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OCR Page 1 of 1312/13/53 - Reel 5, Track 1, Page 1
MR. ACHESON:
Nou, as I recall, the question of the Middle East Command was tem-
porarily put to one side and we said nore work will be done on that
and this will be reported back to MATO, but you do not have to get
concerned about it as a NATO problem. It may be a problem outside of
need
NATO. Therefore, all you have to think about now is how we will deal
with Creece and Turkey and Greece and Turkey will be incorporated into
the WTO-Bisenhower Command. So for the time being, at least, we had
a little peace on that. Then we got going on a Nediterrane naval
situation. And at that point this matter came up that George has
referred to. That the French said that if the British have an inde-
pendent naval commnd, that is the supreme commander in the Mediterranean,
vho is quite as suprome as Eisenhower is, then the Fronch must have a
TRUMAN
ARCHIVESA -NATIONAL 1
supreme commer in the Nediterranean. That was impossible because
RETYROS
is
you couldn't--this thing wouldn't work at all. So some why it was,
had a serics of meetings at which Herbert Morrison was being very
difficult and causing a 'great deal of annoyance to the Trench. I think
Bidault was there, wasn't he? - maybe not. There was some other
cabinet officer, some Frenchman.
MR. PERKINS:
Well, Schumnn vas being very stuffy about it too, because he was under
strict instructions from Paris
astowhathecoulddo.
M. ACHESON:
As I recoll it, we made a concession to the Fronch that they vere
to have a separate naval group, the mission of which was to kreep open
the commication between metropolitian France and North Africa. That
command, as I understánd it, as I recall it now, was to report directly
to
through Eisenhower and not through Carnay, is that right? Or vas that
under Commander South?
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