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10/10/53 - Reel 1, track 2 - Page 2
MR. ACHESON: had a lot of work on that, and we finally got some of that - helped
out a little bit. Another thing that we got into, for instance, was
shipping and petroleum. Vell, you couldn't get into things that were
much more difficult than those. Hore we had statutes that said that
half of everything carried by EOA had to go in American bottoms. Well,
you couldn't change that. You got into the whole tangled business of
dollar oil and sterling oil. The result of all of this vas that we
didn't get very far in helping the British, although we did some things,
and we set up what was called a continuing organization, and Sir
S.
TRUMAN
Leslie - what was his name?
VOICH:
Rovans.
ARCHIVES A RECORDS ADMIN NATIONAL
E
MR. ACHNSON: He was sent over - a high Treasury official - to be stationed in
Washington, and that in turn all ran into the sand and nothing came
out of it, because no decisions were capable of being made at any
level where they vere effective. The result of this thing, as you
know, was that the British did devalue; they got into very serious
trouble with the Fronch because they didn't tell the French anything
about it until the last moment. I think that was understandable,
because if they had it probably would havé been all over the street
and everywhere elso, but it irritated the French very much. But this
began a series of troubles with the British which were financial
troubles and wealmess on the British side, which were to plague the
whole rearmament business for a good many years after that. There
are two other digressions here that - make before coming back to the
defense program.
MR. FEIS:
Dean, would it be worth noting for the record that the devaluation did
have a certain amount of hopeful effectiveness, so that by the first
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"ocrText": "10/10/53 - Reel 1, track 2 - Page 2\nMR. ACHESON: had a lot of work on that, and we finally got some of that - helped\nout a little bit. Another thing that we got into, for instance, was\nshipping and petroleum. Vell, you couldn't get into things that were\nmuch more difficult than those. Hore we had statutes that said that\nhalf of everything carried by EOA had to go in American bottoms. Well,\nyou couldn't change that. You got into the whole tangled business of\ndollar oil and sterling oil. The result of all of this vas that we\ndidn't get very far in helping the British, although we did some things,\nand we set up what was called a continuing organization, and Sir\nS.\nTRUMAN\nLeslie - what was his name?\nVOICH:\nRovans.\nARCHIVES A RECORDS ADMIN NATIONAL\nE\nMR. ACHNSON: He was sent over - a high Treasury official - to be stationed in\nWashington, and that in turn all ran into the sand and nothing came\nout of it, because no decisions were capable of being made at any\nlevel where they vere effective. The result of this thing, as you\nknow, was that the British did devalue; they got into very serious\ntrouble with the Fronch because they didn't tell the French anything\nabout it until the last moment. I think that was understandable,\nbecause if they had it probably would havé been all over the street\nand everywhere elso, but it irritated the French very much. But this\nbegan a series of troubles with the British which were financial\ntroubles and wealmess on the British side, which were to plague the\nwhole rearmament business for a good many years after that. There\nare two other digressions here that - make before coming back to the\ndefense program.\nMR. FEIS:\nDean, would it be worth noting for the record that the devaluation did\nhave a certain amount of hopeful effectiveness, so that by the first"
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