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2/13/54, Reel 5, Track 1, Par 13
I
matters, theft was never able to get a statement out of our intelligence
authorities as to whether there were or were not such installations in the
that
port or even an admission as to whe thor our intelligence authorities knew
whether there were such installations. I can only conclude that in this, as
in other instances, people in the Headquarters in Tokyo were willing to leak
things to American correspondents which they were not willing to transmit
for the information of the State Department. Despite repeated inquiries
about communications through this port, I was never told by any
Antelligence
people that it did not have a railroad connection with the rest of Korea or
Korean territory and in all our discussion I was allowed to labor under the
delusion that it might be an important point on the rail supply route to the
Korean communist forces on the east coast. Finally, in late summer when I
TRUMAN
inquired about what was going on along the Yalu River, I was told that our
NY RV
people had no idea, did not fly reconnaissance in that area, and had no
us.
military reason for doing so at the time. They wanted to know whether
this was a request from the State Department that they conduct such a
reconnaissance and I told them emphatically that it was not. In short,
my impression was that whatever the reasons, it did not prove possible for
the State Department in the crucial months of last summer to obtain all the
important information at the disposal of our government and relevant to the
problem of Bussian and Chinese communist intentions in the event of an advance
of our forces beyond the Barallel. This obviously made it difficult for the
Department to take definite positions on the decisions involved. It seems
to me that all the way through the testimony to date, there has been evidence
of an inability on the part of some of the Senators to recognize what I might
call the dialectics of the relationship between the government and General
MacArthur. By this I mean the simple fact that while there were many things
c_oncerning his position and his decisions and his methods of operation,
both in Japan and in Korea, about which numbers of people in Washington may
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"ocrText": "2/13/54, Reel 5, Track 1, Par 13\nI\nmatters, theft was never able to get a statement out of our intelligence\nauthorities as to whether there were or were not such installations in the\nthat\nport or even an admission as to whe thor our intelligence authorities knew\nwhether there were such installations. I can only conclude that in this, as\nin other instances, people in the Headquarters in Tokyo were willing to leak\nthings to American correspondents which they were not willing to transmit\nfor the information of the State Department. Despite repeated inquiries\nabout communications through this port, I was never told by any\nAntelligence\npeople that it did not have a railroad connection with the rest of Korea or\nKorean territory and in all our discussion I was allowed to labor under the\ndelusion that it might be an important point on the rail supply route to the\nKorean communist forces on the east coast. Finally, in late summer when I\nTRUMAN\ninquired about what was going on along the Yalu River, I was told that our\nNY RV\npeople had no idea, did not fly reconnaissance in that area, and had no\nus.\nmilitary reason for doing so at the time. They wanted to know whether\nthis was a request from the State Department that they conduct such a\nreconnaissance and I told them emphatically that it was not. In short,\nmy impression was that whatever the reasons, it did not prove possible for\nthe State Department in the crucial months of last summer to obtain all the\nimportant information at the disposal of our government and relevant to the\nproblem of Bussian and Chinese communist intentions in the event of an advance\nof our forces beyond the Barallel. This obviously made it difficult for the\nDepartment to take definite positions on the decisions involved. It seems\nto me that all the way through the testimony to date, there has been evidence\nof an inability on the part of some of the Senators to recognize what I might\ncall the dialectics of the relationship between the government and General\nMacArthur. By this I mean the simple fact that while there were many things\nc_oncerning his position and his decisions and his methods of operation,\nboth in Japan and in Korea, about which numbers of people in Washington may"
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