Ask the Scholar

Page 2 of 16
I can add historical knowledge about this page.

Page image

Page 2

OCR

10/10/53 - Reel 1, track 2 - Page 2 MR. ACHESON: had a lot of work on that, and we finally got some of that - helped out a little bit. Another thing that we got into, for instance, was shipping and petroleum. Vell, you couldn't get into things that were much more difficult than those. Hore we had statutes that said that half of everything carried by EOA had to go in American bottoms. Well, you couldn't change that. You got into the whole tangled business of dollar oil and sterling oil. The result of all of this vas that we didn't get very far in helping the British, although we did some things, and we set up what was called a continuing organization, and Sir S. TRUMAN Leslie - what was his name? VOICH: Rovans. ARCHIVES A RECORDS ADMIN NATIONAL E MR. ACHNSON: He was sent over - a high Treasury official - to be stationed in Washington, and that in turn all ran into the sand and nothing came out of it, because no decisions were capable of being made at any level where they vere effective. The result of this thing, as you know, was that the British did devalue; they got into very serious trouble with the Fronch because they didn't tell the French anything about it until the last moment. I think that was understandable, because if they had it probably would havé been all over the street and everywhere elso, but it irritated the French very much. But this began a series of troubles with the British which were financial troubles and wealmess on the British side, which were to plague the whole rearmament business for a good many years after that. There are two other digressions here that - make before coming back to the defense program. MR. FEIS: Dean, would it be worth noting for the record that the devaluation did have a certain amount of hopeful effectiveness, so that by the first

Page data

Page
2
Source index
0
Type
photo
Media ID
1a9675b0140a33be
Size
unknown

Document data

ID
75850536
Core
doc
Type
document
DTO data
{
    "id": "75850536",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75850536",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 1, Track 2",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75850536",
    "collections": [
        "Dean Acheson Papers",
        "Princeton Seminars Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722161-02-01.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722161-02-01.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722161-02-01.jpg",
    "imageCount": 16,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

Context sent to Scholar

Document identity
{
    "localId": "75850536",
    "label": "Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 1, Track 2",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75850536"
}
Document source metadata
{
    "id": "75850536",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75850536",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 1, Track 2",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75850536",
    "collections": [
        "Dean Acheson Papers",
        "Princeton Seminars Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722161-02-01.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722161-02-01.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722161-02-01.jpg",
    "imageCount": 16,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75850536",
    "naId": 75850536,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 10,
            "logicalDate": "1953-10-10",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1953
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722161-02-02.jpg",
    "mediaId": "1a9675b0140a33be",
    "ocrText": "10/10/53 - Reel 1, track 2 - Page 2\nMR. ACHESON: had a lot of work on that, and we finally got some of that - helped\nout a little bit. Another thing that we got into, for instance, was\nshipping and petroleum. Vell, you couldn't get into things that were\nmuch more difficult than those. Hore we had statutes that said that\nhalf of everything carried by EOA had to go in American bottoms. Well,\nyou couldn't change that. You got into the whole tangled business of\ndollar oil and sterling oil. The result of all of this vas that we\ndidn't get very far in helping the British, although we did some things,\nand we set up what was called a continuing organization, and Sir\nS.\nTRUMAN\nLeslie - what was his name?\nVOICH:\nRovans.\nARCHIVES A RECORDS ADMIN NATIONAL\nE\nMR. ACHNSON: He was sent over - a high Treasury official - to be stationed in\nWashington, and that in turn all ran into the sand and nothing came\nout of it, because no decisions were capable of being made at any\nlevel where they vere effective. The result of this thing, as you\nknow, was that the British did devalue; they got into very serious\ntrouble with the Fronch because they didn't tell the French anything\nabout it until the last moment. I think that was understandable,\nbecause if they had it probably would havé been all over the street\nand everywhere elso, but it irritated the French very much. But this\nbegan a series of troubles with the British which were financial\ntroubles and wealmess on the British side, which were to plague the\nwhole rearmament business for a good many years after that. There\nare two other digressions here that - make before coming back to the\ndefense program.\nMR. FEIS:\nDean, would it be worth noting for the record that the devaluation did\nhave a certain amount of hopeful effectiveness, so that by the first"
}