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Document identity
localId
503331371
label
Telegram from Ambassador John Muccio to Secretary of State Dean Acheson
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
503331371
contentType
document
title
Telegram from Ambassador John Muccio to Secretary of State Dean Acheson
citationUrl
collections
Korean War Files (Truman Administration)
Department of State Files
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1
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naId
503331371
levelOfDescription
item
productionDates
day
30
logicalDate
1951-06-30
month
6
year
1951
recordType
description
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nara-archive
Single page context
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1
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0
type
photo
mediaId
1160fccb6bfc18e3
ocrText
144
INCOMING TELEGRAM
Department of State
RE
241
TELEGRAPH BRANCH
4-1-X
TOP SECRET
A
Action
Control: 17166
FE
Rec'd: June 30, 1951
FROM: Pusan
1:58 a.m.
Info
SS
TO:
Secretary of State
G
P
NO: 1103, June 30, 2 p.m.
EUR
UNA
PRIORITY
DCR
SENT DEPT 1103, RPTD INFO TOKYO 202
Immed upon receipt Dept's 1004 I phoned President Rhee that
I had draft msg wished to deliver at once. Upon arrival his
residence I found he had already summoned Prime Minister,
Foreign Minister and Defense Minister. He read General
Ridgway's communique aloud. For the next hour there was
great deal of talk, far fetched and irrelevant, mainly by
the President but also by the Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister. For instance, President Rhee said he wld call an
immediate Cabinet meeting and decide terms under which they
wld take part in the conversations. I took occasion to
3-34
caution against hasty decisions and particularly public pro-
nouncements and suggested advisability of talking matter over
with UNC URK. The Foreign Minister mentioned he had called
a press conference for 10 o'clock. The President instructed
him to call this off. The Prime Minister remarked we should
not (rpt not) talk to Commies until all had been driven from
Korea. I thereupon called attention to the adverse reaction
to the many statements against cease-fire by Korean officials
and expressed feeling better line wld be willingness to
explore armistice possibilities at the same time urging all
proper guarantees against further aggression.
MUCCIO
SMD:RJC
74
TOP SECRET
REPRODUCTION OF THIS
MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED