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United States government to manage this Commission of some- think it was
eleven-members sitting in the old Japanese Embassy in Washington. I think
the most serious issue was over the Japanese Constitution itself. The Far
Eastern Commission had the impression that the Japanese Constitution had been
drafted in SCAP headquarters by American officers and handed to the Japanese
and said, "This you must accept." The theory of the American case was that
this was a Japanese constitution, drawn by Japanese, and that theory did not
stand up very well under the information fed to the other members of the Far
Eastern Commission from Tokyo. And people as eminent as the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Japan commented that there nxxx were certain awkward-
nesses in the Japanese Constitution because it was difficult to translate
into Japanese; and that made some very disagreeable situations between the
United States government and the other members of the Far Eastern Commission.
But I think there was a rather general view in the Far Eastern Commission, as
well as in the United States Government, by 1949 that a Japanese Peace Treaty
TRUMAN,
should be acted upon, even though there were the widest possible views as to
- ARCHIVES E ADMIN 100
-VATIONAL
what kind of a treaty it should be. And when Foster Dulles came in to take on
RECORDS
this negotiation, he started from a position involving wide disagreements
between the United States and its principal allies, particularly in the economic
and reparations field.
MR. NITZE:
I'd like to make a comment on Opje's question. It always seemed to me that
this program was divided between the top, or the intellectual leaders, the
elite in Japan and the masses in Jap an. With respect to the elite, I think
that they saw perfectly clearly that there was, for the time being at least,
no opportunity for them or for Japan, except in terms of their relationship
with the United States. This was the essential thing for them, and they ad-
justed themselves to that. In the long run, the potential friction between
the United States and the USSR was the pesential political xta fact to which
they had to orient themselves. The US was the best thing to back in that
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"ocrText": "3/14/54: Reel 3, Track 2, Page 13\nUnited States government to manage this Commission of some- think it was\neleven-members sitting in the old Japanese Embassy in Washington. I think\nthe most serious issue was over the Japanese Constitution itself. The Far\nEastern Commission had the impression that the Japanese Constitution had been\ndrafted in SCAP headquarters by American officers and handed to the Japanese\nand said, \"This you must accept.\" The theory of the American case was that\nthis was a Japanese constitution, drawn by Japanese, and that theory did not\nstand up very well under the information fed to the other members of the Far\nEastern Commission from Tokyo. And people as eminent as the Chief Justice\nof the Supreme Court of Japan commented that there nxxx were certain awkward-\nnesses in the Japanese Constitution because it was difficult to translate\ninto Japanese; and that made some very disagreeable situations between the\nUnited States government and the other members of the Far Eastern Commission.\nBut I think there was a rather general view in the Far Eastern Commission, as\nwell as in the United States Government, by 1949 that a Japanese Peace Treaty\nTRUMAN,\nshould be acted upon, even though there were the widest possible views as to\n- ARCHIVES E ADMIN 100\n-VATIONAL\nwhat kind of a treaty it should be. And when Foster Dulles came in to take on\nRECORDS\nthis negotiation, he started from a position involving wide disagreements\nbetween the United States and its principal allies, particularly in the economic\nand reparations field.\nMR. NITZE:\nI'd like to make a comment on Opje's question. It always seemed to me that\nthis program was divided between the top, or the intellectual leaders, the\nelite in Japan and the masses in Jap an. With respect to the elite, I think\nthat they saw perfectly clearly that there was, for the time being at least,\nno opportunity for them or for Japan, except in terms of their relationship\nwith the United States. This was the essential thing for them, and they ad-\njusted themselves to that. In the long run, the potential friction between\nthe United States and the USSR was the pesential political xta fact to which\nthey had to orient themselves. The US was the best thing to back in that"
}