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    "ocrText": "REEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page (KR)\nMR. BUNDY: I think to clear he Secretary's point about the press conference, it\nis important to see what he is trying to do here, but not to read it\n(unless you want to).\nVOICE:\nI think there is a reall difference between the kind of thing Paul mehicions,\nwhere they really will study a document on the Marshall Plan and write\ntheir stories their usual technique on press conferences; but I think\nthey look at our press conferences as something of a game in which you\nmay get a statement which is controversal, which will lead to other stories...\n(interruption), to make a dasher (?) on the press conference to Senator\nKnowland or Taft, or somebody else, and say that the S cretary of State\nhas just said this, what do you think about that? And I think they are\nalways playing for a dauble run when they are interrogating you or the\nPresident at the press conferences. It is rather different when they\nare handling a major thing like the white book of Marshall's.\nVOICE ;\nI suppose this document though is more or less in the same category as\na major presentation.\nMR. FESS:\nDeferexyan How long before you show the press conference and allow publication\nand istribute copies of (it (?)).\nHARRIT ES ARCHIVES& RECORDS ADMIN \"NATIONAL TRUMAN CIBRARY\nVOICE:\nAre they given out the day before? At your meeting\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 2 AR)\nMR. JESSUP (?):\nThey were given out, I think, before my meeting. I think we gave\nthem some time to look it over before I went (interruption: Mr. Feis)\ncomments not understandable.) (It is surely not that long, because\nit would not have held that long.) (Water glasses being filled.)\nMR. ACHESON:\nOh, no, no. I should think that it was a matter of day.\nMR. FEIS:\nOnly a matter of\nMR. ACHESON\nMake it 48 hours.\nMR. JESSUP:\n48 hours at the most.\nVOICE:\nThat is probably a factor in the superficiality of the questions both\nQinterruption: I doubt that there...) You couldn't go through very\nmuch of this.\nVOICE:\nI doubt that many of the press people in Washington have ever read\nmore than the letter of transmittal. He would be the rare\n(interruption: I know very few scholars who have done so\n)\nlooked at the White Paper.\nVOICE:\nOne of the rare readers of Felix has final ly claimed that he is the\nonly person, not excluding the Secretary of State (interrupti on and\nlaughter)\nHARRY U.S. GOVERNMENT ANATIONAL TRUMAN LIBRARY\nMR. ACHESON:\nDid he exclude Phil?\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 3, (KR)\n(Interruptions) (After all he had...)\nMR. ACHESON:\nIn answer to your question, Mac, this was not an attempt to summarize\nthe do cummet--my statement to the press. Phil's, the day before, is\na very long.\nMR. BUNDY:\nIt is really an attempt to restate some principles and policy toward\nChina, and it is an attempt to use the press conference in lieu\nof a spe ech in a way, isn't it?\nMR. ACHESON:\nYes. Well, it points out what the problems are that faced us in\nChina, why we are in the position that we are in; we have a traditional\ndoctrines\npolicy, we are trying to follow that one out, here are some documents\nwhich we will be following, on the basis of that we have had to put\nforward the whole story, and Fosdick and Phil and Case, and others,\nare going to go on with it. And what I was talking about is, I was\ntrying to bring out is, that the questions that were are asked me:\nI would not expect them to say that on page 792 there is so and so;\nbut I would expect them to go after more why this was done, what I\nHARRY ARCHIVES& \"NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN: LIBRARY\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\nthink the effect is going to be, and thatkind of broad question.\nInstead of that, we get t his little business of aren't you inconsistent\nwith what you said three weeks ago, and that kind of business.\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 4 (KR)Ø\nMR. FEIS:\nThe thing that\npowerful comment was Dean Rusk's talk,\ntop secrets talk, in 1949, where he said. (not understandable)\nDEAN RUSK?\nI obj ect to having this on the record.\n(interruptions and laughter.)\nVOICE:\n(It's on the machine, you're late. )\nMR. ACHESON:\nIf you don it want to do it, why then...)\nMR. BUNDY:\nI'll takeit and make a memo.\nMR. FEIS:\nWell, I... Apart from the question and quite second to the question\nas to the sorts that lead to the (interruption: preparation You're\nreally pointing out the\n) pre paration and incorporation of\nthe volume and its adequacy for the job, the purpose, as a guy who\nhas been using it constantly, I get the sense of certain delienciesx\ndefidencies in it, as a historical record on which I am experienced,\nHARRY ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL TRUMAN RECORDS ADMIN.\" LIBRARY\nparticularly in the years before 1947 which are the years I most\nUS.\nthoroughly examined. And there was, and there are specifically,\nGOVERNMENT\nthe reasons for the (notes) specifically noted in a footnote or\nin the introduction, i.e., a very limited account of the decisions\nmade by the military, the decisions primarily influenced by military\nconsiderations, the absence of various rather crucial communications\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 the Page\nKR)\nMR. FEIS:\nbetween the President and Chang Kai Chek or khe a too brief summary\nof them, a too scattered extract of them. The lack of thorough\nrevelation of the talks in t he international conferences such as\nAND Potsdam, bearing on China affairs,\nall of those together, make a somewhat distorted record of our\nthen\nChina policy\nto which I/add from an editorial standpoint\nthat I found difficulty because I didn't find definite enough,\nthorough distinction between decisions that could be a guide\nas major ones and secondary ones. But I repeat, I was doing that\nmerely as the student using it, even after years, to try to get\nin the record there, as an indication of early judgment\n(not\nunderstandable)\nMR. BUNDY:\nYou add that a fully record would not reinforce the policy position\nwhich the Department was trying to explain at the time.\nNo, I would not. You\nthat language.\nMR. FEIS:\nI say if you simply put the decisions of the State Department in\nU.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES & \"NATIONAL TRUMAN RECORDS ADMIN\" LIBRARY\na different framework of fact and understanding than they weys\nin which it appears in that book. (intruruption.) Sometimes\nit would reinforce the position; there are other times at which\nit might give ground for additional dispute or criticism of the\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page\n.KR)\nMR. FEIS:\nState Department; but would modify our judgment of the election.\n(Interruption)\nMR. FEIS:\nI beg your pardong.\nVOICE:\nI don't want to go into detail with this little\nMR. JESSUP?\ninformation because I never have seen these documents, and couldn't\nget that on\nterm since.\nDo they change the picture which\nthe\nwe tried to present as the reason for the fall of/Chang Kai Chek\ngovernment?\nMR. FEIS:\nI think they (turn the received account and understanding) of every\nphase of the China racket. If you want to select a spectacular\nplease ask you to keep inside\nexample, which I room: The main decisions at\nYalta were made well ahead of the Yalta Conference. And that's a way in\nwhich the whole historical perspective has changed\nVOICE:\nI am not sure I get how that changes the historical perspective. No\none reading a White Paper concerning a conference--it doesn't indicate,\nHARRY U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& \"NATIONAL TRUMAN RECORDS ADMIN\ndessn't leads you to believe there hadn't been some negotiation on\nit before. I mean the don't remember the section on the Yalta\nConference, sart of saying that this happened something oc curred that\nI am reasonably sure\nin the afternoon with the historical\nperspective you get diffident as to whether or not it has been\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 7 (KR)\nVOICE:\nworked out by Harriman in advance or as he later disclosed in\nconsiderable detail in his affidavit, or been worked out by\nPresident Roosevelt there. What is the perspective in the terms\nof the element of evaluation.\nMR. FEIS:\nWell, I think you willfind, if you looked over/the paper, you\nget the impression that the decisions were pretty completely made\nat Yalta, and the refore oug ht to be considered in the light of\nthe circumstances prevailing in 1945, and there is when it meant\na cheer, and that is the normal, historical test.\nVOIC E:\nYes\nThe\nthe free hand\nMR. FEIS:\n(interruption)\nIf you knew very well that a very large part\nof it was pretty well arranged--ajd I am not referring to the\nHarriman dis cussions; I am referring to discussions well before\nHARRY US GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& \"NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN TRUMAN LIBRARY\nthat (interruppion: what other discussions?) you get a whole\ndifferent approach.\nVOICE:\nI have been going into con siderable detail with Harriman, who\n(Mr. Jessup?)\nI think is about as directly involved in a decision made ther è⑉⑉\nand it was not made with any sense of commitment at t he time; if\nwe wanted to we could have changed it--I did not get that impression\nat all.\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 8 (KR)\nMR. FEIS:\nYou didn't get what impression?\nVOIE:\nDidn't get the impression that there is any difference in perspective\n(Mr. Jessup?)\nor d ifference in historical evaluation because of the fact that there\nhad been prior considerations in some detail. Because the people\nwho finally made up their minds-most of the people had been in the\nearlier considerations--were in fact there. A large number of them\nwere. That t he final putting of the\nsea line was due to an irrevacable commitment made at some other\ndate. Sure, there was considerable work done on it. But when the\nthing was finally agreed to if was agreed to in light of t he circumstances\nthat were then there. Abd you may have (made this aut)af a document\nthat I have not had; but I have\nbut I went thr ough the se things in perhaps excessive detail for the\nlast couple of years; and I certainly don't get that impression.\nMR. FEIS:\nI am tempted to\nby saying that it may n ot have\nchanged your impression, but it changed my perspective and it changed\nmine. (Laughter)\nI agree that (interruppions and laughters\nHARRIS US. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& RECORDS ADMIN \"VATIONAL TRUMAN LIBRARY\nVOICE:\n(Mrs Jessup.)\nMR. FEIS:\nand there is even a possibility that I've run on\na couple of documents you might not have come across.\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page or KR)\nMR. ACHESON:\nIn this matter of press conferences, and the general reception of\nthe White Paper, I noticed that on the conference following the\none that I have just read to you, just read about, apparently--\nand I remember this happening--Lincoln White came to me and said\nI\nthat I was being much too severe with these pe ople and that its hurt\ntheir feelings.\nVOICE:\nI would have said that to you too; and I just never got around to\nmaking an issue of that. (Laughter)\nMR. ACHESON:\nMy whole relation with the press was one of baying them and making\nup. Thanks to God. I thought they were spoiled; they thought I\nwas irritable; we're probably both right. So, I say, on the 12th\nof August, I might have opened the press conference this morning\nhitherto\nby replying to a question from a high/sxkm silent colleague\nof ours here, Mr. Lincoln White. After our last conference, Mr.\nWhite asked me whether certain answers given by the Secretary of\nState to certain que stions from members of the press conference\nHARRIS HARRY ARCHIVES& TRUMAN \"NATIONAL RECORDS LIBRARY\nwere inspired by the advice of (Lewis CamoII), who said, speak\nADMIN\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\nroughly to your little boys beat him when he sneezes, he only does\nit to annoy because he knows how to sneeze. This device questions\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Pagel0 KR)\nMR. ACHESON:\nwas whether that was the case, whether it was the case that I was\nfollowing that admonition, and whether I intend to continue to\nfollow it in the future. His implication was that he hoped to God\nthat was not the c ase. I was right that any similarity between my\nanswers to any living person, in Mr. Carroll's advice, was purely\nincidental and highly regrettable.\nMR. BUNDY:\nThat's mar velous!\nMR. ACHESON:\nWell, we decided that we were all friends again.\nVOICE:\nDoesn't thi S illustrate what has been a constant problem, though,\non the part of the free press conference, which is a privilege of\nunparalleled scope of the press, in which few politicians of any other\ncountry ever approximate, and few people in our walk of life evert\napproach; and doesn't it actually require a greater degree of\nresponsibility on the part of the press; and our press is yet\ndeveloped.\nVOICE:\nAren't you really exposing your self as a public figure in one of\nHARRES HARRY U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& TRUMAN \"NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY\nthe se press conferences to a major ordeal which is way beyond the\ncall of duty?\nMR. ACHESON:\nWell, I think so, and I think it is thoroughly unfortunate, and I\nwould like to see it curtailed. We said at one earlier meeting--\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page\n(KR)\nMR. ACHESON:\nI think it grew out of President Roosevelt's facility at this sort\nof thing, and his enjoyment of it, and that led everybody else to\nbel ieve that they had to do it or to be shown not to be true men.\nI don't see why at a press conference at which questions are put\nin in advance, and are carefully thought out and answers prepared\nand conducted in a very strict way, isn't the best thing to do.\nI think we have now come to the ultimate of absurdity of this\npress conference, where they are printing at the present time the\nfull transcript of President Eisenhower's press conference. The\nthat instead of\nonly change being/having \"I\" in, it says \"the President felt that,\"\nand then it goes on and quotes him verbatim.\nVOICEE\nIt's a long way from\nour spokesman.\nMR. ACHESON:\nIt's a terrible thing.\nMR. FEIS:\nIn this particular instance when you are sure of t he fact that you\nreally haven it set yourself a job in which the outcome could not have\nbeen pleasant after all the quarreling t hgt you account is the\nHARRY ARCHIVES& \"NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN.\" LIBRARY\nvery thing that caused General Marshall to be interested in the\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\npublichision of such records, which was the probability, the increasing\nprobability, that China was going to f ormthe control quite probably\nof unfriendly allies. The American people might be hurt, shocked,\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 be Page\n(KR)\nMR. FEIS:\nsurprised and angered; that it would be better understood if the\nrecord were presented. That being your inspiring (cruces), you\nare, I say, you produce a (lot in the government?), but your\nproducing and presenting is bound to appear as the messenger\nbringing. It is very unpleasant; no matter how fully your\nexplanation of how this story came about, it is still a grievous\nmessage to communicate to the American people, and it is almost\ninevitable that they and the press would not rejoice on it or send\nthemselves, or quickly align a fight on your side to make it all\nsound cheerful and pleasant. I really think you (troubling) with\nsomething almost unmanageable, when the presentation starts.\nMR. ACHESON:\nI agree. I never had any other ideas than that this was going\nto be unpleasant, and that this was going to be troublesome; and I\nwasn't criticizing anybody, the press, or anyome else, for not\nliking it. What we have, I thought, been talking about is whether\nHARRITA U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& TRUMAN \"NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN.\" LIBRARY\nthe press is adequate to Its task; and it doesn't seem to me that in\nmany respects it is.\nMR. JESSUP (?)\nI think this was not also just a problem of an abstract question\nof informing the people about a difficult development. But there\nwere signs that this was going to be a considerable partisan issue.\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page (KR)\nMR. JESSUP (?) Now, you had that on the one side; on the other side you had a great\nreluctance on the part of the Foreign s⁺rvice point of view against\npublishing the White Paper at all; and it was pretty much under\ndirect pressure from the President that the thing was actually\npublished.\nMR. BUNDY:\nOnly you were in favor of publishing it yourself?\nMR. ACHESON:\nOh, yes, yes.\nVOICE:\nDid your judgment on that change at all in retrospect? Would you\ndo it over again?\nMR. ACHESON:\nI think you have to do it. I think we had to do it.\nVOICE:\nThe same kind of argument? The same kind of document?\nMR. ACHESON:\nWell, that is a trickier question, and I don it know\nMR. FEIS:\nAlso it is a good professional question anyway, the same kind that\n(interruption) I would have asked at the same time, i.e., I might\nadd the second professional (question).\nVOICE:\nThis is obviously on the same side of the question?\nMR. FEIS:\nOh, both. That is why I called them professional questions.\nThat is what I mean by it.\nHAREY U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN NATIONAL TRUMAN LIBRARI\nMR. BUNDY:\nBut we ought to look at the question.\na better document\nVOICE: Prof Graham: In what ways could you have gotten at that time?\nn\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 1. (KR)\nMR. ACHESON:\nWell, I think, to answer your question is that t he second t ime\nI had to do it, I did something different, but I did something\ndifferent because I think in large part that had been done, and\nyou couldn't do it without it; and the statement that I made before\nthe McCarthy Committee on China Policy is a wholly different kind\nof a thing, which was short, readable and as accurate as you make\nas an over-simplified insurance statement. But it would not have\nthe\ngotten anywhere at all if all/papers had not been available that\nwere available to me.\nMR. BUNDY:\n(...Yu did interesting piece of speculation onto that, a quite\nwonderful piece of briefing in the double sense of trying to explain\nwhat happened and doing it in short context; if that had been available\nas a Fire Side Chat, or with the White Paper, W ould you then have\nhad a double-barrelled business which gave you a kind of an attack\n\"hit him high with the document, and hit him low with an explanation\"?