Telegram from Ambassador Warren Austin to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

118 COMING TELEGRAN Department of State TELEGRAPH BRANCH -M-X ITDENTIAT Control: 12104 UNA Rec'd: January 26, 1951 New York 12:28 p.m. TO: Secretary of State SS G 1065, January 26, 11:27 a.m. P. L State EUR PRIORITY BY LLC NEA FE Korea - Arab-Israeli views. DCR In Stabler's talks yesterday with certain Arab delegations and Israelis, following emerged: Eban (Israel) said he had received instructions to keep in close touch with British on present situation. planned to speak January 26 in support US resolution although he would have reservations re further collective measures. might also offer certain suggestions but not in form of formal amendments. His main concern was that US resolution did not adequately emphasize objective of peaceful settlement. thought US resolution should first stress need for further explorations of possibilities peaceful settlement and then state that failing these attempts, further collective measures should be considered. promised inform us when and if he decided offer amendments. In any event he would not raise parliamentary questions on January 26. Re Arab-Asian resolution, Eban said his delegation would probably abstain, although it might vote against. felt that this resolution ignored five principles and his delegation would find un- acceptable any resolution which did not make mandatory a cease-fire prior to any discussions regarding conference with C PG . Eban felt Arab-Asian group should have linked their resolution in some way to Paragraph 9 of US resolution. In this connection he expressed tentative view that paragraph 9 our resolution should be expanded both as to substance group mentioned therein. We told Eban that US would work and vote against Arab-Asian resolution. Jamali (Iraq) said he had received no new instructions from Baghdad. However, he emphasized that his present instructions required him to give every support to measures aimed at peaceful settlement and that therefore, he would of course, strongly support Arab-Asian. He hoped that we would agree to giving precedence to vote on Arab-Asian resolution for to insist on precedence for US resolution would make it impossible for him to vote for that resolution. Under present instructions he could vote in all good conscience for US resolution if Arab-Asian resolution failed. stressed tremendous importance of 114 CONFIDENTIAL REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED