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Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 4, Track 2
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Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 4, Track 2
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5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 1
in the view
MR. NITZE:
You raised earlier the difference/between the British and ourselves; I think
you could define it in this way basically: that it is obvious that the
course of action which the British decided to pursue in Iran of letting the
situation deteriorate until the Iranians were willing to yell
?
and ask Anglo-Iranian to come back. That created certain risks; the British
were aware of this, as we were. The British had so much at stake here,
both in terms of prestige and balance of payments, earnings in the oil
company, that they were willing to take greater risks than we. And of course
we, having spent billions of dollars through the Marshall Plan and Greek-
Turkish aid program, in order to protect ourselves against similar risks,
having the rich man's psychology of really being much more cautious and aware
of danger and wanting to guard ourselves against it than the British, who
HARRY TRUMAN 3 U.S. LIBRARY
have less to protect, were not willing to take that risk. It has turned out
could
that Iran did not fall, but how/mares we, who were responsible, have failed
to take some action in light of the risks that we ran? If Iran had fallen,
we would have spent the rest of our lives explaining why we hadn't done
anything, and the Russians would have been at the north end of the Persian
the Gulf at
Gulf looking across/km the oil fields of Saudi Arabia at Kuwait. We weren't
willing to risk as much as the British were.
MR. HARRIMAN:
They had pride to protect, which they thought would affect them in other
areas and in the Middle East generally. There is one thing of interest,
though, when you talk about comparing the Turks. The Turks take great pride
in the fact that they have always fought and kept the invader out; the
and this to some extent explains Mossadegh--the Iranians
Iranians/take pride in the fact that they have always survived--they have
always lost but they have always survived every invasion. And they don't
gddde fight; they just let people come into the country and take them over.
And that attitude is one which partially explains Mossadegh; it's an Iranian
trait. They don't get up and fight. It was perfectly extraordinary--the
incidents in history in which we would have said they were yellow dogs they
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 2
took great pride in. A conqueror came in and slaughtered thousands of their
people and they were
MR. ACHESON:
They were there... (confused)
MR. FEIS:
I think that must be in large part the answer to that first question I asked-
what Mossadegh thought about the Russians. As for the oil situation...
MR. HARRIMAN:
...they got down on their knees before the invader; they took great pride--
they weren't ashamed that at all that they hadn't fought with them; they
just came to terms with them and killed everybody eff but still they were
still there
MR. FEIS:
There's only one thing-every month they postpone the oil settlement as far
as pure oil, the industrial oil thing, goes-and I had a look at that not
long ago-the situation gets more adverse for Iran every passing month. The
existing fields in the Middle East grow in wholly available, low course
capacity, and the range of exploration is extending every month. Within the
last-George probably knows more about this than I do-but within the past
year, serious exploration and drilling has been extended to Israel and
Egypt and Turkey-Turkey has just revised its law-in Trans-Jordan, all
through-in Ethiopia-you're going to get new fields in there as well as the
standard old, so the position of Iran will be comparatively less satisfactory
with each passing month.
MR. ACHESON:
I should think that must be true.
MR. FEIS:
Whether they realize it or not; they must realize...
HARRY U.S. TRUMAN -VATIONAL ARCHIVES& GOVERNMENT RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY
MR. NITZE:
I think they realize it in part today..
MR. FEIS:
so elementary.
MR. NITZE:
And I think this in part explains why they are perhaps more disposed to do
a deal than they ever were before. They've seen this thing now; they now
know-every man, woman and child in Iran knows something about the oil busi-
ness. I think they now, all of them to some extent see that they lost ground
during this period; oil was flowing...
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 3
MR. HARRIMAN:
(?)
figures that they lost about half a billion dollars as against
making the deal in '51.
