just as\ninversely the effectiveness of our air potential will progressively\ndiminish, thus in turn causing his numerical ground superiority\nto become of increasing battlefield significance.\n\"Assuming no diminution of the enemy's flow of ground forces and\nmateriel to the Korean battle area, a continuation of the existing\nlimitation upon our freedom of counter-offensive action, and no\nmajor additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines\ncannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military\nstalemate. Thereafter our further advance would militarily benefit\nthe enemy more than it would ourselves.\n(Synopsis G, page 4)\n\"The exact place of stabilization is of necessity a fluctuating\nvariable dependent upon the shifting relative strengths of forces\ncommitted and will constantly move up or down. Even now there\nare indications that the enemy is attempting to build up from\nChina a new and massive offensive for the spring. These are the\nsalient factors which must continue to delimit strategical\nthinking and planning as the campaign proceeds\n\"Vital decisions have yet to be made decisions far beyond the\nHARRY U.S. ARCHIVES S. \"NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE\" RECORDS TRUMAN AND\nscope of the authority vested in me as the military commander,\ndecisions which are neither solely political nor solely military,\nbut which must provide on the highest international levels an\nanswer to the obscurities which now becloud the unsolved problems\nraised by Red China's undeclared war in Korea.' \"\nSeoul Recap-\nMeanwhile, the UN offensive continued. On March 14th South\ntured\nKorean patrols entered Seoul. On the 15th UN troops moved into\nSeoul in force and began an unopposed advance northward toward\nUijongbu. On the 19th an 8th Army spokesman announced that\nUN forces were within 17 miles of the 38th parallel at five\npoints along the front. On the 20th it was announced that at\nten points along the front UN troops were less than 17 miles\nfrom the parallel. By the 22nd at some points the distance had\nnarrowed to within four miles of the 38th parallel.\nJCS-State Talks\nOn page 1085 of the MacArthur hearings an unnamed document is\non Korean\nquoted as follows: \"On March 15, 1951, the JCS held an informal\nObjectives\nconference with representatives of the Department of State and\namong other things discussed the Korean situation. It appeared\nto be generally agreed that at some future meeting an agreement\nshould be reached on the objectives in Korea. It suggested that\nthe Secretary of State talk to the Secretary of Defense and the\nChairman of the JCS. If this question was not settled before\nthe next meeting, the question would be discussed at the JCS-\nState Department meeting on that date.\" On the same page\nBradley explained this quote by saying, \"We were trying to get\na decision, particularly with reference to the 38th parallel,\nand we did not get it\n\"\nJCS Informs\nOn March 20th the JCS sent this message to MacArthur: \"State\nMacArthur of\nplanning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of\nTruce Plans\nbulk of South Korea of aggression, UN now prepared to discuss\nconditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists\nthat further diplomatic effort toward settlement should be made\nbefore any advance with major forces north of 38th Parallel.\nTime will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and\npermit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that\nparallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS\nwhat authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of\naction for next few weeks to provide security for UN forces\nand maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.\"\nTRUMAN\nMARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\n(Synopsis G, page 5)\nOn March 21st DGA told his press conference that no new authority\nwould be necessary for MacArthur to order UN troops to go beyond\nthe parallel. He stressed, however, that a common point of\nview was necessary among members of the UN that had forces in\nKorea, and he said that consultations on the question were in\nprogress.\nMacArthur\nOn March 24th MacArthur released the statement which was to wreck\nWrecks the\nthe above-noted truce efforts being conducted by the State Depart-\nPlans\nment. The statement said, in part:\n\"We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized\nCommunist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the\nheavy destruction along the enemy's line of supply has left\nhis troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements\nto sustain his operations. This weakness is being brilliantly\nexploited by our ground forces\nEven under inhibitions which\nnow restrict the activity of the UN forces and the corresponding\nmilitary advantages which accrue to Red China, it has shown its\ncomplete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest\nof Korea.