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        "Dean Acheson Papers",
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    "seq": 9,
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    "ocrText": "3/14/54: Reel 5, Track 2( age 9\nformula became operative. I might say, too, that the Foreign Minister\nwas faced with a problem of extremen difficulty in these entire negotia-\ntions, because x these were subjects of current debate in the Japanese\nDiet, right in the middle of the negotiations. Mr. Okazaki would spend\nthe morning in the Diet debating the points on which we were negotiating\nin the afternoons. And he hardled that part of it very well indeed;\nthere was no breach of security on the matters that had to be discussed\nsecretly before we could get agreement and yet he was being hammered and\npestered from all sides right in the middle of our talks. I came to\nhave a considerable regard for his patience and skill and understanding\nas he approached this problem. On the question of U. S. military command\na\nof the area in case of emergency we got nowhere at all. It was pretty\nTHUMAN\nclear that the Japanese were not going to commit themselves to an American\n(YNY 11 Gay\nADMINT\ndecision as to when an emergency would arise and commit themselves in\n<<s\ncountry\nadvance to the placing of Japan and Japanese armed forces under the\ncontrol of American military authorities. Enrl Johnson and I knew\nbefore we went out there that that was a point we would almost certainly\nnot get, but we tried very hard to work out a formula which would produce\nit. We were not able to do so, and we reported back to Washington and\nsaid, \"You'11 have to give us authority to change our minds on this, !\nand in fact we finally got authori ty to drop it. When we got authority\nto drop that particular point, the Japanese were so relieved that they\ngave in on every other point that was un our standing. They were just\nso happy not to have to put anything like that to the Japanese Diet,\nto the Japanese people that the rest of it was fairly easy. We set up\na continuing committee of Japanese and American authorities to work out\nthe facilities and arrangements business, and during all of this discussion\nthe attitude of the Amry-the armed forces out there became increasingly\nliberal and realistic; and so when the administrative agreement was"
}