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In this memorandum, Jones discusses his role in preparing Secretary of State George C. Marshall's speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947, in which the Secretary proposed the program of U.S. aid for the economic reconstruction of Europe that came to be known as the Marshall Plan. Jones describes the background of the proposal, emphasizing the importance of the theme of European unity in Marshall's address.
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201120
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Memorandum for the File by Joseph M. Jones
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id
201120
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document
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Memorandum for the File by Joseph M. Jones
description
In this memorandum, Jones discusses his role in preparing Secretary of State George C. Marshall's speech at Harvard on June 5, 1947, in which the Secretary proposed the program of U.S. aid for the economic reconstruction of Europe that came to be known as the Marshall Plan. Jones describes the background of the proposal, emphasizing the importance of the theme of European unity in Marshall's address.
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Joseph M. Jones Papers
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Memorandums
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201120
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2
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1947-07-02
month
7
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1947
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1
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photo
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b8398668b6e840b8
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7/2/47
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
RE: The Secretary's Harvard Speech of June 5, 1947.
The reaction to Mr. Acheson's May to speech had been exceedingly
favorable and had been successful in bring the discussion back to the
basis of economic aid, where it rightly belonged. In Europe, however,
opinion in regard to the Truman Doctrine continued to be highly
critical and was quite responsive to the Soviet propaganda line that
the United States had embarked upon a course of violent anti-Communism
and imperialism. To my mind what was needed was a new speech by the
Secretary of State directed primarily to the foreign audience and
containing a highly attračtive emotional and psychological appeal.
What was necessary was an idea.
In some of the draft memoranda prepared by Cleveland a few days
earlier (the middle of May) I had been impressed with his arguments
for European unity. It occurred to me that this was the most
popular single concept that the United States could present to Europe,
namely, that Europe should unite, Europe should work together on a
program of reconstruction. It seemed to me that this would hit the
right psychological tone because Europe was afraid of Europe both that the USSR
and the United States and that
we
could
convince
our
help was truly altruistic.
When, therefore, I was asked about May 15 to write an address for
The
the Secretary to give at the University of Wisconsin on May 25, I
began writing along this line. Before I had finished I was informed
said he
want who
that the Secretary was not going to Wisconsin. Nevertheless since I knew
that the Secretary was going to give a number of speeches in June, I
whit
the
to line
thought it would be a good idea to finish this one and have it ready.
I therefore completed it and on May 20 I sent it not only to a number
of office directors for criticism, but sent it to Mr. Acheson.
on may 9
HARTS TRUMAN NARA
A day or two later Mr. Acheson told me that he had taken my
draft personally to the Secretary and had urged him to give it. I
also learned that Mr. Acheson had discussed my draft and had praised
it at his May 21 Staff Meeting.
Here ends the trail of my own knowledge. I heard nothing more
about my draft.
Along around the 25th of May, however, I did hear that George
Kennan was preparing a paper containing ideas somewhat similar to my
draft. It appears that Kennan's paper went to the Secretary about a
week after mine did. Just what effect Kennan's paper had on the
Secretary's speech and what effect mine had, I do not know. Joe
Johnson told me that he was sure that the Secretary did not get the idea
of European unity from Kennan.
It would seem that the Secretary drafted his June 5 speech himself
and that Bohlen worked it over and inserted considerable material. I
have been extremely curious about this matter but has been impossible
to trace it beyond this point.
July
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