\n\"The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a\ndecision of the UN to depart from its tolerant effort to contain\nthe war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military\noperations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom\nPure considerations Arlitical\nRed China to the risk of imminent military collapse. These basic\nfacts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty\nin arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are\nresolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous\nSu Netru if\nmatters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's\nseat in the UN. The Korean nation and people\nmust not be sac-\nrificed. That is the paramount concern.\n\"Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues\nare resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions\ncontinue to be political in nature and must find their answer\nin the diplomatic sphere. Within the area of my authority as\nmilitary commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand\nready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in\nchief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military\nmeans whereby the realization of the political objectives of the\nUN in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might\nbe accomplished without further bloodshed.\"\nThe JCS\nThe JCS immediately replied on the same day with the following\nRespond\nmessage to MacArthur: \"The President has directed that your\nattention be called to his order as transmitted 6 December 1950.\nIn view of the information given you 20 March 1951 any further\nstatements by you must be co-ordinated as prescribed in the\norder of 6 December. The President has also directed that in\nthe event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the\nfield, you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions.\"\n(Synopsis G, page 6)\nAs Does the\nThere were other immediate reactions to MacArthur's statement.\nState Depart-\nAt first State Department officials declined to comment, but\nment\nit was understood that MacArthur's statement had not been seen\nin Washington prior to its release in Tokyo. Later on the 24th\nthe State Department issued a brief statement: \"General MacArthur\nis conducting UN military operations in Korea under military\ndirectives issued through the US JCS, which, as the President\nstated in a recent press conference, are fully adequate to cover\nthe present military situation in Korea. The political issues,\nwhich General MacArthur has stated are beyond his responsibilities\nas a field commander, are being dealt with in the UN by inter-\ngovernmental consultations.\"\nTRUMAN\nis\nAt the same time, it was publicly reported that the US was cir-\nNATIONAL\nculating among the other 13 nations with forces in Korea a pro-\nposed statement of future UN policy in Korea with a view to its\n0.8.\nearly release in the name of the Unified Command.\nIn another statement on the 24th after a trip to Korea (the first\nstatement was issued prior to his departure for Korea), MacArthur\nexpressed satisfaction with the military situation, and added:\n\"No further comment would seem to be necessary with reference to\nthe 38th parallel, the status of which has been so thoroughly\ndiscussed in recent statements from Washington and London and\nother capitals. As a matter of fact, it has never had any military\nsignificance. Our naval and air forces cross it at will and both\nground forces have done so in the past. I have directed the\n8th Army to do so again if and when its security makes it tactically\nadvisable.\" On the 29th South Korean troops on the east coast\ncrossed the parallel.\nOther Re-\nOn the 27th Marshall told a press conference that MacArthur had\nactions\nauthority to go as far beyond the 38th parallel as was necessary\nfor military security, but he added that \"any general advance\n[was] a matter for political decision.\"\nNehry\nOn the 28th Nehru criticized MacArthur's statement and the impli-\ncation that UN military operations in Korea might be extended to\nmacli-\nthe coast areas and interior bases of China. Nehru said: \"The\nUN was meant to be and was organized as an instrument for the\npreservation of peace. Today it is engaged in meeting aggression\nby armed force. Now I find that we have a further extraordinary\ndevelopment fraught with grave consequences for all countries\nconcerned when military commanders in the field make statements\nof political policies.\"\nThe first reaction by Peiping to MacArthur's proposal to confer\nregarding a cease-fire came on March 29th via a radio broadcast.\nMacArthur's offer to meet the Communist commander in chief in\nthe field to discuss terms for a cease-fire was dismissed as a\n\"bluff\" and an \"insult to the Chinese people.