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S.
AND
RECORDS
is
SERVICE",
(Synopsis G, page 2)
successes through maximum exploitation of the air's massive
blows on extended enemy concentrations and supplies, but in
the evaluation of these successes sight must not be lost of
the enemy's remaining potential for reinforcement and re-
supply. We must not fall into the exror of evaluating such
tactical successes as decisively leading to the enemy's defeat
just as many erred in assessing our strategic withdrawals in
the face of Communist China's commitment to war as a decisive
defeat inflicted upon us.
"We are still engaged in a war of maneuver with the object of
inflicting as heavy a punishment upon the enemy as possible,
striving constantly to keep him off balance to prevent his
obtaining and holding the tactical initiative while at the same
time avoiding the hazards inherent in his numerical superiority.
The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line
across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly
unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into
account the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the
rugged terrain which is involved and the relatively small force
which could be committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage
in such strategy would insure destruction of our forces piece-
meal. Talk of crossing the 38th Parallel at the present stage
of the campaign, except by scattered patrol action incidental
to the tactical situation, is purely academic. From a military
standpoint we must materially reduce the existing superiority
of our Chinese Communist enemy engaging with impunity in unde-
clared war against us, with the unprecedented military advantage
Davilarion
of sanctuary protection for his military potential against our
counterattack upon Chinese soil, before we can seriously consider
conducting major operations north of that geographic line. "
DGA and HST
At his press conference on February 14, DGA said that he could not
Comment
discuss the question whether UN forces should cross the 38th
parallel, because such a discussion might aid the aggressors. He
stated, however, that representatives of nations having troops in
Korea were meeting regularly in Washington for an exchange of
ideas and information.
At his press conference on the 15th, HST said that the crossing
of the former boundary was a military matter, that the President
of the US never had interfered with military commanders in the
field, and that he had no intention of doing so in this instance.
He pointed out that the General Assembly resolution of October 7,
which gave tacit approval to the crossing of the 38th parallel
by UN forces, was still in effect and that the question of re-
crossing the old boundary line was a strategic one in the hands
of MacArthur, as the Unified Commander. HST acknowledged that
there had been considerable discussion about the political aspects
of the question, but declined to comment further.
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"ocrText": "S.\nAND\nRECORDS\nis\nSERVICE\",\n(Synopsis G, page 2)\nsuccesses through maximum exploitation of the air's massive\nblows on extended enemy concentrations and supplies, but in\nthe evaluation of these successes sight must not be lost of\nthe enemy's remaining potential for reinforcement and re-\nsupply. We must not fall into the exror of evaluating such\ntactical successes as decisively leading to the enemy's defeat\njust as many erred in assessing our strategic withdrawals in\nthe face of Communist China's commitment to war as a decisive\ndefeat inflicted upon us.\n\"We are still engaged in a war of maneuver with the object of\ninflicting as heavy a punishment upon the enemy as possible,\nstriving constantly to keep him off balance to prevent his\nobtaining and holding the tactical initiative while at the same\ntime avoiding the hazards inherent in his numerical superiority.\nThe concept advanced by some that we should establish a line\nacross Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly\nunrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into\naccount the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the\nrugged terrain which is involved and the relatively small force\nwhich could be committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage\nin such strategy would insure destruction of our forces piece-\nmeal. Talk of crossing the 38th Parallel at the present stage\nof the campaign, except by scattered patrol action incidental\nto the tactical situation, is purely academic. From a military\nstandpoint we must materially reduce the existing superiority\nof our Chinese Communist enemy engaging with impunity in unde-\nclared war against us, with the unprecedented military advantage\nDavilarion\nof sanctuary protection for his military potential against our\ncounterattack upon Chinese soil, before we can seriously consider\nconducting major operations north of that geographic line. \"\nDGA and HST\nAt his press conference on February 14, DGA said that he could not\nComment\ndiscuss the question whether UN forces should cross the 38th\nparallel, because such a discussion might aid the aggressors. He\nstated, however, that representatives of nations having troops in\nKorea were meeting regularly in Washington for an exchange of\nideas and information.\nAt his press conference on the 15th, HST said that the crossing\nof the former boundary was a military matter, that the President\nof the US never had interfered with military commanders in the\nfield, and that he had no intention of doing so in this instance.\nHe pointed out that the General Assembly resolution of October 7,\nwhich gave tacit approval to the crossing of the 38th parallel\nby UN forces, was still in effect and that the question of re-\ncrossing the old boundary line was a strategic one in the hands\nof MacArthur, as the Unified Commander. HST acknowledged that\nthere had been considerable discussion about the political aspects\nof the question, but declined to comment further."
}