\nThat ** I think would have been more helpful.\nVOICE:\nI think there is, there was a little feeling on my part when I came\n(Mr. Bundy?)\nto study this\n,\nthat the Department tossed this heavy\nand important, and I think, with all the reservations underneath\nabout it, extraordinary job of quick work onto the public, and\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 15 (KR)\nMR. BUNDY:\nyet expected it to swim f or itself, in a way that is perhaps asking\ntoo much of channels of communication and transmission and\nan\nVOICE:\nIt is true, Mac; on the other hand when you are dealing with/historical\nexplanation of something that nobody is particularly happy about,\nit seems to me making a project out of it, and it puts it in the\nwrong light.\nMR. BUNDY:\nIt is bound to t be a project anyway. You are only doing it if it is\na project.\nVOICE:\nThat is true.\nHARRY U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES & ADMIN NATIONAL TRUMAN LIBRARY\nMR. BUNDY:\nYou pay that penalty anyway.\nVOICE:\nThat is true. But where they don't increase your price if you say\ntake it to the country, make Fire Side Chats\nMR. BUNDY:\nYou cannot say that this is a standard document of the Foreign Relations\n0\nof the United States Republic and put out an order because we know\neverybody is interested in China.\nVOICE:\nWhat do yout hink the effect would have been, say a series of\nradio hookup tieins to explain why China fell, so to speak?\nMR. BUNDY:\nWell I think that that raises the question of whether Canton was\nquite late enough and other questions of that character.\nREEL 3 to 7/22/53 - Page lo (KR)\nVOICE:\nWhat I think, Mac,\n,\na better time, let's suppose when they\nwere arguing about Formosa: Do you think that (interruption)\nMR. BUNDY:\nI think then you would have really had them. I think that in the\nbeginning of 1950 there could have been more of the battle fought\nthan there was. Yes; but then we haven't got to t hat yet.\nVOICE:\nWell, I think the point that you made, Dean, is important in\nconnection with the reason for publishing it, and I think it\ncorrects a little bit of what you say, in talking a bout t he\nDepartment throwing work out on the country and then letting it sink\nor swim by itself. I think it was conceived as something which would\nbe used cons tantly in the months and years ahead as the partisan\nattack, which was anticipated, developed. And it wasn't thought\nof as being merely a spot job, but something which was going to be\nof continuing value, and which could be referred to and which could\nHARRY ARCHIVES & TRUMAN \"NATIONAL RECORDS LIBRARY\nbe used to knock down partisan attacks as they came along. And I\nADMIN\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\nthink it did serve that purpose.\nVOICE:\nExcept for one major factor. That is, that when you get into a\nformal, official statement from the State Department on a matter of\nthis sort, you can't engage in a fight with an opposition political\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 17 (KR)\nVOICE:\nparty, regardless of which your party is on, on even terms. And\nwhat this issue lacked was Democratic Party\n(interruption)\nMR. BUNDY:\nWell, I quite agree on that\nand policy\nVOICE:\nleadership in Capitol Hill and throughout the c ountry; and therefore\nhere was a foot soldier trying to fight attack politicaly, (because)\nhe wasn't equipped to do that\n(interruption)\nVOICE:\nYou may be entirely right in suggesting that t he persons who\nMR. BUNDY:\nneeded to make speeches about China were not in fact in the Department\nafter the beginning, that it was more important to have the Democratic\nParty... (interruption)\nVOICE:\nLooking back on it, I would think that as the President issued\n(Mr. Jessup)\ninstructions to the State Department to put out these documents,\nthere was another chain of command which he should have stimulated,\nthrough the Democratic National Committee into the party leadership,\nHARRY U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& \"NATIONAL TRUMAN RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY\nto get busy and prepare for the coming battle on this thing; and I\nthink that somewhere along the line that didn't happen, so that\nit was an uneven fight from the beginning, because of the failure\nof the Democratic leadership to take it up.\nMR. FEIS:\nAnd I think if, in the presentation of it, ther e had been a thought\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 18 R)\nMR. FEIS:\nof handling it in this way, editors of the volume would have found that\nthey would have presented the mat erial somewhat dif ferently organized,\nand presumably organized around the contentious points\n(interruption)\nlet me go on, let me go on, and perhaps you--perhaps it's wrong, I don't\nknow-but let me give you what I mean by illustration. Take the\nquestion of the whole protracted end eavor to negotiate some sort\nthe\ngovernment\nof settlement politically between/Chang Kai-Shek/and the communists.\nNow a consistent accusation has been that it was foblishly conceived,\nbased on incorrect judgment, and quite possibly inspired by communist\n(lead) boys spread in and about the State Department. That is the\nattack. Now if you are fully aware of the possibilities that argument\non that point were sufficiently(4live) and thought that the record\nrefuted it, then you present your material on that point, I think, Mac,\nin such a way as to make you-without distorting your material-but\nat least bring out the points in your argument more clearly than\nthat brought out just by a normal, sort of tranquil, even-running\naccount of this, in which you find eight pages here and fifty pages\nalong (interruption) and eight pages from that.\nHARELY U.S. GOVERNMENT ARECORDS ADMIN NATIONAL TRUMAN LIBRARY\nMR. BUNDY:\nI think that is true\nI think you would find yourself organizing in the\nsomewhat\nMR. FEIS:\nREEL # - 7/33/52 - Page 19 (KR)\nMR. FEIS:\ndifferently.\nMR. ACHESON:\nAnd that idea merged at this time.\nMR. BUNDY:\nThis is I think the point that this... (interruption) (not understandable)\nMR. FEIS:\nI don't remember what critical arguments Harriman had. I was just\npicking up... (interruption)\nVOICE:\nThis\nof mine in the spring of '48.