\" The broadcast\nTRUMAN\nBARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nLISBARY\n(Synopsis G, page 7)\nRECORDS\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nreiterated the charge that the US and Great Britain were plotting\n\"direct aggression\" against China, and called upon the Chinese\nand North Koreans to \"fight until the aggressors are driven out\nof Korea. \"\nReactions to and debate over MacArthur's statement of March 24th\ncontinued for several days until superseded by the events sur-\nrounding his replacement as UN commander on April 11th.\nDGA Explains\nDuring the MacArthur hearings DGA was asked to give \"in some\ndetail from your viewpoint precisely what happened\" with respect\nto MacArthur's statement of March 24th and the subsequent collapse\nof the truce ideas. DGA's answer (p. 1774-5) follows:\n\"We were working--we had been working with the Defense Department\non a proposal which we both were considering that, as the head\nof the state, of the Government, which had been asked by the UN\nto be the command, the UN command, the President might make a\nstatement laying down what he proposed as an ending of the\naggression and the stopping of fighting in Korea.\n\"That matter had been discussed by me with the President suf-\nficiently to get his authority to go ahead with it, although no\nfinal paper had been laid before him.\n\"The matter had reached the point where a draft of a proposed\nstatement was made, and had been circulated to the governments who\nhad troops with us in Korea. The replies of most of those govern-\nments had come in, although not all of them had come in on the\ndate in question. Some of the governments approved the statement\nwithout any suggested changes; others suggested some editing\nchanges in it and, as I say, I think two--perhaps more--had not\nreplied on that date.\n\"General MacArthur was informed\nthat a statement was being\nplanned, and his views were requested as to what freedom he required\nas to military purposes to carry on his campaign without embarrass-\nment during that period. He said he had sufficient freedom, but\nhe just did not want any restrictions put on it.\n\"In that situation he made his statement. It seemed to all of us,\nand to the governments concerned, that it was quite impossible for\nthe President to make a statement after that one had been made;\nin other words, the field had been occupied, a statement had been\nmade, and if the President had made one, then everybody puts\ntogether the statement of General MacArthur, which he made, and\ncompares it with the President's statement, and asks is this the\npolicy or, in the case of differences, it is not [sic], and who\nis speaking for the US? So, it was decided that that matter had\nto be held in abeyance.'\nHeavy Fighting\nDuring the months April-June fighting in Korea was heavy and of\nin Korea\na seesaw variety. In late April the Communists launched what\nRidgway called \"the heaviest offensive effort yet made\" and\npushed to within several miles of Seoul. But UN lines held\nand heavy casualties were inflicted on the Communists. By late\nMay UN forces were on the offensive and pushing northwards across\nthe 38th parallel. During subsequent weeks fighting raged in and\nTRUMAN\nBARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\nSERVICE\"\n(Synopsis G, page 8)\nGOVERNMENT\naround what was called the \"iron triangle.\"\nGeneral Assem-\nOn May 18th, by a vote of 47 to o, the General Assembly passed\nbly Passes\na resolution which recommended that all states \"apply an embargo\nEmbargo\non the shipments to areas under the control of [Red China and\nResolution\nNorth\nKorea]\nof arms, ammunition and emplements of war\nIf\nThere were eight abstentions and the Soviet bloc did not par-\nticipate in the voting.\nThere were persistent reports in mid-May that the Soviet Union\nReports of\nhad informally suggested to the US the opening of negotiations\nPeace Feelers\nto reach a settlement in Korea. DGA told his press conference\nDenied by\non the 16th that he knew of no \"peace feelers,' and a representa-\nDGA\ntive of the US delegation to the UN said on the same day that\nhe had no indication that negotiations for a settlement in Korea\nwas taking place with the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists,\nor the North Koreans.\nJohnson\nSenator Johnson\nOn May 17th Senator/offered a resolution in the Senate that\nOffers a\nwould state: \"That it is the sense of the Senate that the UN\nResolution\ncall upon all nations and all groups now engaged in the war\nin Korea to cease fire and declare an armistice effective\nJune 25, 1951; and that prior thereto the UN forces retire to\npoints south and the opposing forces retire to points north of\nthe 38th parallel; and that before December 31, 1951, all\nprisoners of the Korean war shall be exchanged and all non-Korean\npersons, military and non-military (except the ordinary diplomatic\nrepresentatives), shall depart from North and South Korea. The\nproposed resolution was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.