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5/15/54 - Reel 5, track 1, , Page 10 him to move French forces from France, from Madagascar, and other places to Indo-China. The British ere saying that they had no ships they could give him for that purpose; they could promise him nothing. And the President was beginning to avoid discussion of the subject. Now I think that was in part because he was getting more alert to the extent of Soviet wish and desire; and part, more troubled by the difficulties solving or creating a UN organization, and the rest of his European problems, so he was letting it in the background. Now that is about as far as I can go in opening the general trend up to the time of Roosevelt's death. I suspect that the next important chapter which in would certainly be X part in the military files anx the discussion of the available shipping and available forces. I think probably Averill, from his personal memory can go on from there. MR. HARRIMAN I was just on the fringes of deGaulle. I think Roosevelt intended, really had in mind, trusteeship, and I think Herbert is right about DeGaulle having increasing trouble with DeGaulle, but my feeling is -- it may be TOUMAN when entirely wrong, this isn't an historic study -- but President Roosevelt us NATIONAL died our military wanted to take in a minimum of obligations everywhere. and And the question of the French wanting to get into Indo-China and accept surrender there, and the Chinese where Chang's neak stood, which seemed very sensible. And I think the impression was that no one else had been consulted in the department or any policy had been decided upon, and I think the military had a lot to desire to become involved in more commit- ments just led us to agree the French back DeGaulle want to get in and just seated. All the previous talks were just forgotten about, because I remember just talking about it--what we were going to do about Indo-China 0001695

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    "ocrText": "5/15/54 - Reel 5, track 1, , Page 10\nhim to move French forces from France, from Madagascar, and other\nplaces to Indo-China. The British ere saying that they had no\nships they could give him for that purpose; they could promise him\nnothing. And the President was beginning to avoid discussion of the\nsubject. Now I think that was in part because he was getting more alert\nto the extent of Soviet wish and desire; and part, more troubled by the\ndifficulties solving or creating a UN organization, and the rest of his\nEuropean problems, so he was letting it in the background. Now that is\nabout as far as I can go in opening the general trend up to the time\nof Roosevelt's death. I suspect that the next important chapter which\nin\nwould certainly be X part in the military files anx the discussion of\nthe available shipping and available forces. I think probably Averill,\nfrom his personal memory can go on from there.\nMR. HARRIMAN\nI was just on the fringes of deGaulle. I think Roosevelt intended, really\nhad in mind, trusteeship, and I think Herbert is right about DeGaulle\nhaving increasing trouble with DeGaulle, but my feeling is -- it may be\nTOUMAN\nwhen\nentirely wrong, this isn't an historic study -- but President Roosevelt\nus NATIONAL\ndied our military wanted to take in a minimum of obligations everywhere.\nand\nAnd the question of the French wanting to get into Indo-China and accept\nsurrender there, and the Chinese where Chang's neak stood, which seemed\nvery sensible. And I think the impression was that no one else had been\nconsulted in the department or any policy had been decided upon, and I\nthink the military had a lot to desire to become involved in more commit-\nments just led us to agree the French back DeGaulle want to get in and\njust seated. All the previous talks were just forgotten about, because I\nremember just talking about it--what we were going to do about Indo-China\n0001695"
}