MR. NITZE (?):
People always said (confused)
this was going to be
(confused)
MR. HARRIMAN:
...an enormous sum, as I remember it, their total gross national product
figure was around a little over a billion (million?) dollars... (confused)
MR. McGHEE:
This'll be an example to other countries to nationalize your oil; I've always
felt quite the reverse-that this was an object lesson; this was the bad boy,
MR. FEIS:
...As far as Iran goes, this may make the situation more dangerous, because
if the Soviet Union comes along with a big purchase offer of reconstruction
oil, it begins to look more attractive to them; of course, the alternatives
to thi
MR. McGHEE:
The Soviets, of course, have a surplus of oil and couldn't handle it from
Iran anyway.
MR. FEIS:
No, but unless they did it, you know, no way of doing it...
MR. McGHEE:
There's no way the Soviets could handle any Iranian oil.
MR. FEIS:
Well, that I didn't know. Not even with their powers of (?)
?
MR. McGHEE:
Do what?
MR. ACHESON:
George said the Soviets can't handle any Iranian oil.
TRUMAN
MR. McGHEE:
They don't need it, because they have a surplus of their own..
MR. ACHESON:
They would need it for fuel in time of war, wouldn't they?
HARRI U.S. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES -NATIONAL RECORDS ADMINT à
MR. NITZE: (?)
Even less in time of war
MR. HARRIMAN:
They d have to move it around by tanker; they haven't got the tankers to
move it. It's utterly impossible to get it over the mountains...
MR. McGHEE:
You can build a pipeline over the mountains
MR. HARRIMAN:
You can. I don't want to say it's utterly impossible, but to require a modest
investment
MR. McGHEE:
It would be a matter of ten years and a tremendous investment...
MR. HARRIMAN:
And it isn't like going there and taking some oil; they've got to build
tankers; make an enormous investment in a pipeline, and then they would have
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 4
to make an enormous investment in tankers to take it across the Caspian...-
MR. NITZE: (?)
Well, this has a bad effect on the Iranian position; what effect does this
have on the British position? They're the ones who won't get paid; in some
of course the payment itself is unimportant but with respect to
cases maybe/ticks the principle maybe it's worthwhile
from their point of view having held the line, even though they don't get a
nickel out of it, but what is the effect of it on them-I mean in terms of
the possible settlement? This property itself is going downhill.
MR. ACHESON:
I should think that the British would not lose. If you can imagine the
HARRY TRUMAN WATHINAL LIBRARY
earth opening up and swallowing all the oil in Iran, I think the British
would be just as well off.
MR. McGHEE:
I think Anglo-Iranian are making as much money today as they ever have.
MR. GRAHAM:
Their markets (confused)
MR. McGHEE (?):
....in Kuwait, from the standpoint of crude...
MR. HARRIMAN:
I think the British have lost, because the racketeers(?) are taking part of
it in Kuwait but still others have; they've lost a good deal by it.
MR. McGHEE:
I think their stated profits now are the highest in history.
MR. HARRIMAN:
The world as a whole hasn't suffered from it; it did for a short period.
MR. McGHEE (?)
They suffered acutely during the period they were buying dollar oil and
expensive pipes.
MR. HARRIMAN:
For a short period.
MR. McGHEE:
But they've replaced most of the refining capacity in crude now, I believe,
quite satisfactorily. They would like to recoup something from this invest-
ment they have, of course, and under this new arrangement the companies
would acquire what virtually is in Iran the position of a concessionnaire
to other countries, although under the name of nationalization, will give
Anglo-Iranian s'ome compnsation--the amount, I don't know. I think it's
worth pointing out here the position of the Andlo-Iranian Oil Co. in this
thing; I honestly think that one of the principal reaons $ for this whole
difficulty was the anachronism in the British government which ves the
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 5
Anglo-Iranian 6il Co. the power that it has, because Frazier is much more
powerful than any cabinet officer. And this derives from the fact that
the British Government owns, but does not excercise control of, the company;
it is sovereign and under no government. But in our country the government
doesn't own the companies; the companies, although they run their own affairs
know that there's a government above somewhere. But Sir William is stronger
than the government.
