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    "ocrText": "2/13/54, Reel 5, Track 1, Par\n9\nMR. JOHNSON: All of this seems to suggest that the only possible place where any action\nwould havebeen\ncould have been taken wes before the October 24th command or decision went\ninto effect; then they could have said to him\" You go back to the orders\nof September 30th\";any other alternative, I gather, as to this discussion,\none\nwas for one reason or another an impossible alternative. That wouldn\nhave been a possib le. alternative\nMR. NITZE:\nI think that's right. But to go back to the organizational question, I think\nthis was very much in mind when the U.N. Command was set up, so that the U.N.\nasked the United States to take over the job of being in fact the commander\nof this U.N. operation. So that it was the U.S. Government was delegated the\nCAND\nresponsibility from the U.N. So there wasn't any confusion H between MacArthur\n53 ADMIN TAP\nas U.N. Commander and MacArthur as Far Eastern Commander of U.S. forces. This\n(45\nwe did get straightened out the second time; we didn't run into the same error\nso\nthat we'd run into on the Supreme Allied Commander under the occupation. /I\ndidn't think there was any organizational gap where there was any bill hole\nin the chain of command -\nDi Grahem:\nVOICE:\nMy point was a little different than the point you're making. I think you I re\nquite right that the chin of 6ommand is clear in the existence of power [?]\ncommittee or.\nit is perfectly clear. But there is quite a little feeling that a joint\norganization of this sort will temporize the problem more than some single\nindividual who is clearly responsible, and that this same problem existed in\n5\nWorld War II where you were dealing with the ommander in the Pacific through\na Joint Chiefs organization and *t did temporize with many decisions -\nMR. NITZE:\nI would be inclined to agree with you, that there is a question as to whether\nit wouldn't be wiser to give the Cháárman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the\npower of decision, 1 subject to the President's authority, and so forth and so on.\nI'm not sure that this particular instance supports the thing as well as other\ninstances\nreasons do.\nbecause\nDR. FEIS:\nI think this whole discussion is somewhat incomplete, Of course, I think"
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