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5/15/541 Reel 3, Track 2, Page 10
MR. McGHEE:
I've got this only by hearsay, but it is my understanding that the Shah
showed it to Mossadegh--told Mossadegh about the powers for which Ghavam
had asked him in an attempt to get Mossadegh--to win his favor=-and told
him he wasn it going to grant them. The Shah was always acting, of course;
we always felt that had he backed Razmara, Razmara never would have got
into difficulty. The moment Razmara got into power, then the Shah got
scared of him and withdrew his support.
MR. HARRIMAN:
When I was there, I was talking to the Shah about the desirability of his
taking his constitutional perogatives and dismissing the Prime Minister,
which he has the right to under the Constitution; and he didn't trust
seemed
Ghavam very much. And as if he was almost to the point once
he said
3
of doing it but the next day/he wouldn't. But that was back, of
us
course, in 1951.
MR. McGHEE:
Then he didn't trust him; maybe for a very good reason. Maybe Ghavam did
plan to eliminate the Shah at some time.
MR. HARRIMAN:
When I was there the Army was entirely back of him and he had control of it;
al though there was Communist infiltration in the ranks, it seened to be the
general opinion that they would back the Shah at that time.
MR. ACHESON:
Well, you see this s ame course of events happening in 1952; I pointed out,
we had the failure in '51, great tensions increasing through '52, until
in July you have the counter-revolution and the failure of that. Then in
August, the end of August, '52, we worked out another series of proposals.
proposals
And thay==what were called the Truman-Churchill/were made on August 28th;
I don't think it's terribly important to know the content of those. The
fact was that the British had approached very much closer to our point of
view; we had approached closer to the British point of view, and we put
these things out after the thing had gotten very much worse and we had to
do something. So we put them out. These were rejected, and then counter-
proposals were made by Mossadegh. Then we had one of these curious things
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"ocrText": "5/15/541 Reel 3, Track 2, Page 10\nMR. McGHEE:\nI've got this only by hearsay, but it is my understanding that the Shah\nshowed it to Mossadegh--told Mossadegh about the powers for which Ghavam\nhad asked him in an attempt to get Mossadegh--to win his favor=-and told\nhim he wasn it going to grant them. The Shah was always acting, of course;\nwe always felt that had he backed Razmara, Razmara never would have got\ninto difficulty. The moment Razmara got into power, then the Shah got\nscared of him and withdrew his support.\nMR. HARRIMAN:\nWhen I was there, I was talking to the Shah about the desirability of his\ntaking his constitutional perogatives and dismissing the Prime Minister,\nwhich he has the right to under the Constitution; and he didn't trust\nseemed\nGhavam very much. And as if he was almost to the point once\nhe said\n3\nof doing it but the next day/he wouldn't. But that was back, of\nus\ncourse, in 1951.\nMR. McGHEE:\nThen he didn't trust him; maybe for a very good reason. Maybe Ghavam did\nplan to eliminate the Shah at some time.\nMR. HARRIMAN:\nWhen I was there the Army was entirely back of him and he had control of it;\nal though there was Communist infiltration in the ranks, it seened to be the\ngeneral opinion that they would back the Shah at that time.\nMR. ACHESON:\nWell, you see this s ame course of events happening in 1952; I pointed out,\nwe had the failure in '51, great tensions increasing through '52, until\nin July you have the counter-revolution and the failure of that. Then in\nAugust, the end of August, '52, we worked out another series of proposals.\nproposals\nAnd thay==what were called the Truman-Churchill/were made on August 28th;\nI don't think it's terribly important to know the content of those. The\nfact was that the British had approached very much closer to our point of\nview; we had approached closer to the British point of view, and we put\nthese things out after the thing had gotten very much worse and we had to\ndo something. So we put them out. These were rejected, and then counter-\nproposals were made by Mossadegh. Then we had one of these curious things"
}