MR. HARRIMAN:
You mean the British government controls it on a 152 (indistinct)...
MR. McGHEE:
That's right; but since they control it and don't exercise control, that
in a sense makes it (confused)...
MR. FEIS:
Paradoxically, George, I thought that was true under the Labour Government
but not under the Conservative
(confused)
MR. McGHEE:
....and the reason I thought I was talking to Averell is that XXX Labour
Government was losing power; they were Labour men and were subject to great
criticism if, as Labour mén, they barged in and manhandled this company
TRUMAN NATIONAL LIBRARY
British
being run by very competent people, presumably, in the/Government.
which had hurt them great
STATE HAVE O.S.
They lost several hundred million dollars of so they
were afraid to move into the situation, even more afraid than a Conservative
might be under the same circumstances. I'll tell you an interesting insight:
when I came to London after the whole thing was over, at a time when there
wasn't much to be done, a few weeks after Raymara was shot, and noone knew
what to do. Strang arranged that I meet Sir William at his office, and he
and I and Makins went to lunch. And so Frazier--I had never met Frazier
before--Frazier opened up with some statement that he understood that we'd
somewhat
been/critical of him and his concept of this whole affair; I tried to brush
it off and said, "Well, there were a few things in the past that we thought
should have been done;" and he turned to Strang-Strang being his contact
with the Foreign Office-the Directors of the Anglo-Iranian were appointed
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 6
by the Admiralty and the Treasury, not by the Foreign Office. The Foreign
Office had no direct representation on his board; Strang was his contact at
the Foreign Office. And he turned to Sir William and he said, "Sir William,
you've never told me anything I've done wrong, have you?" And Sir William
said, "Of course not, Sir William." This was actually after they'd lost the
concession.
MR. JESSUP (?) Sir, I wonder whether you felt the impact the anti-trust, criminal investiga-
tion was on making it easier or harder for the U. S. oil companies-making it
more or less likely that they would do their share in the arrangement we
were working out in the fall of 152.
myself, because
MR. McGHEE:
I thought it worked both ways' insofar as they were concerned about that
inquiry after the election, an arrangement under which they got a release
seemed to me to guarantee one thing-that nothing* would come of the grand
jury proceeding, and I was never clear that there wasn't a certain element
HARRY TRUMAN LIBRARY
of carrot in there that made the fact that that proceeding had been insti-
tuted perhaps helpful, insofar as it could be called off, because there were
lots of reasons that they did not want to participate in this. They didn't
particularly want to out back on their own production, where they had con-
cessions. They didn't particularly want to make it easier for Iran to escape
a bad spanking; and one of the fun things I seemed to sense in the few
times I talked with them, why they were interested in talking was that a
government-sponsored arrangement with one of those War Powers Act releases
would have certainly cut any-cut Mr. Emerglink's (sp!?) down to the ansker
ankles.
MR. NITZE (?): This is right; this is probably the carrot. bait for the American companies
MR. ACHESON:
I think that's right.
MR. McGHES: NITZE: I think it's worthwhile to point out that in a sense our difficulties were
from the unlimited application of three principles : on the part of the
British, the rule of law, with no exception; you just carried this out
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 7
fairly and without exception, covering the whole field. This was part of
our trouble with the British. With the Iranians, it was the rule of sove-
reignty; there were no limits to what a sovereign nationa could do. And to
Mr. Emerglick (sp?) in the Anti-Trust Division, it was the infinite applica-
bility of the anti-trust laws. People who got themselves just married to
these concepts and couldn't see that there were any other concepts; this
really
was/the essence of our problem.
MR. McGHEE:
Well, of course, Paul, their are a couple things in that. I was never clear
that the British weren't somewhat overstating the rule of law, particularly
NATHY TRUMAN D LIDRARY
km with reference to the suits they threatened to bring against the private
purchasers. The only two adjudicated cases were settled on that-one of
US,
them from the court at Aden, which held in favor of the Anglo-Iran ian Oil
Co., which is not particularly surprising in a colonial court, and the
other in an Italian court, which went the other way.
MR. NITZE:
The one in Japan went the other way.
MR. McGHEE:
Yes, that question-the Hague wouldn't recognize the case and the Security
Countil wouldn't recognize the case, so this original lofty British legal
law position was found possible only in the court at Aden. I think Phil
will agree when you get that case that we had involved in the hides requi-
sitioned in Mr. Via, Edge (?) and several other companies' business, pretty
well establishes that insofar as the suits to reestablish title to the oil
(were concerned), certainly in an American court wouldn't have much chance.
I mean the Supreme Court...
MR. ACHESON:
I think Paul was not saying whether their view was right or not or sound or
unsound, but the whole attitude of the British Treasury was a legalistic
attitude on this, because they thought it was essential to take that atti-
tude to protect their foreign investment.
MR. NITZE:
Well, the other thing, back to the third point-Mr. Emerglick's intransigence
personally terribly
While agreed that he was not particularly helpful, and while agreed he didn't
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 8
such motive in mind when he insituted that proceeding-quite different ones-
I think that the fact that the thing had been started might well have been
helpful in the event that having been started, it could have been called off
something
on proper grounds, and it made these fellows interested in doing/what they
might otherwise not have done.
MR. NITZE:
Well, I think that as long as there was a chance that this was going to be
done, they wanted in on it; they probably wouldn't have liked to have the
thing happen at all. But if it was going to happen, I think they all wanted
in on it.
discussion
MR. ACHESON:
We had a very amusing-not amusing, it was pretty painful/massion one
afternoon when we got the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Secretary of War, Chairman of the Joint Statism Chiefs of Staff, all
HARRY TRUMAN LIBRARY
into the--and talked about getting these companies into this thing, and they
U.S. D
would have to have some kind of dispensation. And Emerglick was fighting
very strongly against any kind of a dispensation at all with the anti-
trust laws. And we pointed out that if we couldn't solve this thing and
it seemed the only way you could solve it was to get the American companies
in a way which
to come in/ witch must violate the anti-trust law, unless they had some snek
labor on this. It was just insoluble; you couldn't possibly deal with it.
And the country might go to hell; the Russians would take it over, and
Emerglick said that he didn't think that that had any bearing on the national
interest of the United States, which was to enforce the anti-trust laws.
And Brad said, "Well, it'll have a good deal of effect on the national
interest of the United States, because if you move the Soviet power from
where it is all the way down through Iran to the Persian Gulf, the whole
burden of defense and the whole rearrangement of the strategic plans of
the United States are going to be pretty fast." And Emerglick listened to
this and said, "General Bradley, I don't agree with you." And to my great
surprise, Brad just said, "Oh, don't you?"
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 9
MR. NITZE:
Oh, he was so made that he was speechless. Of course, that opinion really
made that performance so outrageous...
MR. HARRIMAN:
so extraordinary how a fellow like that can get
that kind of
into/a position in the American government. We discussed that
up and down.
MR. McGHEE (?) Well, the thing that made the performance so bad was this: that akk this was
all dealt with on the basis of the Sherman Act and with no reference to the
fact that there was on the books at that moment authority for a Presidential
exemption when required for purchase under the National Production Act. Now
it is true that authority giving exemption expired on June 30, 1953, but
there was no serious question but what if an arrangement was entered into
and workable there would be no problem in getting that extended. And yet
this whole matter was discussed by a representative of the Attorney General
in the Attorney General's presence without any reference at all to a statua-
tory provision which made it entirely discretionary with the President
to do exactly what the national security required. About as shocking a
performance, I think, as you'll see in a good country mile.
MR. FISHER (?):
What was that business about getting somebody who wasn't mixed up in the
thing to sign something or other -some stage in there where you had to get
somebody who had clean hands?
MR. ACHESON:
Well, this was probably the Security Council..
MR. FISHER:
No, it wasn't the Security Council
ELRRAY U.S. TRUMAN -VATHONAL ARCHIVES& CONTRAMENT RECORDS ADMIY LIBRARY
MR. ACHESON:
Yes, this was...
MR. NITZE:
Dean couldn't go to the meeting; I couldn't go to the meeting; Butch couldn't
go to the meeting;
MR. FISHER:
Oh, yes, that was it...
MR. NITZE (?)
Bruce couldn't go to the meeting; Chip finally went... (confused)
VOICE:
Chipps, oh yes...
5/15/54: Reel 4. Track 2, Page 10
(I wonder if any of you recollect?)
various
MR. FEIS:
(confused)
the fact that in 1943, Dean, myself and/others considered an
Anglo-American oil treaty? It might have helped.. forestalled various
situations..
MR. ACHESON (?)
It might very well have...
MR. FEIS:
...but it did not get...
MR. *********
I worked on that for the $ FEA.
HARRY TRUMAN ARCHIVEN& -VATIONAL REVORDS ADMY LIDRARY
McGHEE:
MR. FEIS:
Very probably...
U.S.
GOVERNMENT
MR. McGHEE:
No, I guess it wasn't; I guess it was...it's basically..
MR. FEIS:
I must say, George, looking back, I can recognize certain defects in the ?
proposal; we have lost Side something-very much in the dark on matters which
have become very much clearer since...
MR. McGHEE:
If you ask me, I don't know what economy blocked it; I don't think there was
any real opposition in Texas to it.
MR. ACHESON:
There was; the independents were very strong...
MR. FEIS:
I have a strong suspicion that (confused) Roesevelt
MR. McGHEE: (?)
....that one company had caused the trouble? I hadn't realized it was the
independents
VOICE:
Yes.
MR. McGHEE:
Paul, ibn January 20, 1953, were the British prepared to buy the package? I'v
got the impression-I was still around until the 26th, because of the anti-
trust case and subpoenas in it-and Meeker came back from London about the
25th with the impression that he wasn't entirely clear that this arrangement
determined
whereby the compensation was going to by the International Court
of Justice, not acting as an International Court, but as private arbitrators.
That was not entirely acceptable to the British; is my impression wrong on
that?
MR. NITZE:
My recollection was the other way; that they did agree to--we worked out a
language with them which covered the point you're talking about, which was
acceptable to them and which wasn't really the basis for the disagreement
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 11
with Mossadegh. The disagreement--when Mossie decided that this thing
was just politically infeasible from his standpoint in Iran, and when
he hoped to get a better deal with Eisenhower, the points that he raised
were di fferent points. One of them was this language, or the question of
the basis on which the Court-the guidelines that the Court would accept
in determining the compensation, whether it was the compensation for the
termination of the enterprise or whether it was some other language which
the British wanted.
MR. JESSUP (?) At some stage they had it arranged on a somewhat--an almost whimsical basis--
sort of pick a law, any law, in which the Iranians had the right to pick
any British nationalization law and then designate...
MR. NITZE:
This was still after (?) ...
MR. McGHEE:
Of course, our position at the beginning was very weak for two reasons:
LIBRARY
one, of course the fact that the British had nationalized industry; but
also the Mexican oil settlement, where our government viewed the oil
U.S. RECORDS COMPUNITY
companies as very weak and settled for fifteen million dollars when they
wanted ten times that amount and did not recognize any...
MR. NITZE:
We worked all this out with the companies; this is one of the things we
went to Mossadegh with-and that was, if you used the Mexican settlement
as a basis and took-I forget how many tons a year were involved in Mexico--
but if you took the percentage, the right porportion forIran, you came out
to a figure of eight hundred million dollars for Iran. We actually got
paid-the amount the Mexicans actually settled, if translated to the Iranian
scene without adjustment for the increase in prices in the interval, would
work out to eight hundred million dollars for Iran.
