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3/14/54 Reel 5, Track 1, Page 3
problem with control of the Suez base, where if necessary you wanted to
protect that control by force, or whether a precondition to using the bases
in Jap an was the consent of the Japanese. Did you really have to rely on
the growth and continuance of a relationship with the Japanese, so that
they would be willing to have you use the bases in the event of trouble;
or was this a thing where our security interests in the Far East were such
that, whether they consented or not, we would use force the way the British
had used force in maintaining their control of the Suez base? Do you
remember this, Dean?
shuffled
MR. RUSK:
Yes, that was a very important point. And I, who back and
forth across the Potomac from the Pentagon to the State Department, felt
that it was short-sighted from the military point of view to think that
5 *
with
(B)
you could maintain effective bases in the middle of 90 million people who
us.
were resistant to the idea. And from a solely military point of view, it
was important for you to move toward obtaining the consent and support of
Japan for the maintenance of your bases rather than pretend that you could
maintain them there if the Japanese objected to them. But that was a very
important problem that we had to work at very hard. If the railway
workers simply quit, or if the Boy Scouts got up and blew up a few bridges,
your bases in Japan were of no particular effect. We were deployed in
Japan, and we wanted to be deployed in Japan in a way that made us com-
pletely at the mercy of the wishes of the Japanese people themselves. And
we had our little financial assistance somewhere way down in
MR. NITZE:
I think this was a little, more dificult than that, because as to Okinawa,
this we were determined on; this we were going to keep as ours, whether
they liked it or not
MR. ACHESON:
You could do that, because the situation of power was such that
MR. NITZE:
And with respect to the Kiska naval base, you could ppobably damn well do
it with respect to Yatruska (sp?)
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"ocrText": "3/14/54 Reel 5, Track 1, Page 3\nproblem with control of the Suez base, where if necessary you wanted to\nprotect that control by force, or whether a precondition to using the bases\nin Jap an was the consent of the Japanese. Did you really have to rely on\nthe growth and continuance of a relationship with the Japanese, so that\nthey would be willing to have you use the bases in the event of trouble;\nor was this a thing where our security interests in the Far East were such\nthat, whether they consented or not, we would use force the way the British\nhad used force in maintaining their control of the Suez base? Do you\nremember this, Dean?\nshuffled\nMR. RUSK:\nYes, that was a very important point. And I, who back and\nforth across the Potomac from the Pentagon to the State Department, felt\nthat it was short-sighted from the military point of view to think that\n5 *\nwith\n(B)\nyou could maintain effective bases in the middle of 90 million people who\nus.\nwere resistant to the idea. And from a solely military point of view, it\nwas important for you to move toward obtaining the consent and support of\nJapan for the maintenance of your bases rather than pretend that you could\nmaintain them there if the Japanese objected to them. But that was a very\nimportant problem that we had to work at very hard. If the railway\nworkers simply quit, or if the Boy Scouts got up and blew up a few bridges,\nyour bases in Japan were of no particular effect. We were deployed in\nJapan, and we wanted to be deployed in Japan in a way that made us com-\npletely at the mercy of the wishes of the Japanese people themselves. And\nwe had our little financial assistance somewhere way down in\nMR. NITZE:\nI think this was a little, more dificult than that, because as to Okinawa,\nthis we were determined on; this we were going to keep as ours, whether\nthey liked it or not\nMR. ACHESON:\nYou could do that, because the situation of power was such that\nMR. NITZE:\nAnd with respect to the Kiska naval base, you could ppobably damn well do\nit with respect to Yatruska (sp?)"
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