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Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 1, Track 2

  • Parte de Dean Acheson Papers, Princeton Seminars Files

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2/13/54, Reel 1, Track 2, Page 1 MR. FEIS: He thought that was quite an introduction to this particular speech. MR. ACHESON: That's undoubtedly true. MR. KENNAN: May I just point out, Dean, in regard to what you just said that while that is true, that it is good to get this critical view of the speech by many people, it does absolutely kill literary effect and spontaneity and it is almost an insoluble problem. MR. ACHESON: I think it is. I think it is a very difficult problem. I read ofer the speech, - the way it was recorded was by having a stenographer, McDermott is a ha d brought a stenographer to the Press Club, the stenographer took it down, and then went back and typed it up and that was the only way amypody had of This any text of this. That was mimeographed and given out; whether that was a wise thing to do or not, I don't know -- I guess it was. As I read the speech, it seems to me to be a pretty good speech. It was ed quite frank, and so far as my knowledge was concerned, it was pretty clearly stated. It talked about the problems of the Far East in what I t hought was a sensible way, pointing out their - the great diversity of problems all & underlying through that area, and pointing out some of the/similarities in the attitude S COVER and of the people in the Far East toward colonialism and one thing and another. that It seemed to me that it was hopeful in trying to get an understanding of the 9 % nature of the Far Eastern problem was very different from Europe -- people were talking a bout a Marshall Plan for the Far East, about NATO for the Far East -- a whole lot of ideas that were quite silly in the context of the Far East, but somebody had to say why they were, and I thought I did that. The part which caused so much trouble had to do with our defensive area in the Pacific from the point of view of the defense of the continental U.S. and our actual military commitments. This wasn't talking about what ought to be done in the event of any possible threat developing in that area, but how the United States was proposing to defend itself if trouble came in the