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3/14/54: Reel 1, Track 15 L'age 13 on this point was that it would be to our advantage to continue brisk military operations. MR. KENNAN: It wasn't done, was it? MR. NITZE: The reason it wasn't done is that, once you got into the truce negotiations and particularly after the agreement had been made about the line, because the military operations were quite intense immediately after the initiation of the truce negotiation. They didn't really diminish in --this is my recollection- volume/until about December when there was agreement on the existing line. Thereafter we did not move forward anyfurther. Because I was out in Korea, in general about the time of Malik's speech. I had gone out with Admiral Sherman, and the military operations were very intense then. We were trying to capture the Punchbowl, and this was an extremely costly operation. As I recollect it, our casualties had been extremely high and the Chinese casualties were extremely high; and this operation continued thereafter until we did capture the Punchbowl, and beond that; and it was after thegx agreement on the 38th parallel that operations petered out, is FAY because it was difficult for our military commanders in the field to ask US. our people to go up and really take heavy casualties when the ground which we were going to capture was going to be given up anyway as soon as they got it. MR. ACHESON: That was only true--that the ground would be. given up for 30 lays--because the agreement provided that it should meet a present line for a period of 30 days and thereafter it should be the line at the time of the armis- tice. But I think the same considerations apply, that the heart went out of the fight. MR. NITZE: Yes, I think MR. ACHESON: about ended the discussion. That was the armistice. MR. RUSK: We have to remind ourselves that at no point in all this period did we expect the armistice negotiations to continue for nearly two years; and

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    "ocrText": "3/14/54: Reel 1, Track 15\nL'age 13\non this point was that it would be to our advantage to continue brisk\nmilitary operations.\nMR. KENNAN:\nIt wasn't done, was it?\nMR. NITZE:\nThe reason it wasn't done is that, once you got into the truce negotiations\nand particularly after the agreement had been made about the line,\nbecause the military operations were quite intense immediately after the\ninitiation of the truce negotiation. They didn't really diminish in\n--this is my recollection-\nvolume/until about December when there was agreement on the existing line.\nThereafter we did not move forward anyfurther. Because I was out in\nKorea, in general about the time of Malik's speech. I had gone out with\nAdmiral Sherman, and the military operations were very intense then. We\nwere trying to capture the Punchbowl, and this was an extremely costly\noperation. As I recollect it, our casualties had been extremely high and\nthe Chinese casualties were extremely high; and this operation continued\nthereafter until we did capture the Punchbowl, and beond that; and it was\nafter thegx agreement on the 38th parallel that operations petered out,\nis FAY\nbecause it was difficult for our military commanders in the field to ask\nUS.\nour people to go up and really take heavy casualties when the ground which\nwe were going to capture was going to be given up anyway as soon as they\ngot it.\nMR. ACHESON:\nThat was only true--that the ground would be. given up for 30 lays--because\nthe agreement provided that it should meet a present line for a period\nof 30 days and thereafter it should be the line at the time of the armis-\ntice. But I think the same considerations apply, that the heart went\nout of the fight.\nMR. NITZE:\nYes, I think\nMR. ACHESON:\nabout ended the discussion. That was the armistice.\nMR. RUSK:\nWe have to remind ourselves that at no point in all this period did we\nexpect the armistice negotiations to continue for nearly two years; and"
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