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Americans could really have driven away
if they had wanted to
do so." So that perhaps we have something of that in us, too.
DR. OPPENHEIMER: A spectacular example was their early behavior in the UN on the atom. It
was very foolish from their point of view. But it has continued, even
as recently as Berlin.
MR. NITZE:
I got the distinct feeling that Vishinsky had been instructed
by Stalin, and Stalin had made up his mind on fairly short notice to kick
Menon in the teeth on this resolution, don't you remember?
MR. KENNAN:
Paul, there is this fact that Joe Stalin was terrified of the cosmopolitan
wing and the cosmopolitan tendencies in his own movement, and I think he
was always frightened that that wing would find something in common with
Menon and his people.
DR. OPPENHEIMER:
I think that' is as dangerous as a Social Democrat.
MR. KENNAN:
Nothing's as dangerous as a Social Democrat. I think at the bottom of it
was the reason for the purge in Czechoslovakia-that they were afraid that
THLMAN VATHUNAL EX
this government might provide sort of a spark plug contact with the Left
ARCHIVEN &
RECORDS
Wing labor groups and others abroad, and they were more frightened of that
ADMIN
than anything x else. Well, I'm sorry but I have to go...it finishes up
the Kor ean thing, anyway.
MR. RUSK:
Did you get into the Syngman Rhee side of the Korean matter last time?
MR. ACHESON:
No.
MR. RUSK:
Well, I don't know that I have much to say about it; but just in case
that side of it comes into further study I have a question: that the
reason why we, during our day and time, have the kind of difficulty that
the present administration had in the closing period of the armistice
negotiations was that Syngman Rhee was probably gambling very heavily all
along that this would never really come about. I am inclined to think
that if we had actually come to the point of an armistice on the basis of
something like the 38th parallel we would have had approximately this dif-
ficulty with Rhee in any event. It is true, I think, that some of the
0001429
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"ocrText": "3/14/54: Reel 2 !rack 2/ age 7\nAmericans could really have driven away\nif they had wanted to\ndo so.\" So that perhaps we have something of that in us, too.\nDR. OPPENHEIMER: A spectacular example was their early behavior in the UN on the atom. It\nwas very foolish from their point of view. But it has continued, even\nas recently as Berlin.\nMR. NITZE:\nI got the distinct feeling that Vishinsky had been instructed\nby Stalin, and Stalin had made up his mind on fairly short notice to kick\nMenon in the teeth on this resolution, don't you remember?\nMR. KENNAN:\nPaul, there is this fact that Joe Stalin was terrified of the cosmopolitan\nwing and the cosmopolitan tendencies in his own movement, and I think he\nwas always frightened that that wing would find something in common with\nMenon and his people.\nDR. OPPENHEIMER:\nI think that' is as dangerous as a Social Democrat.\nMR. KENNAN:\nNothing's as dangerous as a Social Democrat. I think at the bottom of it\nwas the reason for the purge in Czechoslovakia-that they were afraid that\nTHLMAN VATHUNAL EX\nthis government might provide sort of a spark plug contact with the Left\nARCHIVEN &\nRECORDS\nWing labor groups and others abroad, and they were more frightened of that\nADMIN\nthan anything x else. Well, I'm sorry but I have to go...it finishes up\nthe Kor ean thing, anyway.\nMR. RUSK:\nDid you get into the Syngman Rhee side of the Korean matter last time?\nMR. ACHESON:\nNo.\nMR. RUSK:\nWell, I don't know that I have much to say about it; but just in case\nthat side of it comes into further study I have a question: that the\nreason why we, during our day and time, have the kind of difficulty that\nthe present administration had in the closing period of the armistice\nnegotiations was that Syngman Rhee was probably gambling very heavily all\nalong that this would never really come about. I am inclined to think\nthat if we had actually come to the point of an armistice on the basis of\nsomething like the 38th parallel we would have had approximately this dif-\nficulty with Rhee in any event. It is true, I think, that some of the\n0001429"
}