\nVOICE:\nIt seems to me that that was what we tried to do in the letter of\n(Mr. Jessup)\ntransmittal, and I was reading that over again today. And it seemed\nto me in reading it over again that that came out very well. But t hat's\nVOICE:\nI don't think I agree with you on the method of presentati on on the\nbasic documents. I think that in the first place you are calling on\nprofessional foreign staff by and large to do that work for you. And\nI think they have to be trained and protected against organizing for the\ncombatted\ndávided points. That is a word that ought to be carried by the\npolitical leadership, and I think it is a difficult question and I am\nHARRY US GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& TRUMAN NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN.\" LIBRARY\nnot sure what the answer to it is, but I think it is a difficult question\nanyway.\nMR. BUNDY:\nI do think it is important that the kinds of aggument, even if Joe\ndra.\npicked on the stragegical one early, there is a kind of hyper-headedness\nabout this China business:/answer one accusation and you would find\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 28 'KR)\nMR. BUNDY:\nthat in a subordinate clause that the answer would have exposed yourself\nto a nice piece of the ratrace. In other words, this is bound to be\na quarry, and the organization and argument would have to be new for\nthe context every time, I whould think.\nVOICE:\nWell this is in my case, I know, complete (Monday morning) because\n(Mr. Jessup?)\nI don't remember feeling that this battle had the kind of urgency\nor the kind of\nthat looking back at it you now do seem\nin the\nto find, that developed opinion in '48 and '49. Let me make one\nNATIONAL\nother totally ex post facto suggestion, and that is that the timing\nU.S.\nARGISTES GOVERNMENT ADMIN\nthat was taken here seemed to be, seemed to place the Depar tment\nin the posture of making an answer before it was really under heavy\nfire. Now I notice this is in a sense not quite true in the light\nhas\nof what the Secretary/said; and yet one wonders whether, if you had\nenough people saying \"Well, what t he hell does the Department of State\nthink it was doing\", and had this as a (repulse) to pressure for explana-\ntion, you would have been in a stronger position. (interruption) This\nties in with my feeling that(if you) had a little bit of excuse to\nthe people who said you have done it too early, because of course there\nwere lots of Chinese on the mainland, in terms of spots and areas\nin 1949, and you could make an argument that this was a hell of a thing\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 2\n(KR)\nHARRIS TRUMAN ARCHIVES& \"NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN.\" LIBRARY\nMR. JESSUPE\nto do. I don't know about this.\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\nVOICE:\nThis question of objectivity is taking an awful beating in poditical\nchannels anyhow, Mac; I am not sure that at t he time if the pot had\nreally boiled, and you could have come out with the White Paper, that\nit wouldn't have been under\nVOICE:\nDipping down into the wor st collection of attitudes, it wouldn't have\nbeen \"defensive\" and argumentive, and that that would have been the\nanswer.\nVOICE:\nWell, doesn't think accomplish quite a bit, as it is supposed to?\nMR. BUNDY:\nWell it was very helpful to those who wished to be helped. I mean\npeople in any academic work, who believed a lot of this, and hadn't\nhad document S to indivate the (various scores). It was a instrument\nof understanding and late of argument. The first year I used it teaching\nthe re wasn't any argument, W hich is an interesting fact.\nVOICE:\nAs a sample of the lack of a political follow-up that I was talking\nabout within a few months after the appearance of this in the spring\nof '50, I made a short speech on China, which in its principal policy\npoints, it is very close to the principal policy points stated in the\nSecretary's letter of transmittal, even such things as hoping that the\nChinese would do something about, we should do everything we could to\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 22 (KR)\nmy\nVOICE:\nencourage them, and things of that sort. When that speech was made,\nthough, a few months later, both sides of this controversy considered\nan entirely new statement of policy.\nMR. BUNDY:\nyou mean the one you marte in the spring of '59, don't you?\nVOICE:\nNo, '50\nHARBITA HARRY U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& \"NATIONAL TRUMAN RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY\nMR. BUNDY:\nThat was at the time of the McCarthy hearings.\nVOICE:\nYou're right, excuse me, '51; I'm sarry. I got a year off the track.\nVOICE:\nOf carse, Dean, I have a feeling I can speak only from acquaintance\nwith one particular national committee, but Mac might bear me out\nis\non this other: if is the idea/that you mobilikie mobilize it sort\nof like you mobilize the GH human army, it just isn't SO. I mean\nthat just goes on the assumption of our whole political organization\nis getting far afield. That isn't the problem this evening; but I\nthink this is a footnote.\nVOICE:\nYou just can't go to a national committee and say Mr. Chairman please\nmobilize twent y-two senators to raise hell on the\nMR. BUNDY:\nwas done, though, Butch. I think that you are right in a sense.\nI only know minority national committees. I have seen nothing of\nor anything\nmy national committee, connected with the White House. But I think\nthe White House' own party is a little different.\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page\n(KR)\nVOICE:\nWell, you can always point out that your acting majority leader in\nthe Senate is saying that Singham Rhee in most recent discussions\nis the same thing\nMR. BUNDY:\nI agree. But it still would be true that if Len Hall wanted to get\nway,\na lot of Senators to go and/make noises that Eisenhower wanted me. de,\nhe could get them to do SO.\nU.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& \"NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY\nVOICE:\nThe Senators I know, they would bitterly resent any attempt by the\nNational Committee to tell them what they ought to say on anything.\nsort of\nVOICE:\nI think we are probably getting into\nI don it know, I have/a feeling\nthat it overestimates the potentialities of the political organization\nas such, to, say, crack the whip with the committees. The Senate is\nregarded as a service function to a large degree.\nMR. BUNDY,\nWell then suppose we change it around and make the point that there\nwas needed a Presidential follow-up. Somewhere there is a problem\nof political leadership in this issue, which the White Paper is not in\nitself. (This is, I thinki something to say)\nVOICE:\nWell, aren't you simply saying that in this period the Truman adminis-\nt\ntration did not have active Briends in the Senate group who would take\nthe initiative in doing these things.\nreally\nMR. BUNDY:\nby something which by the natur e of Amer ican politics nobydy wants\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 2 (KR)\nMR. BUNDY:\nto do. This is a most unpleasant business. We're saying that a country\nyou've had a passionate and rather sentimental love affair with for\ngoing to\nfifty years has just turned Whore, and what do you/do aboutit.\nVOICE:\nThis is unattractive stuffto deal with at all politically. I should\n(Mr. Nitze)\nthink it would be a liability. (interruption)\nVOICE:\nThis has, God knows, been a little rough, Paul.\n(Interruption)\nMR. BUNDY:\nI couldn't agree with you more, that there was no easy way; and yet,\nseeing what did happen, you wonder whether there was any other.\nreally\nVOICE:\nI think that is all you can/try to assess from hindsight, is what\nwould have happened if you had not issued the White Paper, or if\nyou had issued something different than the White Paper. Would you\nhave been any better off. I am sure that the political attack on the\nadministrati on would have gone forward in any case, whether the White\nPaper had been issue d or note. (interruption)\nHARRY U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES & \"NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY\nMR. BUNDY:\nI think that is right.\nVOICE:\nThis was well designed. It was perfectly clear why; this made complete\npolitical sense; this was the area for the major attack on the part\nnot had a\nof the Republicans; it was bound to be. Now, if you had smother\nWhite Paper, there would have been a lote of other things. But then\nREEL 3 - 7/33/53 - Page 25 (KR)\nVOICE:\nyou would have been under attack for not having a record of what\nhappened. The whole thing would have been trumped up. Would that\nattack have been any worse than the attack was as a result of the\nWhite Paper, or not? I dan it know.\nHARRITE HARRY TRUMAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY\nU.S.\nGOVERNMENT\nVOICE:\nSince the administration and the government was barred officially\nfrom reporting what was happening here to Chang Kai-Shek, is it\npossible that as an alternative unofficial observers could have been\n(spaded) in reporting what was happening, so that the pubbic might\nhave been more prepared for this fall.\nVOICE:\nWell, was that the problem of prep aring the public for the fall.\nIt doesn't seem to me that that is the problem. The problem is that\nhere was a ready-made issue that the Republicans could grab hold of.\nor hear\nMR. BUNDY:\nCount it less \"ready-made\", even though you say,/thx people say, well,\nwe do\nyes, yourdenow damn well it had to happen. Another\nof attack,\nwhic h you suggested by the existence of these closed-session meeting,\nand which has been helpful in other areas of party politics, is to\nassociate people in responsibility. Now it is true that the Republicans:\ndepth is public responsibility all the way through. The question\ndoesn't arise whether this ducking shouldn't have been brought ho me\nto them at an earlier stage, and whether the record couldn't then have\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 2L (KR)\nMR. BUNDY:\nincluded, rather more than it now does, although, by golly, there is\nplenty on Vandenberg, which he ducked; there's enough even in his\nown book to make his own public muklix position doubtful. I don't\nmean to suggest, I am not trying to say that there was anything\neasy about this, or that it would have been much better; but I think\nit is important to try and figure out whe ther there were other things\nthat might have been done, or whether this is the nature of events in\nAmerican foreign policy, when something unpleasant happens, when some-\nthing unexpectedly disagreeable comes across the mind of the American\npeople, does it then become inevitably a point of great advantage to\nthe opposition party? You can say that the fall of China was like a\nfor\ndepression; that might be the easiest political assessment nit the\nobjective of (political science).\nMR. FEIS:\nThat8s really what I was suggesting: That this is a disaster to the\ncountry of the same magnitude as a depression.\nHARRY U.S. ARCHIVES& NATIONAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY\nVOICE:\nOf course, you know there were people who were politically disappointed,\nand you can argue with their facility that the Chairman of the\nForeign R e lations Committee during this period supported this line\nkey\nperhaps with excessive vigor. Some of the which democrats in the\nForeigh Relations Committee, including McMahon and, say, Connolly,\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 27 (KR)\nVOICE:\ndid not run out on us. I think, the more they tried to downething\nabout it, until you got to the point of t he McCarthy hearings, where they\nhad to, in one form or another-they got a little discouraged as they\nwent on. (interruption).\nVOICE:\nThey became moreand more defensive, as they went on.\nVOICE:\nThat is right, they did. And it wasn't until you had a man like\ns\nthat anyone of cour se this ole thing had\nnot\na non-fefensive basis. I mean, Connolly and those fellows did/run\nout on us. They\nMR. ACHESON:\nThey fought hard. The record is full of Connolly's taking a vigorous\nposition.\nVOICE:\nWell, it was liking singing psalms to a dead duck; they kept on fighting\nhard, and they got less and less response; and I think that tends to\nthe depression theory a little bit too, Mac.\nCould this be off the record?\nHARRY U.S. TRUMAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES GOVERNMENT RECORDS ADMIN & LIBRARY\nVOICE:\nMxxxx (Yes.)\nMR. ACHESON:\nSo we might say tonight, and then tomorrow get into the real fireworks\n(interruption\nthat began in January. And this was powerful, but this was\nof what was to come. I had a press conference on the 24th, which I\nshall not read here; but I go into very considerable length here into\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page28 KR)\nMR. ACHESON:\nan attempt to get everybody together, inside, outside the Department,\nin both parties, into an appraisal of where we go from here on out,\nand stop talking about who ought to have done something differently.\nThat is a long discussion. Then, on the 26th, I had an off-the-record\nthat\nmeeting with the press in the evening, another one of those whichedd we have\ntalked about before: John Hightower, John Reichman, and 8. whole list,\nvery much the same people we ha ve talked of, (and Evis Carl McCartel\nis in it), and rather more people than were in the last one; but of the\na lot\nsame general character. And we talked/about many things. These notes wer\nmade afterwards by\nWhite; we talked about China; and them\nTRUMAN U.S. D LIBRARY\nwe get into this question of aid, and I am pointing out to them that\nthey have got to get a much clearer idea in their minds as to what\nthe organization is that they want to aid, and I point out what it is\nthat is on Formosa, and what the nature of that Government and that\noutfit are, and then point art that the, what had happened on the\nmainland is that the President has been left-Lee is alone, without\na government, without funds, without an organization of any sort--\nthe legislature couldn't make up its mind what it was going to do;\nit was finally decided that they should go to Chung-King; at that\ntime when went to Chung-Khing, and a hundred went to Formass,\nten of them\nREEL 3 ⑉ 7/22/53 ⑉ Page 20 (KR)\nMR. ACHESON:\nand some others have disappeared. They have no money; whatever money\nthere was was taken off by the Generalissimo, and whatever money is\nbeing collected now is being collected by various warlards or in little\na unified\ngroups around the country, and it doesn't make any sort of/financial\nbasis for resistance. And it is in that situation that we have been\nasked to give military aid to the Nationalist Government far the\nrecapture of the continent. That, I say, is sheer madness. If you\ntry to get together any people in Canton to do this, there isn't anyone\nto do it;\nthere if you sent it to various warlords, there is no chance\nthat they will take it and use it for any useful purpose. And then I\nmake a rather violent statement her apparently they are pressing me\nHARRYS U.S. THE ARCHIONAL RECORDS GOVERNMENT LIBRARY\nabout it and they are saying that everybody wants to send aid to them,\nand I say that XXH people are coming to me every day asking that we go\nto Congress and ask for aid, and I don't propose to do it and I don't t\npropose to be bullied by the Congress or by public opinion; it just\nisn't going to be done. And if they want to find a Secretary of\nState who thinks otherwise they have got to look somewhere else for\nhim. So that, apparently, was quite a vigorous meeting.\nAt this point, the attack on the WhitePaper really gets going. Judd\nfiled his sixteen charges, and we put out detailed answers to those.\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page .\n(KR)\nVOICE:\nWhat is the date?\nMR. ACHESON:\nDecember 24 is the date that that was issued. The sixteen charges\nwere made shortly before that, a day or two before. We go on with\nthe arguments about recognition. Bevin and Schumann arrived in\nSeptember and that gives rise to a lot of rumors that we are going to\nrecognize the communists, which we deny. Nehru arrived on October 4;\nand that starts it all up again. And I discussed recognition with the\npress quite fully, at the press conference of October 12th. On\nNovember 16th I point out that the President said, and I repeat, that\nthe world chaos removes any possibility of the American recognition of\nARCHIONAL\nLIBRARY\nHARR\nthe communists. In november the Flying Cloud gets fired on by the\n3\nGOVERNMENT\ncommunists and we put out a statement on that on N°vember 30th. Again\non November 16th, I am asked whether I am talking with Bevin about\nrecognition. November 30th the Smith- BENDER case comes up again;\nand then we begin to move in December into Formosa as the important item.\nI note that all this talk about aid for China resulted in Knowland\nwanting to put 175 million dollars inks in the ECA Bill, and that was\nwhen the bi-partisan agreement was reached on 75 million, which was\naccepted by Knowland for the ganeral area of China, which is where that\n(note)\ncame in. But you can see what they are talking about when\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 31. (VH)\nMR. ACHESON:\nthey come to do something - 75 million military aid for that whole\narea is all they think can be used. Well, I think that brings us to\na good stopping point for tonight. I perhaps might add that NB, in\nconnection with the White Paper, there is a great deal of publicity\nWellington Koo\non *****sistive\nwanting to prevent the Paper from coming\nout, and then when it does come out he attacks it, and he is\nMCCaRRANC?\nOn August 5 ax (Karen?), Bridges, Halley, Knowland make a very vigorous\nattack on me, saying that they want a forthright policy\n,\nthat I am vacillating and weak, and that everything we have done before\nhas been picayune. Now, at some point here I have - no, that's later\non. One of the things that you might mention in connection with this\nTRUMAN \"NATIONAL ARCHIVES& RECORDS LIBRARY\nSmith-Bender case - you remember those were the two marines who had\nS\nGOVERNMENT\nbeen held for a long time, and we did everything we could to try and\nget them released - this was a common occurrance during those four\nyears, of people being held by Iron Curtain countries, and then great\npressure being put on the Department. Vogeler was one, Otis, Smith-\nBender - dozens of them around. Well, again, this is a part of my\ncomplaint about the press, that you are asked almost every meeting\nwhat you have done about it, whether you are doing anything about it,\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 32. (VH)\nMR. ACHESON:\nwhen they are going to be released, and that sort of thing. You\ncarry on the best kind of operations you can to get somebody sprung,\nthe last thing that you can possibly do is to talk about it. Therefore,\nyou are put in the position of saying that there is nothing you can\nsay that is constructive since your last talk with them, whereupon\nthey will report that you haven't done anything, and then everybody\njumps on you, and you have an awful commotion. And then some newspapers\nplay up things, like the wife of one of these men - Smith or Bender,\nI have forgotten which - when we were out in San Francisco, she was\nbrought up and photographed, and Mrs. Vogeler was photographed with me\nHARRIS U.S. TRUMAN ARCHIVES& NATIONAL COVERNMENT RECORDS LIBRARY\nin London, and you get all this - publicity just does the exact opposite\nof what they think it is going to do, but from the news sales point of\nview it gives them a story, it is an utterly useless way of using the\npress and public media, but accomplishment (isn't everything?).