Ask the Scholar
Page 6 of 14
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 1, Page 6
I really don't think it would be good for the United States if it does
work.' So this was kind of tough sledding, to try to
MR. HARRIMAN:
What was he going to do-let Iran go down the drain?
MR. NITZE:
No, he was going to make a favorable gesture to the Arabs as against the
Israelis.
MR. HARRIMAN:
Didn't he know the Iranians were not Arabs?
MR. NITZE:
He wouldn' 't believe it; we tried to plug this out, but he wouldn't believe
it.
(confused)
MR. ACHESON:
Let's get these things straight on the record here; what, what?
MR. McGHEE (?) :
I was just pointing out that they are not only not Arabs; they are the
rival Modem sect.
MR. FEIS: *
How often truly, genuinely did you think Mossadegh thought about this prob-
(*record not too clear
on Mr. Feis' ques-
lem of Soviet Russia and Communism and all that? Or do you think we 've
tions here)
vovered that ground this afternoon?
MR. ACHESON:
No, we haven' covered that at all; what would you say to that, Paul?
MR. NITZE:
We argued this thing at length with him at the Shoreham Hotel one night,
TRUMAN
and his view on this was that the major mistake XX that the United States had
A RT
recognized
made was the error in China, that we had that a true revolution
and
was going on in China, that we backed Chiang, who was the representative of
the reactionary movement in China, that this is contrary to all the
historical and social pressures, it was bound to be a failure and had failed
in China. We were making the same mistake in Iran that we had made in China,
fioux that we were backing-that we were failing to recognize the fact of
revolution in Iran and any attempt to back the wrong horse, *k to back the
was bound to
reactionary lead us into a disaster in Iran. This
factor of whether you were playing with the forces of progress or whether
you were playing with the fax reactionary, unhistorical forces was much
more important than questions of military aid or alliances or pseudo-
0001662
Page data
- Page
- 6
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- b8cc039a75b85a0a
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 75852255
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "75852255",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75852255",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 4, Track 1",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75852255",
"collections": [
"Dean Acheson Papers",
"Princeton Seminars Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722170-07-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722170-07-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722170-07-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 14,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "75852255",
"label": "Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 4, Track 1",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75852255"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "75852255",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75852255",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Transcript of Princeton Seminar Discussion, Reel 4, Track 1",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75852255",
"collections": [
"Dean Acheson Papers",
"Princeton Seminars Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722170-07-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722170-07-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722170-07-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 14,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75852255",
"naId": 75852255,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 15,
"logicalDate": "1954-05-15",
"month": 5,
"year": 1954
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 6,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/653115/1722170-07-06.jpg",
"mediaId": "b8cc039a75b85a0a",
"ocrText": "5/15/54: Reel 4, Track 1, Page 6\nI really don't think it would be good for the United States if it does\nwork.' So this was kind of tough sledding, to try to\nMR. HARRIMAN:\nWhat was he going to do-let Iran go down the drain?\nMR. NITZE:\nNo, he was going to make a favorable gesture to the Arabs as against the\nIsraelis.\nMR. HARRIMAN:\nDidn't he know the Iranians were not Arabs?\nMR. NITZE:\nHe wouldn' 't believe it; we tried to plug this out, but he wouldn't believe\nit.\n(confused)\nMR. ACHESON:\nLet's get these things straight on the record here; what, what?\nMR. McGHEE (?) :\nI was just pointing out that they are not only not Arabs; they are the\nrival Modem sect.\nMR. FEIS: *\nHow often truly, genuinely did you think Mossadegh thought about this prob-\n(*record not too clear\non Mr. Feis' ques-\nlem of Soviet Russia and Communism and all that? Or do you think we 've\ntions here)\nvovered that ground this afternoon?\nMR. ACHESON:\nNo, we haven' covered that at all; what would you say to that, Paul?\nMR. NITZE:\nWe argued this thing at length with him at the Shoreham Hotel one night,\nTRUMAN\nand his view on this was that the major mistake XX that the United States had\nA RT\nrecognized\nmade was the error in China, that we had that a true revolution\nand\nwas going on in China, that we backed Chiang, who was the representative of\nthe reactionary movement in China, that this is contrary to all the\nhistorical and social pressures, it was bound to be a failure and had failed\nin China. We were making the same mistake in Iran that we had made in China,\nfioux that we were backing-that we were failing to recognize the fact of\nrevolution in Iran and any attempt to back the wrong horse, *k to back the\nwas bound to\nreactionary lead us into a disaster in Iran. This\nfactor of whether you were playing with the forces of progress or whether\nyou were playing with the fax reactionary, unhistorical forces was much\nmore important than questions of military aid or alliances or pseudo-\n0001662"
}