MR. McGHEE:
Well, you see it was complicated by the fact that production in Mexico
dropped off because the companies who participated in nationalization hadn't
kept up the oil property, but also...
MR. HARRIMAN:
Well, no. It was on the basis of the Dutch oil, meaning the Royal Dutch,
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 12
it was on the basis of the Dutch as they existed when the nationalization
took place.
MR. NITZE:
But production had dropped in Mexico by the time that nationalization did
take place, because the companies had let it drop in anticipation of it.
MR. McGHEE:
The principle of the settlement, as I recall, was no compensation for oil
in the ground, only compensation for surface facilities. And if you applied
that in Iran, you wouldn't get much out of it. There's quite a lot of
difference between the value of the wells, all the Iranian quite a differen
MR. HARRIMAN:
Boccarini? worked it all out; we were working with him...
MR. McGHEE:
...and ten billion barrels of oil in the ground, which would be worth ten billion
dollars in America.
MR. NITZE:
Yes, but it's in Iran.
MR. McGHEE:
Dean, will we have a chance to tal k about some of the general points you
raised? On the Middle East?
MR. ACHESON:
Yes, right now.
MR. McGHEE:
I don't want to--you of course in your general presentation raised some
extremely interesting points and I'd hoped there'd be an opportunity to dis-
cuss some of those
MR. ACHESON:
Let us take them up right this minute.
HARRY U.S. TRUMAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES & GOVERNMENT RECORDS ADMIN LIBRARY
MR. McGHEE:
I don't want to terminate the Iranian thing unless
MR. ACHESON:
Oh no, I think we're pretty well through with it.
MR. McGHEE:
One thing that I think we should keep in mind is why we are interested in
these Colonial problems. There's no question that we are basically intereste
because of the cold war and the fact of political instability creates areas
of weakness to us which could be exploited by the Russians-that in a more
normal world we would not necessarily concern ourselves with a great many
of these issues which we now do. And even our traditional attitude toward
colonialism I don't believe would lead us into taking national positions
ifoexs
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 13
about a great many of these questions, apart, maybe, from our position in
the USI, and I think that's one thing we should keep in mind. Now, in
taking the position that we do, which is basically to maintain the standax
because
status quo in the world/ although a change might be desirable, the process
of change leads to instabilities; we get ourselves in very dangerous posi-
tions. If, say, the world had been frozen at any given period in the past,
a great deal of the progress which has been made in the world would not be
possible. If, for example, we had never been able to revolt against the
TRUMAN
LEBRARY
British, or various other wars had never been fought to a conclusion, a
HARRY INTERNATIONAL US.
great deal of progress would have been denied the world. And in a sense
******* one of the great problems of the UN--I don't know whether it's
generally recognized--is to prevent wars from being fought out. It's very
dangerous to stop a war from being fought out, because no one is willing to
act like a loser. And there's no pro6f yet that wars which are not fought
out can ever really be resolved by peaceful methods-the existing examples,
the Arab-Israeli is one, Kashmir is another, are not very good of wars
having been stopped artificially ever reaching any agreement by them. I
think it would be a dangerous form of thinking that this present attitude
of ours, which is dictated entirely by the cold war, could lead us into
general recognition--approval of all the status quo in the world. Now,
the Middle East I'd always analyzed is a great problem, mainly because it's
the tag end of policies made elsewhere. No one really cares very much,
basically, about the Middle East; you care about other things more. When
in terms
you talk about the Middle East, the average person thinks/of Israel and the
states adjacent to Israel. Turkey isn't really the Middle East; she dis-
claims it. Iran is quite a separate thing-you talk to the average person
about the Middle East, they're thinking of the countries involved in the
Arab-Israeli dispute. Now if you take the countries most closely involved,
they aggregate very few people-empty people. And it is true that they live
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 14
