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SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET
C. If no election is held and the Presidency becomes vacant:
Again in this case it will be necessary to assume
control and I will require the advice and guidance outlined
in para 2 above.
Part 3. The following action could develop the immediate
future and would influence most adversely the mil situtation:
President Rhee remains adamant in his refusal to lift martial law
and, in an attempt to employ the ROK Army and the National Police
for his own political purposes, takes action to abrogate the
the agreement which places the ROK Army under the UNC. It is
absolutely essential to preclude such action. I plan to have
General Lee, Chief of Staff ROKA, assured that under such circum-
stances he will receive complete UNC support in continuing the
ROKA on its present mission of repelling Communist aggression.
In case of defection of individual ROKA units, the 8th Army
will be directed to withdraw logistic support from those units
and block their movement. 8th Army will be further directed
to deny transportation for movement of National Police units to
affected areas if such units are operating under Rhee's direction.
Part 4. In the case of any of the developments outlined
in part 2, para 1B, 3A (2) and 3C and part 3 above, the 8th
Army will require immediate and strong reinforcement, both in
combat troops and military government specialists. The only
immediate combat reinforcements are those in the Far East Command.
Adequate mil govt reinforcements are not immediately available
to the UNC. The current restrictions imposed on movement of troops
from Japan do not permit the dispatch of any sizeable force to
Korea. Even if such restrictions were lifted, I do not consider
that I can reduce the forces presently in Japan beyond 1 RCT
without seriously jeopardizing my ability to carry out my primary
mission, the defense of Japan.
DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT- 77-75
DA IN 145238
(31 May 52)
By HC NLT DB
MAY 30 1978
Date
TOP SECRET
- 1020 -
TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
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"ocrText": "TOP\nSECRET SECURITY INFORMATION\nSECRET\nC. If no election is held and the Presidency becomes vacant:\nAgain in this case it will be necessary to assume\ncontrol and I will require the advice and guidance outlined\nin para 2 above.\nPart 3. The following action could develop the immediate\nfuture and would influence most adversely the mil situtation:\nPresident Rhee remains adamant in his refusal to lift martial law\nand, in an attempt to employ the ROK Army and the National Police\nfor his own political purposes, takes action to abrogate the\nthe agreement which places the ROK Army under the UNC. It is\nabsolutely essential to preclude such action. I plan to have\nGeneral Lee, Chief of Staff ROKA, assured that under such circum-\nstances he will receive complete UNC support in continuing the\nROKA on its present mission of repelling Communist aggression.\nIn case of defection of individual ROKA units, the 8th Army\nwill be directed to withdraw logistic support from those units\nand block their movement. 8th Army will be further directed\nto deny transportation for movement of National Police units to\naffected areas if such units are operating under Rhee's direction.\nPart 4. In the case of any of the developments outlined\nin part 2, para 1B, 3A (2) and 3C and part 3 above, the 8th\nArmy will require immediate and strong reinforcement, both in\ncombat troops and military government specialists. The only\nimmediate combat reinforcements are those in the Far East Command.\nAdequate mil govt reinforcements are not immediately available\nto the UNC. The current restrictions imposed on movement of troops\nfrom Japan do not permit the dispatch of any sizeable force to\nKorea. Even if such restrictions were lifted, I do not consider\nthat I can reduce the forces presently in Japan beyond 1 RCT\nwithout seriously jeopardizing my ability to carry out my primary\nmission, the defense of Japan.\nDECLASSIFIED\nAuthority NLT- 77-75\nDA IN 145238\n(31 May 52)\nBy HC NLT DB\nMAY 30 1978\nDate\nTOP SECRET\n- 1020 -\nTOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION"
}