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- Parte de Dean Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminars Files
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Q.
I
asked
whether you were for-what your own perplexities and thoughts were in regard to
the S ituation of the American Government--i Formosa went to the Communists--] was thinking
not so nuch in regard to the belligeral or military defense situation as strategic import-
to the
ance of Formosa as legards/diplomatic question--what we were going to do next in this
Q.
dominent and unchallenged Communist regine in China.
DA. I have now independent recollections about our discussions at that time--] recall Phil
Q. I remember a discussion which is pertinent to this which t ook place a little later--I
think it was either in February or March--at that time it seemed to us that ?
--that
the question thich had been put to the Joint Chiefs was perhaps not direct question.
The
question
that
was
put
to
them
in December, in October and December, had really been whether
they thought the strategic importance of Formosa was sufficient to warrant the use of
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military forces in its defense.
Q. What you were really asking him, in other words, was from their point of view--from a
strictly military point of view--if they wanted to use force.
DA. That's right. And so we went back to them, and we asked them a different question.
We said, just assume for a minute that from the political standpoint the loss of Formosa
would have such spreading repercussions aroûnd the World, that we from a political decision--
we make a political decision--that it is of the utmost importance to defend Formosa.
Now,
not being asked to weigh the importance of Formosa, all you are now being asked is to tell
us
whether
you can make the forces available to defend it. We went over and discussed
this matter with the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, I r emember, one afternoon--I think
there exists a I ecord of this discussion in policy planning staff. They took the view-
they finally understood-the change in the question--they took the view that even if we
were to come to a political decision that this was of the utmost importance and warranted
everything we could do to defend it--they did not see how they could makre the forces avail-
able without upsetting their general emergency war plant--the commitment of the
Q. It seems to me the actual processes of defending the base in Formosa turned out in the
end to be not an overwhelmingly difficult task given the relative balance of nature forces,
just as the a tactical matter--I don't want to discuss the wisdom of it--but as a military
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