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2/13/54, Reel 5, Track 1, Par 13 I matters, theft was never able to get a statement out of our intelligence authorities as to whether there were or were not such installations in the that port or even an admission as to whe thor our intelligence authorities knew whether there were such installations. I can only conclude that in this, as in other instances, people in the Headquarters in Tokyo were willing to leak things to American correspondents which they were not willing to transmit for the information of the State Department. Despite repeated inquiries about communications through this port, I was never told by any Antelligence people that it did not have a railroad connection with the rest of Korea or Korean territory and in all our discussion I was allowed to labor under the delusion that it might be an important point on the rail supply route to the Korean communist forces on the east coast. Finally, in late summer when I TRUMAN inquired about what was going on along the Yalu River, I was told that our NY RV people had no idea, did not fly reconnaissance in that area, and had no us. military reason for doing so at the time. They wanted to know whether this was a request from the State Department that they conduct such a reconnaissance and I told them emphatically that it was not. In short, my impression was that whatever the reasons, it did not prove possible for the State Department in the crucial months of last summer to obtain all the important information at the disposal of our government and relevant to the problem of Bussian and Chinese communist intentions in the event of an advance of our forces beyond the Barallel. This obviously made it difficult for the Department to take definite positions on the decisions involved. It seems to me that all the way through the testimony to date, there has been evidence of an inability on the part of some of the Senators to recognize what I might call the dialectics of the relationship between the government and General MacArthur. By this I mean the simple fact that while there were many things c_oncerning his position and his decisions and his methods of operation, both in Japan and in Korea, about which numbers of people in Washington may

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    "ocrText": "2/13/54, Reel 5, Track 1, Par 13\nI\nmatters, theft was never able to get a statement out of our intelligence\nauthorities as to whether there were or were not such installations in the\nthat\nport or even an admission as to whe thor our intelligence authorities knew\nwhether there were such installations. I can only conclude that in this, as\nin other instances, people in the Headquarters in Tokyo were willing to leak\nthings to American correspondents which they were not willing to transmit\nfor the information of the State Department. Despite repeated inquiries\nabout communications through this port, I was never told by any\nAntelligence\npeople that it did not have a railroad connection with the rest of Korea or\nKorean territory and in all our discussion I was allowed to labor under the\ndelusion that it might be an important point on the rail supply route to the\nKorean communist forces on the east coast. Finally, in late summer when I\nTRUMAN\ninquired about what was going on along the Yalu River, I was told that our\nNY RV\npeople had no idea, did not fly reconnaissance in that area, and had no\nus.\nmilitary reason for doing so at the time. They wanted to know whether\nthis was a request from the State Department that they conduct such a\nreconnaissance and I told them emphatically that it was not. In short,\nmy impression was that whatever the reasons, it did not prove possible for\nthe State Department in the crucial months of last summer to obtain all the\nimportant information at the disposal of our government and relevant to the\nproblem of Bussian and Chinese communist intentions in the event of an advance\nof our forces beyond the Barallel. This obviously made it difficult for the\nDepartment to take definite positions on the decisions involved. It seems\nto me that all the way through the testimony to date, there has been evidence\nof an inability on the part of some of the Senators to recognize what I might\ncall the dialectics of the relationship between the government and General\nMacArthur. By this I mean the simple fact that while there were many things\nc_oncerning his position and his decisions and his methods of operation,\nboth in Japan and in Korea, about which numbers of people in Washington may"
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