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40,000 troops which would give us a total of 160,000 troops, and then there would be
questions as to whether you could ask the Russians to go down to 40,000 or whether you
had to permit them 120,000. In other words, would you have to give them a position equal
to the combined total of the three of us, or equal to just oneof US. Then there was also
the question as to how many troops the Russians had: as I remember it, our estimates
were in the order of 2 350,000 troops that the Russians had in the Eastern zone of Germany
while we had something of the order of 260,000 between all three af us. I think this
came up afterwards in the C.F.M.--I think you asked a question of Vishinsky and he came
back with a reply which indicated that, according to their gigures, they had less than
we had. This was another variation on trying to work up something in the line of, if
not withdrawal of troops, at least the limitation of their number and their separation
from civilian affairs, because what we really wanted to do was to have a German govern-
ment which would not be defeated in its civilian functions by the occupying forces.
Does this correspond with your recollection? I think that the upshot of all this was
that we did not leave Washington with any high hope that there was anything substantial
which you could in this field of mutual withdrawal of forces. Chip took the view that it
was highly unlikely that the Russians would make any offer for the withdrawal of forces.
I remember I was very much concerned that they would make such an offer because this W as
highly embarrassing to us, and Chip said that in his opinion it was unthinkable for the
Russians to offer to withdraw their forces from Eastern Germany in any short period of
time; that they would look upon that as the destruction of their entire position and
all their hopes for Germany, and that this was not a real risk.
as
?? My recollection is that there was a good deal of discussion back and forth/be-
tween the iilitary and the political considerations; some people maintaining that as
things stood, there was no military possibility of stopping the Russians anyhow, so that
if you were analyzing it from a military point of view it didn't make any difference
whether you pulled them back or how many you had--whatever it was the Russians were in
a position to come right through. And others' argued along the line that you noted:
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"ocrText": "7/16/53 - 28\n2\n40,000 troops which would give us a total of 160,000 troops, and then there would be\nquestions as to whether you could ask the Russians to go down to 40,000 or whether you\nhad to permit them 120,000. In other words, would you have to give them a position equal\nto the combined total of the three of us, or equal to just oneof US. Then there was also\nthe question as to how many troops the Russians had: as I remember it, our estimates\nwere in the order of 2 350,000 troops that the Russians had in the Eastern zone of Germany\nwhile we had something of the order of 260,000 between all three af us. I think this\ncame up afterwards in the C.F.M.--I think you asked a question of Vishinsky and he came\nback with a reply which indicated that, according to their gigures, they had less than\nwe had. This was another variation on trying to work up something in the line of, if\nnot withdrawal of troops, at least the limitation of their number and their separation\nfrom civilian affairs, because what we really wanted to do was to have a German govern-\nment which would not be defeated in its civilian functions by the occupying forces.\nDoes this correspond with your recollection? I think that the upshot of all this was\nthat we did not leave Washington with any high hope that there was anything substantial\nwhich you could in this field of mutual withdrawal of forces. Chip took the view that it\nwas highly unlikely that the Russians would make any offer for the withdrawal of forces.\nI remember I was very much concerned that they would make such an offer because this W as\nhighly embarrassing to us, and Chip said that in his opinion it was unthinkable for the\nRussians to offer to withdraw their forces from Eastern Germany in any short period of\ntime; that they would look upon that as the destruction of their entire position and\nall their hopes for Germany, and that this was not a real risk.\nas\n?? My recollection is that there was a good deal of discussion back and forth/be-\ntween the iilitary and the political considerations; some people maintaining that as\nthings stood, there was no military possibility of stopping the Russians anyhow, so that\nif you were analyzing it from a military point of view it didn't make any difference\nwhether you pulled them back or how many you had--whatever it was the Russians were in\na position to come right through. And others' argued along the line that you noted:"
}