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3/14/54: Reel 1, Track 2, Page 2 munists could succeed in shifting the basis for the fighting. And so those were the considerations that led to limiting it to military talks rather than injecting the political side into it. MR. KENNAN: Was there not also the thought that, with the prevailing temper on the Hill, any political person who would presume to talk about the military matters involved in the Korean truce might have been very, very bitterly attacked for betraying the. (confused) throwing our victories away? MR. RUSK: I don't think so-I don't think that was a matter of whether the person was military or political, but whether the talks were going to be political or military. Now you can make a better-you can make a case for saying, "Well, of course you talked to these people over here because you knew they were shooting at each other, and if you want to stop the fighting, you talk with the people who are political traitors. But had you gotten into talks, even through military channels which might have involved other TRUMAN the 3 questions such as Formosa, you would have had considerable trouble, of and course, with your Congress. I might also say here that the military did us not reach out to grasp for this opportunity. The military were very - reluctant to be tagged with the necessity of conducting these negotiations; and it ought to be said for them that they did not want to do this. MR. KENNAN: 0h, yes; I understand. MR. ACHESON: There is one event at this time which bears on thèse discussions and, since (sic) we cannot place the exact time of Paul's talk with Malik, it makes this even more intriguing. On the 17th of May, Senator Johnson-mow, it doesn it say here whether this is Senator Johnson of Colorado or Senator Johnson of South Carolina; do you know which one it is? MR. ROSENAU: I think it was Colorado. MR. ACHESON: 0h, yes. He offered a resolution in the Senate that it was the sense of the Senate that the UN call upon all nations and all groups now engaged in the war in Korea to cease fire and to declare an armistice effective June 25, 1951. And that prior thereto the UN forces retire to points

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    "ocrText": "3/14/54: Reel 1, Track 2, Page 2\nmunists could succeed in shifting the basis for the fighting. And so those\nwere the considerations that led to limiting it to military talks rather\nthan injecting the political side into it.\nMR. KENNAN:\nWas there not also the thought that, with the prevailing temper on the Hill,\nany political person who would presume to talk about the military matters\ninvolved in the Korean truce might have been very, very bitterly attacked\nfor betraying the. (confused) throwing our victories away?\nMR. RUSK:\nI don't think so-I don't think that was a matter of whether the person\nwas military or political, but whether the talks were going to be political\nor military. Now you can make a better-you can make a case for saying,\n\"Well, of course you talked to these people over here because you knew\nthey were shooting at each other, and if you want to stop the fighting,\nyou talk with the people who are political traitors. But had you gotten\ninto talks, even through military channels which might have involved other\nTRUMAN\nthe\n3\nquestions such as Formosa, you would have had considerable trouble, of\nand\ncourse, with your Congress. I might also say here that the military did\nus\nnot reach out to grasp for this opportunity. The military were very\n-\nreluctant to be tagged with the necessity of conducting these negotiations;\nand it ought to be said for them that they did not want to do this.\nMR. KENNAN:\n0h, yes; I understand.\nMR. ACHESON:\nThere is one event at this time which bears on thèse discussions and, since\n(sic)\nwe cannot place the exact time of Paul's talk with Malik, it makes\nthis even more intriguing. On the 17th of May, Senator Johnson-mow, it\ndoesn it say here whether this is Senator Johnson of Colorado or Senator\nJohnson of South Carolina; do you know which one it is?\nMR. ROSENAU:\nI think it was Colorado.\nMR. ACHESON:\n0h, yes. He offered a resolution in the Senate that it was the sense of\nthe Senate that the UN call upon all nations and all groups now engaged\nin the war in Korea to cease fire and to declare an armistice effective\nJune 25, 1951. And that prior thereto the UN forces retire to points"
}