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    "ocrText": "2/13/54, Reel 3, T k 2, P\n2\nthat point. This, I think, was originally sent out in some form or other\non the 27th. It was discussed by the President and General Marshall with\nme. All the various considerations which later became important were men-\ntioned; the difficulty of operations notth of that line as your own communi-\ncations were extended, as your troops got more and more into an area of\ntrouble on the other side, and your own air forces became attenuated; the\ndanger of misconstruction on the Chinese port, and the fact that this had\nvvery\nbeen a/ tender and delicate part of Korea for almost all the years that the\nwere\nJapanese 1/1/1000 in occupation -- there was always trouble up in this area.\nVOICE:\nWhat was the Japanese trouble there?\nMR. ACHESON:\nThey never -- the whole northeastern part of Korea they never really reduced.\nThis was an area of guerrilla warfare almost all through the Japanese occupa-\ntion.\nTAUMAND\nDR.\nOPPENHEIMER: You came right within forty mines of Vladivostok --\nKean ARCHIVES RECTIRDS ADMIN JERN\nF\nMR. ACHESON:\nYes, you got into very difficult territory -- we'd had a lot of trouble before\nwhich Was\nthis with Rashin,/very close to the Soviet bomder, and the desire of people\nto bomb that, and your planes got lost in the clouds and were over Soviet\nkinds\nterritory - you provoked all sptts of troubles if you got in -thore nor th\nof this area. So it was decided that that was the thing to do. I agreed\nthat this was the right thing to do. And a directive was sent off, I think\ndated September 30th, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur, giving him\nby\nfor omatime\nthis instruction. I went off then - back to New York and various places -\nmatter\nand regarded this as far as I knew, this was settled. This was where the\narmy was and whatever happened north of that would be a feeling-out operation --\nproposition, through Nor th Koreans. MacArthur made his demand for surrender\non the 30th of September.\nThen occurred a meeting which is quite an extraordinary one and on which\nrecite much\nPhil can ptpting more detail than I can. But President Truman went off on\nthe llth of October and was gone until the 18th."
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