Memorandum of Conversation

127 CONFIDENT IAL DECLASSIFIED US/S/1581 3-402 E.O. 12065, Sec. 1987208 November 21, 1950 PAGE State Dept. 1950 UNITED STATES MISSION F.A. NLT, TO THE INNITED NATIONS By HC MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION November 21, 1950 SUBJECT: Security Gouncil - Korea PARTICIPAITS: Mr. Dayal, Indian Delegation Mr. Charles P. Noyes, United States Delegation Mr. Dayal gave me the attached draft resolution and requested US comments. His thought was that the Security Council might set up a subcommittee consisting of the six non-permanent members during the course of this week before the Chinese Communists arrive. This subcommittee could then continue its work while the Security Council was in the process of holding a series of meetings on the Formosa question. He thought this would have the advantage of finding a way to obtain the Chinese Communists views and intentions with respect to the Manchurian border and their intervention in Korea. They had refused to appear before the Security Council, He thought they would probably be willing to state their position to this subcommittee in private session, The subcommittee would also have the advantage of avoiding the difficulty of Dr. Tsiang being President of the Council during December. Dayal indicated that, of course, the subcommittee members would remain in close touch with the US Delegation as well as the delegations of the other permanent members. He doubted that they would make proposals which were undesirable from our point of view. I reacted somewhat sympathetically to the Indian proposal with clear under- standing that this was entirely a personal point of view. I broached with him the idea of following the precédent in the Berlin Case rather than having a formal resolution setting up a subcommittee. He thought this was worth considering but was inclined to feel that too much informality in the formation of a subcommittee might result in the Chinese Communists being unwilling to meet with it. He thought the Committee's recommendations would then have less weight. I pointed out that there was no indication that if this subcommittee were set up the Communists would attend its meetings and if they refused this would make the Council look a little silly. If the matter was handled as in the Berlin Case it would be possible to make sure that the Chinese Communists would meet with the Committee before going ahead with the plan. I also pressed the point of view that a formal resolution of the Council might be vetoed by the Russians or that they might try to do so. I suggested that the Russians might not like the idea of the Chinese meeting privately with the six non-permanent members. I also suggested that the Chinese might have some difficulty with the formal subcommittee and that such a proposal might invelve a full fledged debate. I asked him what he would do with the present draft resolution. He had not thought of that but thought that it might be sent to the subcommittee or simply left in abeyance. I expressed feeling that even if the US would go along with their basic idea... we would probably have some difficulty with subparagraph A. Subparagraph A might well leave the impressic that the subcommitted could re-examine the whole question of the nature of a peace settlement in Korea. I thought the Security Council should not take any step which would reopen any of the policy issues settled either in the Security Council or the General Assembly. Dayal was sympathetic to all of these comments and left me with the impression that the Indian Delegation would be willing LO make any necessary modifications in their plan or in the text to meet these various points. I told Dayal I would consult the Delegation and we would let them know the US position on their draft shortly. Attachment 14624