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INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State 24 RE TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION 5-1 Action Control: 5567 UNA Rec'd: FROM: New York November 15, 1952 Info 2:06 a.m. SS TO: Secretary of State G EUR NO: DELGA 196, November 15, 12:34 a.m. 9 (PART 1 of 2) NEA ARA FE PRIORITY L Re Korea Secretary discussed with Eden and Pearson situation arising from Menon's attempt to draft a resolution on Korea. Secreter tary said situation had now become very serious. There were three points in particular re Menon's latest draft which it was simply impossible for us to accept: (1) The affirmation that force should not be used against PWs to prevent or effect their return to their homelands was not included in the proposals which the President of the GA was re- quested to transmit to the other side as a basis for armistice agreement. After some discussion Pearson and Eden agreed that this was correct and that this feature should be changed. (2) The resolution as now drafted provided that after 90 days PWs not repatriated should be turned over to some other body (Political Conference), a fact which made a mockery of the principle of no forced return. The Secretary pointed out result might be that we would have these people in captivity indefinitely and that this continuing situation might induce PWs to forciby resist transfer to Repatriation Commission or might produce a future crisis. He did not see what the political conference could do to solve the remaining elements of the PW question unless indeed the British, French and others should unexpectedly unite with the opposition to effect a solution against our own desires. Secretary informed Eden and Pearson that in examining all possible types of solution for the PW question we had con- sidered this particular one in Washington, that it had been turned down by unanimous decision of the JCS, and that the President had agreed with this decision. (3) The resolution was still badly draited: Impression was now given that numbered "proposals would be written bodily into the armistice. Precise terms to be included in armistice must be discussed and worked out by General Clark and negotiators; it was his responsibility. Eden said he appreciated this, though Pearson at first attempted to argue that such matters should not be left to generals. 130 Secretary -194 REPRODUCTION FROM THIS TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED 16-67338-1