in a strategic part of the world, but we are much more concerned about
controlling the important strategic factors then we are about them. We
want to hold the Suez; and there's no question of the basic reason the
Eritish want to keep a base in the Suez-I'm convinced it's against the
Egyptians, not against the Russians. That's never stated, but it's always
main
been fairly obvious to me. Our/preoccupation is to keep the oil flowing;
and as long as we can do that we really don't care much about it. The Arab-
Israeli thing is much more an internal political problem here than is--
the political problem created here in this country is more important than
our desire to get a settlement, and no one will buck that problem to a degree
sufficient to get a settlement. We may not like, for example, the aspects
left
of colonialism/in the Middle East, and then we may conclude,
for example, that British colonialism left in the Middle East is indicated
by her-say, what you might characterized their treaty positions in Iraq, Egyp
and Jordan-that we are more interested in keeping friendly with Britain
than we are in rectifying some position out there. When you get down to
it, nobody really wants to get down and face these basic issues; you run
HARRY TRUMAN D U.S. LIBRARY
into more difficult problems elsewhere in the world that are more important
to you; and as long as the Middle East is the tag end of the policy--no one
real
will ever really care whether Jordan is a/xkxxxx country and Syria is not a
real country-they're just little fragments which the British-which the
Europeans created for their own convenience. And those problems are just
going to go unresolved forever; and that's very nice, because it means that
people can have colloquia about them and meetings and seminars and discuss
them. But you never solve them that way because nobody ever really wants
to solve them. (confused)
MR. NITZE:
...purely circular argument that George has advanced?
MR. GRAHAM:
It's the initial presumption that his position is correct. (laughter)
(confused) fixed upon the status quo, is that correct?
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 15
VOICE:
That's about right, George.
MR. McGHEE:
Well, where have we taken a position against the status quo?
MR. NITZE:
We took a position against the status quo in Indonesia; we certainly did at
really
considerable immediate cost to ourselves, because we/believed in it. We
tried to take a position against the status quo in Indo-China; we finally
cause
got fouled up on this because it began to/xaxxm such great difficulties in
Europe that we had to reverse our field somewhat. But that we have taken
positions against the status quo seems to me to be absolutely true of our-
selves and also of the British. The British did, after all, give India its
a question of
freedom; this wash't/mick maintaining the status quo. We did, after all,
give the Philippines their freedom; this wasn't a question of maintaining
the status quo. The problem is to move in a direction which is a forward
direction without creating greater difficulties for yourself and the people
that you're liberating in the process of so doing. Sure,
STRUMANT
you've always got problems. The fact that you've always got dilemmas in-
in these situations
MARATE ARL U.S. REFUNDS ADMING COMMUNITY
volved/is a fact; and the fact that you put greater weight on the more
important end of the dilemma than you do on the lesser one is certainly
also a fact. You wouldn't advocate the reverse, would you?
MR. McGHEE:
Well, in the case of India, of course, I think everyone would agree that
the British could not have reasserted control...
MR. HARRIMAN:
Oh no, this policy has been--I don't agree with anything you've said. I've g
.... Roosevelt started the policy during the war, with the idea only to break down
which was in force?
colonialism, which he used (?) at that time, and it had tremendous reper-
cussions everywhere.
MR. McGHEE (?): But we don't do it now
MR. HARRIMAN:
Now whether the right way or wrong...
MR. NITZE (?):
Sure we do it now-Indonesia is the last case that I know where we took..
MR. McGHEE: (?)
Where would you want us to do...
MR. FEIS:
How far is this.... (Very confused)
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 2, Page 16
MR. ACHESON:
...one at a time. Go ahead, Herbert.
assertion
MR. FEIS:
George, how far is this counter association wrong? That we luxal have stood
for a change in every situation except those where we anticipated that
the....
(END OF REEL)
HARRY TRUMAN ARCHIVES& NATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN LIDRARY
US. GOVERNMENT