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5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 1, Pag- 3 this twenty-five percent of the purchase price was going to be paid. There we had a lot of difficulty with the British as to whether-whow you expressed what they regarded as future profits. If you said "future you profits, " it was all off with Mossadegh; talked about "the loss of the enterprise, # that had certain difficulties. Well, we worked it out various language back and forth. In the course of all these arrangements, we had, as you can see, very grave trouble with each one of these things. And the first one, that Herbert spoke of, was how you got the United States THUMAND government to buy a hundred million tons--to agree to buy it-worked out ARCHIVES & "VATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN RAR by the Department through/Bustr tith the Department of Justice interpreting COVERANCY all the various war, Korean war, statutes--finally we got an opinion from the Attorney General that this was all right, and we got an order of the President directing somebody to do it. And then MR. NITZE (?) this took somebody a weekend to work out MR. ACHESON: It was done; and here was a Presidential directive, and that was fixed. The negotiation with the oil companies was perhaps the longest and most difficult of any, because they started off with the most uncooperative attitude in mind--in the first place, they wouldn't even meet with us because they were going to be indicted for violating the Sherman law, and we had to get a letter from the Attorney General exempting them from the Sherman law before they'd even come to the State Department to talk with us. Then they claimed that the letter only covered the first meeting, and everytime they came down there they had to have another letter. That was a very troublesome thing, but we finally got that straightened out. Then of course they were not too cooperative with the Democratic administration which had done this damage to them. And a lot of them-some of them took the attitude that what we were trying to do was to rescure Mossadegh from the consequences of his folly, and the best thing to do was to let him go down with a crash, even if Iran disappeared from the Western world. We pointed out that 0001659

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    "ocrText": "5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 1, Pag- 3\nthis twenty-five percent of the purchase price was going to be paid.\nThere we had a lot of difficulty with the British as to whether-whow you\nexpressed what they regarded as future profits. If you said \"future\nyou\nprofits, \" it was all off with Mossadegh; talked about \"the loss\nof the enterprise, # that had certain difficulties. Well, we worked it\nout various language back and forth. In the course of all these arrangements,\nwe had, as you can see, very grave trouble with each one of these things.\nAnd the first one, that Herbert spoke of, was how you got the United States\nTHUMAND\ngovernment to buy a hundred million tons--to agree to buy it-worked out\nARCHIVES & \"VATIONAL RECORDS ADMIN RAR\nby the Department through/Bustr tith the Department of Justice interpreting\nCOVERANCY\nall the various war, Korean war, statutes--finally we got an opinion from\nthe Attorney General that this was all right, and we got an order of the\nPresident directing somebody to do it. And then\nMR. NITZE (?)\nthis took somebody a weekend to work out\nMR. ACHESON:\nIt was done; and here was a Presidential directive, and that was fixed.\nThe negotiation with the oil companies was perhaps the longest and most\ndifficult of any, because they started off with the most uncooperative\nattitude in mind--in the first place, they wouldn't even meet with us because\nthey were going to be indicted for violating the Sherman law, and we had to\nget a letter from the Attorney General exempting them from the Sherman law\nbefore they'd even come to the State Department to talk with us. Then they\nclaimed that the letter only covered the first meeting, and everytime they\ncame down there they had to have another letter. That was a very troublesome\nthing, but we finally got that straightened out. Then of course they were\nnot too cooperative with the Democratic administration which had done this\ndamage to them. And a lot of them-some of them took the attitude that\nwhat we were trying to do was to rescure Mossadegh from the consequences of\nhis folly, and the best thing to do was to let him go down with a crash,\neven if Iran disappeared from the Western world. We pointed out that\n0001659"
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