Telegram to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

98 INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State BE 127 TELEGRAPH BRANCH FOR SECRET 26 B-X Action Control: 8438 UNA Rec'd: March 16, 1951 FROM: New York 8:45 p.m. Info SS TO: Secretary of State G NO: 1293, March 16, 7:02 p.m. L EUR E.O. 12065, NEA PRIORITY. State Dept. Guideline 1979 ARA FE Re peaceful settlement Korean affair. DCR Following are reports conversations concerning peaceful settlement Korean affair which Ross and I had with Grafstrom, Padilla Nervo and Trygve Lie yesterday on their initiative. We met jointly with Grafstrom and Padilla Nervo. At their request and pursuant to questions raised by them in con- versation on March 6 (USUN 1236) I outlined what I described as "general" reactions of Dept as set forth in DEPTEL 776, Mar 12. Padilla and Grafstrom expressed general agreement; latter in particular expressed view no other attitude could be taken pending development such factors as military situ- ation in Korea and FONMIN deputies talks in Paris. Padilla then raised question Trygve Lie idea of approach to North Koreans as reported my letter Mar 10 to Hickerson. At some length Padilla indicated idea intrigued him. Said much same idea had grown out of consultations he had had with number LA's dating back to period before passage Feb 1 resolution. He said there had been considerable feeling that dealing directly with North Koreans would sidestep necessity political concessions to Chinese Communists. I indicated tentative views expressed by Hickerson in his letter to me of March 13 without referring to Hickerson by name, and emphasizing that these views were not necessarily definitive views of Dept. I elaborated following points: (A) We did not think approach to Gromyko at Paris was likely to be fruitful. (B) We did not think idea of driving wedge between Chinese Communist$ and Russians seemed very realistic. (c) Approach to North Koreans might get UN drawn into series of commitments while Chinese Communists would be left free of commitment. Result of this process might be very seriously disadvantageous from both political and military viewpoints. (D) In response TAB SECRET REPRODUCTION OF THIS -14 MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED