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    "ocrText": "3/14/54: Reel 2, Track 1, Page 5\n(indistinct) balance, and that would create a very serious question\nof military morale and civilian trouble with the families of those men.\nBut they thought principally, I think, that the failure to agree on these\npeopla-which would continue because there would never be any willingness\nto agree--was to put one more, and the last fatal wieght, they thought,\nupon the stability of the armistice. We pointed out there were already a\ngood many weights on the stability of the armistice. We had ultimately\nto work out this line as a political line. We had to work out the\nwhole question of the future of Korea if we were no going to have a line.\nWe had the problem of inspection. We had a lot of questions which might\nput pressure on the armistice. They said they agreed with that; but this\nwas one more which was inacceptable, because this differed a little bit\nfrom the others in that each one of us would hold men on the other side\nthat we had to do something with and which the other side wanted to get,\nand &\nand thérefore they were not willing to do it. We had several days of\nlis.\nargument about this. And on the 18th of September we had a meeting with\nthe President, at which Lovett, Bradley and maybs some of the other Chiefs\nwere present- was; I don't know whether anybody else was present but me.\nMR. NITZE:\nI wasn't there at the time.\nMR. ACHESON:\nPerhaps nobody was; but this was put up to the President and discussed\nwith him, and the President decided in favor of the military view. And\nhe did not go against any conviction of mine in deciding that, because I\nconcluded that that was the right view. So therefore we went to New York\nwith that as a governmental decision. And the importance of this is that\nthe essence of Menon's proposal was exactly what the President and the\nwhole government had considered and rejected, and that was what I was up\nagainst for two months in New York. When we thing about this meeting in\nNew York--the UN meeting-one of the remarkable things about it is the\nreal emergence of India at this point in the person of Menon, because it"
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