\nVOICE:\nIs any\na press conference? Would it be\npossible to say the first time each question comes up, just what you\n?\nsaid just now: this is not something that(would be profitable) to\ndiscuss, therefore I will not consider the question\nthe\nfuture. (Indistinct)\nall the time?\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 33. (VH)\ntold us\nVOICE:\nThey would just say: \"Well, you/saidxlast time you would report it\nif you had anything interesting to report. Have you got anything\ninteresting?\"\nMR. ACHESON:\nYes, they would keep on doing it.\nVOICE:\nEach one is\nto take it, and the other\nwouldn't.\nYou remember, one\nVOICE:\nWhat would happen if one had the system you were outlining here a\nlittle while ago, about questions in writing, and you select those\nthat you choose to answer at a press conference?\nVOICE:\nThat was\nHARRI U.S. ARCHIVES & NATIONAL TRUMAN RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY\nGOVERNMENT\nVOICE:\nI beg your pardon?\nVOICE:\nThat was a system already used..\nVOICE:\nSecretary Stimson did the same thing.\nMR. ACHESON:\nI think it would be very good, and I think what a secretary\ncan do in addition to that, or he cando it with that, is to pick out\na question and prepare himself, so that he gives a really informative\ndiscussion of the whole background of this thing, and gets something\nout which is useful and good. The business of exposing a high official\nof the Government to examination by a United States District Attourney,\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page 34. (VH)\nMR. ACHESON:\nor a State District Attourney, which is about what happens, is, I think,\na most destructive thing. There are many questions which the mere\nfact that they are asked is embarrassing; if you say \"no comment\",\nthat's one thing, you have to deal with it. One reason that I was so\ndisagreeable here, many times, was to put a little bit of the fear of\nGod into the press, and you really can get it into them - if you snap\na fellow's head off when he does domething that he knows he oughtn't\nto do three or four times, he is very cautious about doing it. If\nhe is a real douse, he'll do it anyway, he doesn't care, but you can\nget some order out of it. It doesn't make you loved; on the other\nHARRY ARCHIVES & RECORDS GOVERNMENT LIBRARY\nhand it makes you respected, and it doesn't hurt your relations with\nS\nthe press one bit. The idea that you are going to be a good fellow,\nand everybody loves you, and you get what is called a good press, I\nthink is nonsense - it doesn't happen that way at all. It seems to\nme particularly in the case of the President, it is just wicked to\nexpose him to these questions, the significance of which he cannot get,\nif he isn't trained in courtroom life.\nVOICE:\nThe worst exchange was the one about who had authority to authorize\nthe use of atomic weapons in Korea. Do you remember that one?\nREEL 3 - 7/22/53 - Page .). (VH)\nMR. ACHESON:\nYes, that was very bad.\nVOICE:\nYou\na real dilemma here, because the press conference has\nbecome a very powerful weapon\n. It is one of the\nreal devices which the President has, and Department heads have, :.\nMR. ACHESON:\nWell, if they all together decided that they were going to do it, and\nthe President gave instructions to do it, in what I think is the right\nway, there would be a squawk about it, there would be all sorts of\neditorials written about the freedom of the press, and the right to\nHARRY TRUMAN ARCHIVES& NATIONAL RECORDS LIDRARY\nquestion, and censorship, and a lot of nonsense, but it wouldn't last\nS.\nGOVERNMENT\nlong, they would get over it.\nVOICE:\nI am not suggesting that the pattern on procedure and the rules can't\nbe changed, but just saying that the press conference is so valuable\nnow, that this is really something new in our whole constitutional setup,\nand it is one of the most important weapon S of the Administration. I\ndo think you are quite right that the thing could be modified: different\nmen could use different patterns, as far as that goes.\nMR. ACHESON:\nI think the whole thing needs to be trimmed down to size. It is\nperfectly absurd that everybody has a press conference. A friend of\nmine went out to give a seminar at Washington University in St. Louis.\nREEL 3- 7/22/53 - Page\n(VH)\nMR. ACHESON:\nThe first thing he knows, he arrives, and the University has set up a\npress conference. (laughter). And he says, \"Well, what am I going to\nsay? What's the idea?\" \"Oh, well, they may have some questions to\nask you.\" Well, sure, (they have plenty of questions, many do, but\nwhy do that thing?) You wouldn't have one at home, you wouldn't have -\nit's just foolishness.\nVOICE:\nYou say different men might have different techniques. I doubt whether\never before or since, did anyone handled a press conference\n.\nIf asked a question, withthe greatest of gladness he\nwould respond to it. Sure this question\ntell all about\nthis in the most intimate detail. The sentences would get longer and\nlonger and longer, and get lost in\nmore and more disjointed\nsubject, predicate(laughter)\nHARRY U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES& \"NATIONAL TRUMAN RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY\nMR. ACHESON:\n11:30, let's adjourn. The bar will close at 12.\n(Indistinct.)\nVOICE:\nSpeaking of editors, here is a sentence from the editor of the Harvard\nBusiness Review. \"Also, if you happen to be one of those persons, as\nthis editor is, who has a great interest in science but lacks the formula\nand how it works..\"\nEnd of REEL 3"
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