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5/16/54 - Reel 7 - Track 2 - page in
close to the present sceneof the success. You read in the papers that
the whole Delta is likely to fall because of mass movement of the
people.
MC Ghees
not attempting to hold so close, but pull back a little where you
have a better chance. The people now
be
seeing the Communists/so successful probably concluded that they're
going to tale Indochina and are not likely to be willing to stay
with you in your attompt
MR. HARRIMAN:
You're talling about psychological things which aren't so far renoved
from them. I think you've got to get something on foot which indi-
cates that there's a vinning side here and a bold attempt to hold an
area which *s gives us time to build up a situation back of it. Dut
11 we should just let Indochina go it would be very very hard to rC-
capture any sense of victory on the other side, it seems to me.
the
MT.
Suppose you made your effort there and then a mass revolt of/people
NATIONAL
ARCHIVESA
for example, overwhelmed you-wouldn't it make it more difficult for
RECORDS
ADMING
us
you to male your stand elsewhere then, because there again the
psychology
MR. HARRIMAN:
making some assumptions which I think are fairly sweeping assumo-
tions. I think you'll get a good deal more support--that's
assuming that you get the French to go in with a complete offer of
freedom-you¹v certainly got a certain number of the Vietnamese on
your ide. It may be a minority but you've got a certain number of
begin to
then. And of course you've imediately got to/strenghten agación your
Saigon situation, your Thailand-Burm situation. It will take a lot
of money, a lot of effort, and it will take a considerable length of
time. I'n assuming that you could capitalize on an agreement with the
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"ocrText": "5/16/54 - Reel 7 - Track 2 - page in\nclose to the present sceneof the success. You read in the papers that\nthe whole Delta is likely to fall because of mass movement of the\npeople.\nMC Ghees\nnot attempting to hold so close, but pull back a little where you\nhave a better chance. The people now\nbe\nseeing the Communists/so successful probably concluded that they're\ngoing to tale Indochina and are not likely to be willing to stay\nwith you in your attompt\nMR. HARRIMAN:\nYou're talling about psychological things which aren't so far renoved\nfrom them. I think you've got to get something on foot which indi-\ncates that there's a vinning side here and a bold attempt to hold an\narea which *s gives us time to build up a situation back of it. Dut\n11 we should just let Indochina go it would be very very hard to rC-\ncapture any sense of victory on the other side, it seems to me.\nthe\nMT.\nSuppose you made your effort there and then a mass revolt of/people\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVESA\nfor example, overwhelmed you-wouldn't it make it more difficult for\nRECORDS\nADMING\nus\nyou to male your stand elsewhere then, because there again the\npsychology\nMR. HARRIMAN:\nmaking some assumptions which I think are fairly sweeping assumo-\ntions. I think you'll get a good deal more support--that's\nassuming that you get the French to go in with a complete offer of\nfreedom-you¹v certainly got a certain number of the Vietnamese on\nyour ide. It may be a minority but you've got a certain number of\nbegin to\nthen. And of course you've imediately got to/strenghten agación your\nSaigon situation, your Thailand-Burm situation. It will take a lot\nof money, a lot of effort, and it will take a considerable length of\ntime. I'n assuming that you could capitalize on an agreement with the"
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