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5/16/54 - Reel 7, Track 2, page 13 assure him that our one purpose in Indochina is to create a situation from which you can negotiate something with the Communists, he would be prepared to see U.S. forces in there, he is prepared to see action for six months, a year, for two years, provided he was clear upon the objective thereof. Now you put together these various elements MR. ACHESON. Do you throw this constitutional point in too? MR. NITZE: You throw the constitutional point in as the second thing that you do after you eliminate the leaders of the Communist party. Then you satisfy him that he has really accomplished something with r espect to his people and that you're not building with German contribution as fast as we said we were doing--ve relieve. the pressure of the German contribution. And you put first the building of internal strength in France, without which I don't think the EDC in any case would be effec- . tive; and I don't believe the German contribution would really do you Us any much good as long as you've got a 25 percent group in France following the Communist position. MR. HARRIMAN: I thought he was dead opposed to the EDC and in order to make a deal about Germany with Russia. MR. NITZE: I doubt it very much. MR. ACHESON: I have been told that this is not his view. I had b een wopried about it but somebody said to me the other day, the very thing that Paul has said, that he seemed to me the best bet there was for it. MR. JESSUP: Is it conceivable that that could be done quietly? If any of it came out it would be the surest way to defeat itself foreign fellows trying to run France. Your man would be ruined if any of this g ot out. MR. ACHESON: Well, it might not be if he laid it down as to program, if this was the Mendes-France program. MR. HARRIMAN: Somebody else told me that [name, something like Forbe] was taking

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    "ocrText": "5/16/54 - Reel 7, Track 2, page 13\nassure him that our one purpose in Indochina is to create a situation\nfrom which you can negotiate something with the Communists, he would\nbe prepared to see U.S. forces in there, he is prepared to see action\nfor six months, a year, for two years, provided he was clear upon the\nobjective thereof. Now you put together these various elements\nMR. ACHESON.\nDo you throw this constitutional point in too?\nMR. NITZE:\nYou throw the constitutional point in as the second thing that you do\nafter you eliminate the leaders of the Communist party. Then you\nsatisfy him that he has really accomplished something with r espect to\nhis people and that you're not building with German contribution as\nfast as we said we were doing--ve relieve. the pressure of the German\ncontribution. And you put first the building of internal strength in\nFrance, without which I don't think the EDC in any case would be effec-\n.\ntive; and I don't believe the German contribution would really do you\nUs\nany\nmuch good as long as you've got a 25 percent group in France following\nthe Communist position.\nMR. HARRIMAN:\nI thought he was dead opposed to the EDC and in order to make a deal\nabout Germany with Russia.\nMR. NITZE:\nI doubt it very much.\nMR. ACHESON:\nI have been told that this is not his view. I had b een wopried about it\nbut somebody said to me the other day, the very thing that Paul has\nsaid, that he seemed to me the best bet there was for it.\nMR. JESSUP:\nIs it conceivable that that could be done quietly? If any of it came\nout it would be the surest way to defeat itself foreign fellows trying\nto run France. Your man would be ruined if any of this g ot out.\nMR. ACHESON:\nWell, it might not be if he laid it down as to program, if this was the\nMendes-France program.\nMR. HARRIMAN:\nSomebody else told me that [name, something like Forbe] was taking"
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