Document
Memorandum from Ambassador Warren Austin to John Hickerson and Dean Rusk with Attachment
Images (9)
- Parte de Korean War Files (Truman Administration), Department of State Files
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 9UNP-CAM
rec
One
UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
any
so
70
level
MEMORANDUM
4/25/57
TO:
UNA - Mr. John D. Hickerson
OFFICE
OF
UNITED
NATIONS
FE
-
Mr. Dean Rusk
alos
POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS
Ambassador Warren R. Austin
eyes
1951
FROM:
SUBJECT: Next Steps in Korea.
I. The mood of the country is angry. The testimony by
Secretary Marshall and General Bradley has calmed the. storm for a while,
and responsible commentary in the press and on the radio is pointing out
no
the fallacies in General MacArthur's recommendations. Nevertheless, the
demand continues for a statement of how peace is to be achieved.
II. Already, under the pressure generated by General MacArthur, the
Administration has "toughened" its policy: the United Nations strategic
embargo, the increased aid to Formosa, the diplomatic pressure on our
friends, and Secretary Marshall's flat statement that we would never agree
to let Formosa fall into Chinese Communist hands or let the Chinese
Communists fall into the United Nations seat. If there is no settlement
in Korea, the public pressures to get peace or hit harder will increase.
The Administration may then be forced to move further; we might even
wind
up by doing most of what General MacArthur recommends, with all the
disastrous results foreseen by those who now oppose-his recommendations.
III. Even now, the result of the great debate is a diplomatic stale-
mate. Secretary Marshall's testimony on Formosa and the United Nations
seat leaves us without a bargaining position. The Chinese Communists might
have accepted the January cease-fire proposal when they came to decide that
they could not drive us out of Korea, with the hope of getting Formosa and
the United Nations seat in return for a Korean settlement on United Nations
terms. We have now said that we may be forced into discussion but will
never surrender. The Communists are confident that so long as we take this
position a majority of the United Nations will uphold it. There is
consequently no political or diplomatic advantage to them in a cease-fire.
IV. An early Korean settlement is therefore both imperative, if we
are to avoid the possibility of a larger Asian involvement with unforeseeable
consequences, and more difficult than ever to achieve.
Relations
belongs_to
belongs_to