\nPravda\nTwo days later, Pravda published the full text of the Johnson\nResponds\nproposal with the comment that \"even certain representatives of\nUS ruling circles are beginning to realize that Wall Street's\ngamble in Korea is hopeless.\" At the same time, other Soviet\nnewspapers and Communist publications in Eastern Europe gave\nextensive publicity to the proposal. Some Western diplomats\nin Moscow were said by \"informed sources\" to believe that the\nattention given the matter might be significant.\nReports of\nMeanwhile, the reports that the Soviet Union had indicated a\nSoviet Desire\ndesire to discuss a cease-fire in Korea continued to circulate,\nfor Cease-Fire particularly at the UN. On the 24th Swedish Representative\nGrafstrom confirmed that the Good Offices Committee had received\na message in which a \"Russian source\" conveyed the willingness\nof the Soviet government to negotiate a settlement in Korea.\nHe said that the message, which had been sent by the foreign\nministry of a non-Communist country to its representative in the\nUN on May 7, had stated that information had been received from\na citizen of that country that, according to \"a Russian source,\"\nthe Soviet Union would regard as acceptable a settlement of the\nS.\nTRUMAN\nHARRY\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIBRARY\n(Synopsis G, page 9)\nU.S.\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nKorean conflict \"along the line of the 38th parallel, but that\nthe Soviet Union was not prepared to initiate the negotiations.\nThe message stated further that the foreign ministry of the\nnon-Communist country concerned was not in a position to judge\nwhether the \"Russian source\" was official. The approach was\nunderstood to have been made to a Swedish citizen, but this was\nneither denied nor confirmed by the Swedish government.\nThe US delegation at the UN continued to deny that an approach,\neither direct or indirect, had been made to any member of the\nUS mission. On May 28th Malik authorized a spokesman for his\ndelegation to say that reports of Korean \"peace feelers\" by\nthe Soviet Union to the US were \"completely groundless.\"\nOn June 8th Lie said that UN member governments were consulting\non what further steps, if any, the UN might take to bring the\nKorean fighting to an end, but he said that he would not wish to\nsay anything in detail that would \"embarrass these consultations.\"\nLie added: \"We must never forget that the objective of the UN\nforces in Korea is to win a victory for collective security\nagainst future wars everywhere by repelling the aggression in\nKorea and restoring peace and security there. A cease-fire\napproximately along the 38th parallel, with all the requisite\nsafeguards, would be a long step forward to such a victory.\"\nMalik's Speech\nBy mid-June some observers had reached the conclusion that the\nrumors of \"peace feelers\" had no foundation in fact. Then, on\nJune 23rd, Malik, speaking on a UN radio program on the subject\nof \"The Price of Peace, If said, in part:\n\"The Soviet Union will continue its struggle to strengthen peace\nand avert a new world war. The peoples of the Soviet Union believe\nthat it is possible to defend the cause of peace. The Soviet\npeoples further believe that the most acute problem of the\npresent day the problem of the armed conflict in Korea could\nalso be settled.\n\"This would require the readiness of the parties to enter on the\npath of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet\npeoples believe that as a first step discussions should be\nstarted between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice\nproviding for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th\nparallel.\n\"Can such a step be taken? I think it can, provided there is a\nsincere desire to put an end to the bloody fighting in Korea.\nI think that, surely, is not too great a price to pay in order\nto achieve peace in Korea.\nState Depart-\nFollowing the broadcast the State Department issued a statement\nment Reaction that said: \"If Mr. Malik's broadcast means that the Communists are\n(Synopsis G, page 10)\nnow willing to end the aggression in Korea we are, as we always\nhave been, ready to play our part in bringing an end to hos-\ntilities and in assuring against their resumption. But the\ntenor of Mr. Malik's speech again raises the question as to\nS.\nwhether this is more than propaganda. If it is more than pro-\npaganda, adequate means for discussing an end to the conflict\nare available.\"\nU.S. RECORDSAND\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\nOther Reactions\nComment on the Malik broadcast in most world capitals was cautious,\nbut optimistic. Morrison told the House of Commons on the 25th\nthat the Soviet proposal for a cease-fire had revivedthe hope of\na settlement and that \"if these sentiments are shared by the\nChinese and North Koreans, it may be possible to make progress\nin the direction we all desire.