Telegram from Ambassador Warren Austin to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State 154 TELEGRAPH BRANCH 26 CHOREST Action Control: 13472 UNA FROM: New York Rec'd: December 30, 1950 6:55 p.m. Info SS TO: Secretary of State G L NO: DELGA 470 December 30, 4.44 p.m. EUR NEA Re Korea. ARA FE Ambassador Muniz (Erazil) called on me this morning at DCR his request and said that he was anxious to know where we stood. I indicated that the first item of our agenda was the 6 power resolution and we thought that the best course of action open to U.S was to proceed in normal course with that resolution perhaps with some modifications. I said T understood that the Asiana were still interested in their 12 power proposal. Speaking for the United States mission, I said I felt that the passage of this resolution would lower the prestige of the UN and that I thought that it was clear that the efforts of the UN to obtain a cease fire had been rejected and had been rejected in insulting terms. The UN had received two slaps in the face from the Chinese. Was it appropriate now to repeat the same process and receive a third slap in the face? I said that I did not believe that anything useful could come of such an effort and indicated that it was not clear to U.S that the Asian states had made up their minds to press this step. There were indications that they might not do so unless they received a favorable response from the other delegations. I said that I rather hoped that they would not put this proposal forward at all. I indicated that we were extremely conscious of the importance of maintaining the unity of the free world in the present situation. It was of great importance to us to have all the free world, including the Asian states and the Arabs stand together. We hoped that in the present circumstances it would be possible to take a first and relatively mild step forward basing our action upon the fundamentals of the 6 power resolution. This had received very wide support heretofore. It was not provocative. It did not close any doors, nor do we intend to close any doors to negotiation. On the other hand, it would be a first action which would begin to uphold the prestige of the UN. We were quite pre- parea to consider amendments to this resolution which would increase its support among the members. I mentioned that some delegations were concerned that the resolution would authorize the Unified Command and MacArthur to bomb China. This was a misconception. If necessary, we were quite prepared to modify the two paragraphs which gave concern in this respect. We were (over) REPRODUCTION OF THIS 124 MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED