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OCR Page 1 of 227/9/53 - Wire II - p.1
Hull
Q. You ended. up about being subject to attack for softness to the neutrals.
DA. Oh yes, hé - Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain - all of our policies toward them
by
were being attacked the liberal press, and by those people who wanted to be more
vigorous than we could afford to be in dealing with those. And then there was some talk
about: what are you going to do after the war; have you got any plans. Well, this speech
of mine was devised on the basis of what was called moving from weakness to strength. The
underlying foreign policy, there were (realities?) quite apart from points of view. You
could have liberal views, energetic views, relaxed views, all of that; but underlying the
thing there were fundamental realities, and power was one of them, and we had been weak up
to the time that he was speaking, and you had to have policies which were devised for
somebody who was not strong enough to do something more vigorous. And now we were c moving NATIONAL AND
TRUWAN
SERVICE
from a period of weakness into a period of strength; and this was intedided to give
neutrals warning that we were going to be tougher, and we could be tougher, and we had the
means to be. And then it went on to talk about what you were going to do when you achieved
the victory, and it has a very interesting little bit which talks about the proposed United
Nations, and that this was going to depend on Great Power unity, that that was one of the
fundamental theses upon which it was going to rest, and it was rather optimistic that that
was going to occur, but it was an indication of that. Well, at any rate, this was on Mr.
Hull's desk, and he read it over, and rather liked it, and then he said well, he thought
this was pretty good, and we had better get some of the boys in and go over it. Well, I
knew perfectly well that the moment you did that, it would turn back into Leo Paswolski's
speech, and we would be right back where we started, so I said, "I think that's a mistake.
I think before you put any more work in on it, this has got some new ideas in it, and why
don't you send it over to the White House, and see whether Prosident Roosevelt would
approve it?" So he said, "That's a very good idea." So he wrote a note to the President
saying "I am thinking about making this speech, and I would be glad if you would read it,
and give me your criticism." He sent for me Sunday afternoon. I vent back there, and he
said, "Look at this." Here was the speech with a note in the President's handwriting,
which said, "Dear Cordell, this is the best speech you ever made. I will arrange for a
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