\" Schuman said on the 25th that\nhis government considered the Malik speech to be \"a positive\nelement to the extent that without any political prerequisites\n[it] may make possible negotiations on the specific subject of\nhalting hostilities in Korea and the mutual withdrawal of troops\nfrom the 38th parallel.\"\nAlso on the 25th Rhee informed his ambassador to the US that any\nproposal for separate governments in North and South Korea would\nbe unacceptable and that a unified Korea was a \"minimum requirement.\"\nThe Korean ambassador told a press conference, however, that he\ndid not think his government \"would be unwilling to discuss anything,\nprovided we were included in all the discussions, but if they're\ngoing to talk behind closed doors and leave us out, I would be\nvery suspicious and doubtful of peace.'\nThe first reaction of the Chinese Communists was published on the\n25th. An editorial in the \"People's Daily\" said that \"the Chinese\npeople fully endorse\" the Soviet cease-fire proposals, but, unlike\nthe Malik broadcast, it alluded to earlier Chinese Communist demands\nfor possession of Formosa and for Chinese Communist representation\nin the UN. It said: \"If [the US] is willing to stop the war,\nshe should therefore fall in at once with the just and reasonable\nmeasures for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question re-\npeatedly proposed by the People's Republic of China, the Soviet\nUnion, and the other countries which desire peace.\"\nOn the 26th Lie cut short his vacation and returned to UN head-\nquarters. He said that in his opinion, the Soviet proposal was\n\"sincere\" and should be \"taken seriously.\" Meanwhile, Malik had\nbeen \"indisposed,\" so that neither the President of the General\nAssembly nor any UN delegate was able to arrange further discussions\nwith him.\nRepresentatives of the 16 members of the UN with forces in Korea\nmet at the State Department on the 27th for a regular twice-a-week\nbriefing on the military situation in Korea. For the first time,\nfollowing one of these meetings, the representatives issued a joint\nS.\nTRUMAN\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nRECORDS\nLIDRARY\nSERVICE\"\nGOVERNMENT\n(Synopsis G, page 11)\nstatement. The Malik proposals had been discussed and \"there was\na consensus that the situation called for further clarification\nand it was noted that steps\n[were] being taken to obtain such\nclarification.'\nII\nGromyko Comments\nOn June 28th the State Department announced that the US Ambassador\nin Moscow had conferred the day before with Gromyko on certain\naspects of Malik's speech. The announcement said, in part: \"In\ndiscussing.\nMalik's statement\nGromyko indicated that it would\nbe for the military representatives of the Unified Command and of\nthe North Republic Command on the one hand and the military\nrepresentatives of the North Korean Command and of the 'Chinese\nvolunteer units' on the other to negotiate the armistice envisaged\nThe armistice\nGromyko pointed out, would include a cease-fire\nand would be limited to strictly military questions without in-\nvolving any political or terri torial matters; the military represen-\ntatives would discuss questions of assurances against the resumption\nof hostilities. Beyond the conclusion of an armistice the Soviet\nGovernment had no specific steps in mind looking toward the peaceful\nsettlement to which\nMalik referred\nGromyko indicated, however,\nthat it would be up to the parties in Korea to decide what subse-\nquent special arrangements would have to be made for a political\nand territorial settlement. He said that the Soviet Government\nwas not aware of the views of the Chinese Communist regime on.\nMalik's statement. II\nRidgway Offers\nFollowing further discussions with representatives of members of\nto Discuss\nthe UN with forces in Korea, the US, with the approval of those\nan Armistice\nmembers, directed Ridgway on June 29 to attempt to arrange a meeting\nwith the Communist command for the purpose of discussing a cease-fire.\nAccordingly, on the 29th, the following message by Ridgway was\nbroadcast to \"the Commander in Chief, Communist forces in Korea\":\n\"As commander in chief of the UN command, I have been instructed\nto communicate to you the following:\n\"I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice\nproviding for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed\nforce in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of\nsuch armistice. Upon receipt of word from you that such a meeting\nis desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would\nalso at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your\nrepresentative. I propose that such a meeting could take place\naboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan Harbor. 11\nThus began the long negotiations to arrange an armistice (see\nSynopsis H)."
}