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constitution) and that they seek purely to free democratic elements
of South Korea from oppression of reactionaries, pro-Japanese, and
American puppets, and from the American Imperialists themselves.
Such claims are conventional with Communists and would be quite
in keeping with theme of recent broadcasts. The Communists can
gamble that American public will not countenance US personnel
being killed in what many Americans will consider to be a matter
of little if any concern to US, and that occupation forces must
be content to protect American lives and installations. If they
feel that American public opinion will countenance the occupation
forces opposing the invasion, the Communist leaders can be counted
on to be indifferent to any loss of North Korean lives. It is
safe to assume that the Communists realize and fear that a
government in South Korea will not only bring many more North
Koreans to the South, but will inspire North Korean opposition to
a Communist rule. By striking before a South Korean Government
is formed, the Communists will efficiently eliminate any hope of
escape from their power. It is certain that the Communists will
not fear adverse opinion of world.
The best reason why an invasion in April should not be con-
sidered advisable by the Communists is that after the South Korean
Government is formed, the Communists can force it to capitulate
by cutting off the electric power.
End
CM IN 1448
(8 Mar 48)
SECRET
- 174 -
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nconstitution) and that they seek purely to free democratic elements\nof South Korea from oppression of reactionaries, pro-Japanese, and\nAmerican puppets, and from the American Imperialists themselves.\nSuch claims are conventional with Communists and would be quite\nin keeping with theme of recent broadcasts. The Communists can\ngamble that American public will not countenance US personnel\nbeing killed in what many Americans will consider to be a matter\nof little if any concern to US, and that occupation forces must\nbe content to protect American lives and installations. If they\nfeel that American public opinion will countenance the occupation\nforces opposing the invasion, the Communist leaders can be counted\non to be indifferent to any loss of North Korean lives. It is\nsafe to assume that the Communists realize and fear that a\ngovernment in South Korea will not only bring many more North\nKoreans to the South, but will inspire North Korean opposition to\na Communist rule. By striking before a South Korean Government\nis formed, the Communists will efficiently eliminate any hope of\nescape from their power. It is certain that the Communists will\nnot fear adverse opinion of world.\nThe best reason why an invasion in April should not be con-\nsidered advisable by the Communists is that after the South Korean\nGovernment is formed, the Communists can force it to capitulate\nby cutting off the electric power.\nEnd\nCM IN 1448\n(8 Mar 48)\nSECRET\n- 174 -"
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