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3/14/54; Reel 3, Track 2, Page 2 State Department get busy in trying to get some kind of a moral consensus which would support the military effort which we were engaged in. And, as a result of that, the January meeting which resulted in the Atlantic Charter resolution-what was the name of that--came out within a month. Prior to Pearl Harbor most of the work in the State Department had been on the Japanese Peace Treaty. IR. ACHESON: Well, that's the United Nations MR. JESSUP: the United Nations resolution of January, '50 MR. NITZE: of January '41 or January 44. But here we were in a--this wasn't merely a kind of never-never land do-gooders. Here we were, in a very concrete situation, where we had a military disaster at Pearl Harbor, and where the toughest minded fellows you could find, who were the generals in charge, insisted that this is the prime order of business--to get something which will contribute toward a moral consensus which will back up your military effort. MR. JESSUP: And which paid dividends, I should think, in particular instances through TRUMAN, uses of port facilities and various things all around the world. MR. NITZE: I don't think that's what they were really thinking about. AZCHIN RECOROS ADMIN A MR. JESSUP: No; but I think that's not of importance. DR. OPPENHEIMER: You may be right, if we take some of them-some of the more hazardous and enterprising things that we 've done in the last eight years like the airlift; it seems to me that it did not require the UN to have a very general recognition of both the restraint and the resolution that went into that. I think this was recognized very, very clearly. Now maybe it wasn't recog- nized as much in South America as if the airlift had been authorized by the UN, but you run a terrible danger when you want approval all the time-- that you'll be asking for approval when you don't deserve it and that you'll be denied it when you do deserve it.

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    "ocrText": "3/14/54; Reel 3, Track 2, Page 2\nState Department get busy in trying to get some kind of a moral consensus\nwhich would support the military effort which we were engaged in. And,\nas a result of that, the January meeting which resulted in the Atlantic\nCharter resolution-what was the name of that--came out within a month.\nPrior to Pearl Harbor most of the work in the State Department had been\non the Japanese Peace Treaty.\nIR. ACHESON:\nWell, that's the United Nations\nMR. JESSUP:\nthe United Nations resolution of January, '50\nMR. NITZE:\nof January '41 or January 44. But here we were in a--this wasn't merely\na kind of never-never land do-gooders. Here we were, in a very concrete\nsituation, where we had a military disaster at Pearl Harbor, and where the\ntoughest minded fellows you could find, who were the generals in charge,\ninsisted that this is the prime order of business--to get something which\nwill contribute toward a moral consensus which will back up your military\neffort.\nMR. JESSUP:\nAnd which paid dividends, I should think, in particular instances through\nTRUMAN,\nuses of port facilities and various things all around the world.\nMR. NITZE:\nI don't think that's what they were really thinking about.\nAZCHIN RECOROS ADMIN A\nMR. JESSUP:\nNo; but I think that's not of importance.\nDR. OPPENHEIMER: You may be right, if we take some of them-some of the more hazardous and\nenterprising things that we 've done in the last eight years like the airlift;\nit seems to me that it did not require the UN to have a very general\nrecognition of both the restraint and the resolution that went into that.\nI think this was recognized very, very clearly. Now maybe it wasn't recog-\nnized as much in South America as if the airlift had been authorized by\nthe UN, but you run a terrible danger when you want approval all the time--\nthat you'll be asking for approval when you don't deserve it and that you'll\nbe denied it when you do deserve it."
}